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‘Where there is no vision 
the people perish.’
Proverbs 29:18 
(King James Version)
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Figure 1.1: The IJsselmeer area encompasses the entire former Zuiderzee and has a surface of 
more than 2,000 square kilometres. It has the largest freshwater lake in the northwest of Europe. 
Today, the area has several lakes: the IJsselmeer (around 1,200 km2), the Markermeer-IJmeer 
(around 750 km2) and the corner lakes (Veluwe) (around 75 km2). The largest supply of water (70 
per cent) comes from the Rhine basin through the river IJssel. Also part of the area is the Prov-
ince of Flevoland, which consists of the polders of Eastern Flevoland, Southern Flevoland and the 
Noordoostpolder. The Wierringenmeerpolder and Afsluitdijk, which demarcate the IJsselmeer 
from the Wadden Sea, are also considered part of the IJsselmeer area. Another landmark is the 
Houtribdijk, which separates the IJsselmeer and Markermeer-IJmeer (Beleidsnota IJsselmeerge-
bied 2009–2015, 2009, p. 8).
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1.1 Introduction 
Cornelis Lely had a dream—change the Netherlands by closing off 
the Zuiderzee with a large dam and creating new land, rising out of 
its waters within. In 1891, he gave voice to his dream by drafting a 
plan; however, it would take over 27 years before the plan was ac-
cepted by the national government. Within his lifetime, he witnessed 
the beginning of this largest and most ambitious infrastructural en-
deavour ever initiated by the Dutch—the Zuiderzee Works—but did 
not live to see it finished. This water engineer clearly left his mark in 
Dutch history and is remembered as the visionary who accomplished 
what not many deemed possible at the time—transforming a whole 
sea into a freshwater lake with polders of new land within. This trig-
gers the following questions: how did Lely achieve this, and what can 
we learn from his story?
Lely was not the first to propose such a plan. In 1667, Hendrik Ste-
vin first developed plans to close the Zuiderzee, with the goal of pre-
venting the hinterland from ever flooding again. Although this was 
an ambitious plan, it was impossible to complete with the technol-
ogy available at that time. Moreover, the Zuiderzee was an important 
trading route on water for the Dutch, and closing it off would be dis-
astrous for the trading market. Two centuries later, around 1850, the 
issue returned to the agenda due to changing circumstances. First, 
the Zuiderzee had lost its international status as a trading route be-
cause of a newly created canal from the Zuiderzee to the North Sea. 
Second, the Dutch population was growing, and land was lost after 
Belgium revolted in 1830. Third, due to the industrial revolution, more 
powerful steam-run mills were produced and used to successfully 
drain some lakes in the Zuidplas. This gave new life to the develop-
ment of plans for turning water into land in the Zuiderzee, as a whole 
or in part. Numerous plans were created by engineers from private 
firms and by Rijkswaterstaat—the Directorate-General for the Public 
Works and Water Management Department of the then Dutch Min-
istry of Water Trade and Industry. However, most initiatives did not 
receive support from the national government because they were 
deemed too unrealistic, unnecessary and expensive, or were put on 
the political agenda at the wrong time due to issues such as Cabinet 
crises or other concerns. This changed when a lobby organisation, 
called the Zuiderzeevereniging, was founded in 1886. This group—
with representatives of provinces, local municipalities, water boards 
and private notables—had the goal to set an agenda to transform the 
Zuiderzee.
The group commissioned the relatively unknown water engineer, 
Lely, to take the lead in developing a plan. Lely and his associates 
conducted research on the alternatives and possibilities to trans-
form the Zuiderzee. He established a public campaign, wrote papers 
and gave lectures to raise awareness. In 1891, he finally presented 
his plan—known as ‘Plan Lely’. The plan impressed many and gen-
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erated some public support, but not enough for the plan to be ac-
cepted. However, in the same year, Lely became the Minister of the 
Dutch Ministry of Water Trade and Industry, and sought for his plan 
to be approved as an Act. He formed and chaired a state commission 
that had the task of judging his own plan. Unsurprisingly, in 1894, 
this commission developed a report advocating Plan Lely as a mat-
ter of national interest that should be implemented by the state. Un-
fortunately for Lely and his supporters, the Cabinet lost power and 
the Cabinet that replaced it had other priorities. In 1901, Lely again 
became Minister for the Dutch Ministry of Water Trade and Industry; 
however, due to his plan’s large costs, opposition to the plan was 
growing. In response, Lely changed the plan by proposing construc-
tion of smaller polders in order to meet the financial constraints. Plan 
Lely was close to being accepted; however, again, a Cabinet change 
prevented it from reaching a final decision. In 1913, Lely became min-
ister for the third time, but now on the condition that his plan would 
be supported. Despite objections from the Ministry of War—which 
viewed the Zuiderzee as a part of the national defence system—the 
plan received considerable political support.
Ultimately, fortunately for Lely, two events helped push his plan 
onto the agenda and receive approval (Bosch & Van der Ham, 1998; 
Peys & Koetzier, 1985; Van der Ham, 2007). First, in 1914, World War 
I diverted the attention of the national government to more urgent 
matters. However, because of the Netherlands’ neutrality in World 
War I, it was cut off from some important trading relationships with 
neighbouring countries. As a result, the Dutch faced food scarcity 
because the country was unable to self-sustain. Thus, Lely framed his 
plan as the solution to the problem of food scarcity because the new-
ly created polders would offer room for additional agricultural land. 
Second, the Dutch suffered from a flood of the Zuiderzee in 1916 that 
caused considerable damage deep into the country. In response, Lely 
emphasised that closing off the Zuiderzee would reduce the risk of 
future floods. Subsequently, the parliament accepted Lely’s plan and, 
on 13 June 1918, the original draft of the Zuiderzee Act was signed by 
the Dutch queen. After 27 years, the Dutch finally started working to 
realise Lely’s dream.
Lely’s story provides numerous lessons. It indicates that people can 
make a difference and make radical change occur. Lely had a dream 
that he translated into an ambitious, yet feasible, plan that offered 
solutions to pressing problems, and he mobilised the public, politics 
and policymakers to adopt his plan. His perseverance also proved 
crucial, with giving up being much easier than continuously trying 
to change the government’s agenda. However, this story also shows 
that change is not only reliant on individual design, but also influ-
enced by contextual factors that can act as both a constraint (such 
as the Cabinet changes or lack of financial resources) and an oppor-
17
tunity. For example, the crises caused by World War I and the 1916 
Zuiderzee flood helped Lely align his plan with these events; it seems 
unlikely that Lely’s plan would have succeeded if these events had 
not occurred to create a sense of urgency.
1.2 Research focus
The present study focuses on change agents, such as Lely, who stra-
tegically seek to set the agenda for or against policy change. It fo-
cuses on the area that Lely—literally and figuratively—placed on the 
map: the IJsselmeer area. The Zuiderzee is known today as the Ijs-
selmeer area and is a clear result of Lely’s efforts.
The creation of the IJsselmeer and polders generated an open 
playing field for numerous actors with different plans, ideas and 
policies. The Zuiderzee had been an empty space or institutional 
void before the Zuiderzee Works commenced. The creation of new 
ground, nature, agricultural land, cities, a province and more pro-
duced opportunities for actors to project their ideas onto the area. 
This led to innovations and experiments in engineering, agriculture, 
spatial planning, city design, infrastructure, water management and 
even socialisation and colonisation practices by the national state, 
who would only allow farmers to live in the polder if they met certain 
social value standards for this brave new world (Van der Ham, 2007). 
While further examination of these innovations and experiments 
would be interesting in future studies, the current research does not 
focus on the agents behind these historical changes, but rather on 
those agents who sought to set the agenda during the last decades 
by advocating and opposing plans to change the IJsselmeer area.
The main research question addressed by this study is how actors 
strategically seek to set the agenda within the context of the IJs-
selmeer area. To answer this question, the agenda-setting process 
will be reconstructed. In particular, I will examine how actors frame 
the problem at stake and the solutions, and manoeuvre their way 
through the policy process by networking with others to create sup-
port for, or against, policy change. I consider the change agents in-
volved and their actions as examples of policy entrepreneurship, and 
define a policy entrepreneur as an actor who advocates and strategi-
cally seeks to change or oppose policy (Kingdon, 1984). The overall 
hypothesis is that policy entrepreneurs, by employing strategies, can 
set the agenda.
On one side, there is the policy entrepreneur with his or her set 
of strategies, and on the other side, the agenda is believed to be in-
fluenced by the policy entrepreneur’s strategies. As Lely’s example 
indicates, policy entrepreneurs are constrained or enabled by the 
institutional context in which they operate, depending on the issues 
involved. Therefore, although this study adopts an agency perspec-
tive, the context is not neglected. However, this study will examine 
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the context primarily from the perspective of the policy entrepre-
neurs involved.
The main goal of this research is to gain a better understanding 
of the relationship between policy entrepreneurs, who employ cer-
tain strategies, and the dynamics of agenda setting. Although policy 
entrepreneurs increasingly receive attention in political and social 
sciences, understandings of their strategies to pursue policy change 
is still limited (Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom 
& Norman, 2009; Pralle, 2009; Roberts, 1998; Roberts & King, 1991; 
Sheingate, 2003; Zahariadis, 2007). For example, Mintrom and Nor-
man (2009) note that there is still room for further conceptual devel-
opment and empirical research concerning policy entrepreneurship, 
including policy entrepreneurs’ strategies. They state that there is 
also need for further study of the interactions between policy en-
trepreneurs and their specific policy contexts (Mintrom & Norman, 
2009). Therefore, when studying the relationship between policy en-
trepreneurs and agenda setting, I take into account the context as 
perceived by the policy entrepreneurs.
The present research is different from other studies on policy en-
trepreneurship because it studies not only the stakeholders at the na-
tional governmental levels—such as members of parliament, political 
leaders and so forth—but also discusses the strategies employed by 
local and regional policy entrepreneurs (cf. Carter, Scott & Rowling, 
2004; Doig & Hargrove, 1997; Thompson, 1994; Uslaner, 1978; Weis-
sert, 1991). Moreover, the 
policy entrepreneurs em-
pirically studied include 
people from within the po-
litical system, such as local 
aldermen, as well as policy 
entrepreneurs acting from 
outside on behalf of their own interest or that of their interest groups 
(Bakir, 2009; Oliver, 2004). Further, while most studies on policy en-
trepreneurship only discuss policy entrepreneurs in favour of policy 
change, this study also analyses the opponents of policy change (Ba-
kir, 2009; Crow, 2010). The case studies reveal that numerous actors 
seek to influence the area by setting the agenda to change policy or 
prevent policy from occurring. Finally, as detailed in the next chap-
ter, this research builds on the available literature on policy entre-
preneurship, while also expanding its focus by studying theories on 
agenda setting. It also includes other theoretical frameworks to en-
rich knowledge on the framing and networking strategies employed 
by policy entrepreneurs. There is particular focus on the former be-
cause empirical studies of policy entrepreneurship tend to focus on 
networking strategies, rather than framing strategies (Brouwer, 2013; 
THE MAIN RESEARCH QUESTION 
ADDRESSED BY THIS STUDY IS HOW 
ACTORS STRATEGICALLY SEEK 
TO SET THE AGENDA WITHIN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE IJSSELMEER AREA
Figure 1.2: Plan Lely (1891). Source: Nieuw Land Heritage Centre.
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Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009b; Mintrom 
& Norman, 2009). The distinction made here between framing and 
networking is for heuristic purposes, rather than to present yet an-
other new or better way of categorising types of strategies (Brouwer, 
2013). The next chapter presents the theoretical foundation of this 
study in full detail.
1.3 Thesis outline
As aforementioned, the next chapter discusses the theoretical frame-
works used in this research to analyse the strategies that policy en-
trepreneurs employ to set the agenda. Chapter 3 elaborates on the 
research strategy, introduces the research design and selected case 
studies, and accounts for the data collection and analysis methods. 
Chapters 4 to 7 discuss the four conducted empirical case studies. 
Chapter 4 presents the first case study on the Second Delta Com-
mittee, which tried to set the agenda for water safety and climate 
adaptation in the Dutch Delta and, among other things, suggested to 
raise the water level of the IJsselmeer. Chapter 5 discusses the poli-
cy entrepreneurs who pushed for change in the nature policy of the 
Netherlands, triggered by developments in the southern part of the 
province of Flevoland. Chapter 6 presents an analysis of policy entre-
preneurs who advocated or opposed plans to build an infrastructural 
connection—either a bridge or tunnel—through the Markermeer-IJ-
meer, and make outer-dike urbanisation possible. Chapter 7, the final 
empirical chapter, focuses on a case study of policy entrepreneurs 
who advocated or opposed plans to create a wind park next to the 
dikes of the Noordoostpolder, close to Urk. Chapter 8 presents the 
conclusion of this research and discusses its main findings.
Figure 1.3: A statue of Cornelis Lely on the Afsluitdijk, the IJsselmeer’s sealing dam, made by Mari 
Andriessen in 1954. Photo: Bayke de Vries.
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one writer it’s plagiarism, but 
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2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides the theoretical framework for the empirical case 
study analysis. The first step is to introduce the agency perspective 
taken and then review theories on agenda setting with regard to the 
role of agency. Next, the central concept of policy entrepreneurship is 
explained—the origin of entrepreneurship, the significance of policy 
entrepreneurs and the personal characteristics of policy entrepre-
neurs. Subsequently, the strategies that can be employed by policy 
entrepreneurs are presented. These strategies are grouped into fram-
ing and networking strategies.
2.2 Structure and agency
Many have struggled with the relationship between structure and 
agency (Giddens, 1986; Hay, 2002; Hodgson, 2004; Sewell Jr, 1992) 
and I have neither the ambition nor the skill to resolve this debate. 
Nonetheless, I have to account for the agency perspective taken in 
this study. I contend that humans are inventive and have the capacity 
to create, recreate and procreate. However, humans are constrained 
by context, which is natural, physical, cultural and institutional. This is 
called the ‘paradox of agency’, in which people are deeply conditioned 
by and dependent on the continuity and stability of the social systems, 
while also capable of creating and changing these systems through 
both conscious and unconscious effort (Battilana, Leca & Boxenbaum, 
2009; Seo & Creed, 2002; Sewell Jr, 1992; Westley & Antadze, 2010). 
Thus, the interplay between structure and agency is complex and con-
tingent on the local context (Oborn, Barrett & Exworthy, 2011).
To better understand structure, and not be blinded by this study’s 
focus on agency, I studied various accounts of institutions and their 
constraining effects on the policy processes, such as the traditional 
and new ‘historical’, ‘rational choice’ and ‘sociological’ institutional-
isms (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Lindblom, 1959, 1968, 1979; March & Olsen, 
1989; North, 1990; Ostrom, 2007; Peters, Pierre & King, 2005; Scott, 
2008; Thelen, 1999). However, I found that these frameworks, due to 
their focus on the structuring effect of institutional factors—such as 
rules, norms, patterns, legal systems and bureaucracies—often tend 
to offer a very static notion of the policy process by focusing on the 
gradual development of policy and leaving little room for change in-
duced by agency (John, 1998). These frameworks are especially help-
ful for those wanting to explain stability and incremental change over 
a longer period.
As stated in the introductory chapter, I prefer to look at the dy-
namics of the policy process and the interplay of various actors, and 
thus chose not to focus on explaining stability or change over a long-
er period. Hence, I focus on one of the most dynamic aspects of the 
policy process—agenda setting (Pralle, 2009). Precisely because of 
this focus, I studied various key theories on agenda setting to deter-
mine which kind of role is assigned to agency (Araral, Scott, Howlett, 
25
Ramesh & Wu, 2012; Bachrach & Baratz, 1963; Birkland, 2011; Bovens, 
Hart & Twist, 2007; deLeon, 1999; Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2003; 
Howlett & Ramesh, 2003; May & Wildavsky, 1978; Moran & Rein, 2009; 
Teisman, 2000; Van de Graaf & Hoppe, 1992). Thus, before discuss-
ing agency in further detail in terms of policy entrepreneurship, it is 
important to first attain a better understanding of the role of agency in 
the policy process, and agenda setting in particular.
2.3 Theories on agenda setting
Agenda setting scholars are interested in why certain issues emerge on 
the political agenda, while others are neglected. As explained below, 
this does not automatically include the need to incorporate agency in 
the model, perspective or framework on agenda setting. The following 
sections discuss various theories on agenda setting and examine what 
is considered the role of agency in agenda setting.
2.3.1 Social gap theory
A first approach to agenda setting is to consider it an autonomous and 
automated process filling a gap. The logic is that a performance gap 
between a perceived and socially preferred situation will automatical-
ly lead to attention from decision-making authorities. The magnitude 
of this gap is deemed decisive for whether or not an issue will receive 
agenda priority and lead to policy change (De Vries, 2003; Hoogerw-
erf & Herweijer, 2003). The magnitude of the gap can increase due to 
changing societal norms and standards, or worsening of the current 
situation. An underlying assumption is that the longer a problematic 
situation persists, and the more structural it becomes, the sooner gov-
ernmental actors are likely to pay attention to it (De Vries, 2003). Num-
bers and figures that highlight important issues—such as increased 
employability, crimes committed or immigrants entering the coun-
try—can pressure the national government to take action to prevent 
situations perceived as undesirable.
Downs’s (1972) ‘issue attention cycle’ provides an application of this 
thinking because Downs argues that a key domestic problem ‘sudden-
ly leaps into prominence, remains there for a short time, and then—
though still largely unresolved—gradually fades from the centre of 
public attention’ (p. 1). According to Downs (1972), this cycle has five 
stages. The first is the pre-problem stage in which the problem already 
exists, but has not captured much public attention. This changes in the 
second stage of alarmed discovery and euphoric enthusiasm (Downs, 
1972, p. 39), in which the public suddenly becomes aware of the prob-
lem and pressures political leaders to solve it. In the third stage, the 
public begins to realise that problem solving has its costs. The fourth 
stage is a gradual decline in public interest because people become 
discouraged, bored or threatened by thinking about the problem, and, 
as a result, the focus of attention wanes. Moreover, by this stage, it is 
likely that another issue has entered stage two of its cycle. The fifth 
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and final stage is the post-problem stage, in which the issue has fi-
nally been replaced ‘at the centre of public concern [and] moves into 
a prolonged limbo—twilight realm of lesser attention or spasmodic 
recurrences of interests’ (Downs, 1972, p. 40). Downs argues that not 
all issues or social problems will travel through the entire issue atten-
tion cycle because, to do so, they must meet certain conditions. An 
example of such a condition is that problems need to be ‘dramatic and 
exciting to maintain public interest’ (Downs, 1972, p. 42).
Downs’s systemic view of the agenda-setting process is emblem-
atic for the general structural and functional conceptualisation of the 
nature of ‘social problems’ as objective and subject to social systems 
(Schneider, 1985). The existence of social problems are regarded ‘the 
direct products of readily identifiable, distinctive and visible objec-
tive conditions’ (Hannigan, 2006, p. 63). Therefore, in this systemic 
perspective on agenda setting, agency hardly plays a role other than 
providing decision makers with information about conditions that may 
lead to societal unrest.
2.3.2 Systems approach
Easton (1957, 1965) offers a systemic view of the political life, including 
the policy process and agenda setting. Easton (1957) speaks of political 
life as a system of activity, with interactions between political actors 
and all kinds of institutions that influence ‘the way in which authorita-
tive decisions are formulated and executed for society’ (p. 384). In-
teractions that do not relate to the authoritative allocation of values 
for society are regarded external variables in the environment of the 
political system (Miller, 1971, p. 198). The environment is linked to the 
political system by a conversion process of inputs into outputs. Inputs, 
consisting of public demands and support shaped by their environ-
ment, are transformed through the political system into outputs, con-
sisting of decisions and actions, such as laws, programmes and poli-
cies. Easton (1957) argues that outputs, ‘in turn, have consequences 
both for the system and for the environment in which the system ex-
ists’ (p. 384), thus creating a feedback loop of information and actions. 
The transformation of inputs into outputs takes place within the black 
box of politics and bureaucracy, which unfortunately remains largely 
sealed and unanalysed.
Easton (1965, pp. 87–99) stresses the importance of what he calls 
‘gatekeepers’, political actors and institutions that filter public demands 
within or at the boundary of the political system. Many demands fail to 
pass through the gatekeepers’ filtering, which is essential for the po-
litical system to survive. Easton (1957) views the political system as al-
most like a biological organism that ‘is subject to constant stress from 
its surroundings to which it must adapt in one way or another if it is not 
to be completely destroyed’ (p. 386). Stress can occur if disturbances 
from outside the system threaten the system’s capacity to self-sustain 
and continue to produce outputs. The political system might also over-
27
load or stop functioning if, for instance, the inflow of demands is too 
heavy and/or the inflow of support is too light (Miller, 1971, p. 200). 
The gatekeeper is in a position to regulate the flow of information that 
runs through the political system, and can control the opening and 
closing of communication channels (Pettigrew, 1972). Thus, the most 
important form of agency in Easton’s model is the gatekeeper. Others 
wanting to set the agenda must go through or bypass the gatekeeper, 
but have little to no capacity or locus of control to direct the flow of 
information themselves. Thus, the role of agency is minimised.
2.3.3 Barrier model
With their barrier model of agenda setting, Bachrach and Baratz (1963, 
1970) try to open the sealed black box of policymaking offered by Eas-
ton. In contrast to Easton’s function of the gatekeeper, Bachrach and 
Baratz argue that there is more than one barrier to overcome before 
a demand or issue leads to policy change. The first barrier is ideologi-
cal, based on the dominant pattern of community values. A problem 
must be identified and recognised as a problem, and translated into 
demands for solutions. A second barrier is institutional because cer-
tain procedures and requirements need to be met before a demand 
or issue is incorporated in the decision making. The third barrier to 
survive is the decision making, as political actors must decide between 
specific demands or issues. If a demand or issue does not overcome 
the decision-making barrier, it is regarded a non-decision. Bachrach 
and Baratz (1970) describe non–decision making as:
a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation 
of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated be-
fore they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain 
access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these 
things, maimed or destroyed in the decision-implementing stage of 
the policy process. (p. 44)
The fourth and final barrier is the implementation, as decisions are 
sometimes modified or not carried out after a decision has been made. 
Those who want the change policy need to compete with those de-
fending maintenance of the status quo (Bachrach & Baratz, 1970). Both 
proponents and opponents of change, with their various resources 
and powers, must try to exploit the critical moments in the policy 
process to realise or prevent effective policy change. There are differ-
ences though, as Bachrach and Baratz (1970) argue: ‘while advocates 
of change must win at all stages of the political process … the de-
fenders of existing policy must win at only one stage in the process’ 
(p. 58). Following Schattschneider (1960), they conclude that all politi-
cal systems have an inherent ‘mobilisation of bias’, and this structural 
bias favours those actors seeking to defend the status quo (Bachrach 
& Baratz, 1970, p. 58).
C
ha
pt
er
 2
: T
he
or
et
ic
al
 F
ra
m
ew
or
k
The barrier model has also been applied and theorised differently 
(Cobb & Elder, 1971; De Vries, 2003; Hoogerwerf & Herweijer, 2003; 
Peters & Hogwood, 1985; Van de Graaf & Hoppe, 1992). For example, 
De Vries (2003) takes a slightly different staged approach to the bar-
riers in agenda setting. De Vries (2003) states that there are barriers 
between various types of agenda levels. After a perceived problem has 
been set into collective demands, it must be recognised by the public 
and placed on the public agenda. De Vries does not define the types of 
agendas; thus, I follow Pralle (2009) who defines the public agenda as 
‘the set of issues that are most salient to citizens and voters’ (p. 782). 
The next barrier is the transition of the issue definition 
on the public agenda to the policy agenda. The policy 
agenda ‘consists of the issues that are up for discus-
sion in governmental institutions such as legislatures 
and executive agencies’ (Pralle, 2009, p. 782). The fol-
lowing barrier would be the transfer of an issue from 
the policy agenda onto the political agenda. The political agenda is ‘the 
narrower set of issues about which governmental officials are poised to 
make a decision’ (Pralle, 2009, p. 782). The final barrier, as is the case 
in the original model, would be the translation of an issue into feasible 
implementation targets because not all issues about which decisions 
are made make it through to actual implementation (Pressman & Wil-
davsky, 1984). 
Unfortunately, the barrier model does not offer a clear image of how 
issues are dealt with, and by whom. This raises the following questions: 
How do various groups enforce power, exploit resources and compete 
over issues to set the agenda if, for instance, public awareness and sup-
port is low? How would an actor turn a barrier into an opportunity to 
set the agenda?
2.3.4 Agenda-building perspective
Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976) present an agenda-building perspective 
on agenda setting. By developing the insights offered by Easton (1957, 
1965), Bachrach and Baratz (1963, 1970), Cobb and Elder (1971) and oth-
ers (cf. Dahl, 1961; Schattschneider, 1960), they wanted to further un-
derstand the process by which demands of various groups are trans-
lated into issues considered for decision making—defined as ‘agenda 
building’. In addition, they wanted to explain variance across different 
types of political systems, thus focusing more on the role of agency in 
the agenda-setting process (Cobb et al., 1976, p. 126). Cobb et al. (1976) 
argue that the agenda-setting process is far from automated, although 
issues generally do follow the same ‘careers’ of issue initiation, solution 
specification, expansion of support and entrance to the political—or 
formal—agenda. The manner in which the issues are dealt with varies 
depending on the model of agenda setting taken, and the issues’ career 
stages need not to be sequential—for example, ‘issue entrance’ may 
precede ‘expansion of support’ (Cobb et al., 1976, p. 132).
HOW WOULD AN 
ACTOR TURN A BARRIER 
INTO AN OPPORTUNITY 
TO SET THE AGENDA?
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Cobb et al. (1976) distinguish three different models: the ‘outside 
initiative’, ‘mobilisation’ and ‘inside access’ models, which are, respec-
tively, typically found in egalitarian societies, hierarchical societies and 
societies with a high concentration of wealth and status (cf. Howlett & 
Ramesh, 2003, p. 135). They argue that societal actors, in an egalitar-
ian society, that have no direct access to the policy or political agenda 
need to initiate and raise public support from the outside in order to ar-
ticulate grievance and set the public agenda—this is the ‘outside initia-
tive’ model. If sufficient public support has been achieved, actors can 
pressure decision makers to seriously consider an issue for the political 
agenda. Decision makers or actors with political agenda access, in a 
hierchical society, who want to set the agenda will most likely consoli-
date policies if both political and public support is high enough, but if 
they would want to change policy and support is low a mobilisation of 
the public is deemed necessary—this is the ‘mobilisation’ model. Thus, 
the mobilisation model offers a mirror image of the outside initiative 
model because actors try to expand the issue from the political to the 
public agenda, by mobilising the public (Cobb et al., 1976, p. 132). Alter-
natively, decision makers or privileged societal actors, in a society with 
a high concentration of wealth and status, who already have access to 
the political agenda do not need much public support to initiate agenda 
setting from the inside—this is the ‘inside access’ model. These actors 
would rather ‘try to limit the issue expansion to the public because they 
do not want the issue on the public agenda. Instead they seek a more 
“private” decision within the government’ (Cobb et al., 1976, p. 135). In-
side groups try to attract support from carefully selected likeminded 
groups, and bargain behind the scenes to reach an agreement on an 
issue or proposal. These actors are most likely not to succeed in setting 
the agenda and changing policy if opposing groups effectively oppose 
and set the public agenda to their advantage.
In short, agency is deemed important in this agenda-setting per-
spective because it can strategically define issues and expand support, 
in competition with other actors and issues. However, the different 
styles of agenda setting are determined by the general nature of the 
political system (Cobb et al., 1976; Howlett & Ramesh, 2003).
2.3.5 Punctuated equilibrium framework
Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993) punctuated equilibrium framework 
assumes that, at a policy system level, long periods of stability and 
policy monopolies in policy communities are punctuated by moments 
of abrupt, significant perturbations or change (Baumgartner & Jones, 
1993; Jones & Baumgartner, 2005; Meijerink, 2008; Pralle, 2003; True, 
Jones & Baumgartner, 2007). The observation is that political process-
es are usually stable and incremental, but sometimes change radically, 
and the punctuated equilibrium framework seeks to explain this (True 
et al., 2007, p. 155). The claim is that stability is caused by the limited 
ability of actors to handle more than one or two issues at a time, within 
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a specific policy subsystem. Over time, these issues or policy images—
defined as ‘the manner in which a policy is characterised or understood’ 
(True et al., 2007, p. 176)—become institutionalised and incrementally 
develop into dominant policy monopolies that, by themselves, dampen 
pressure for change (True et al., 2007, p. 159). However, monopolies do 
not last forever; thus, the challenge for agency is to both undermine the 
present policy image and receive attention for others to set the agenda.
The competition among conflicting policy images, which also di-
rectly relates to interests, could result in newly fashioned or rede-
fined policy images that change policy monopolies. Agents wanting to 
achieve this need to try to gain support for their policy image. Shopping 
for venues, which will be discussed in detail later, is regarded an impor-
tant strategy for agents to attract support from others for the preferred 
policy images (Meijerink, 2008). Therefore, despite systemic patterns 
and mechanisms of stability and change, agency does have discretion-
ary attributes.
2.3.6 Advocacy coalitions framework
Sabatier’s (1988) advocacy coalitions framework places coalitions 
and interactions at the centre of explaining agenda setting and policy 
change (Meijerink, 2005; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Sabatier, 1988, 
2007; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007b; Wei-
ble, Sabatier & McQueen, 2009). According to the advocacy coalitions 
framework, one to four advocacy coalitions can be distinguished with-
in a policy domain or policy subsystem. Parties such as interest group 
leaders, agency officials, legislators, applied researchers, journalists 
and politicians share a set of normative and causal beliefs and show a 
non-trivial degree of coordinated behaviour to realise their objectives 
and policy proposals. Coalitions are built and formed around deep core 
beliefs, policy core beliefs and secondary beliefs that are connected to 
shared problem definitions at different levels from the core.
At these different levels, agents have the possibility to direct 
change. In order to effect this change, they need to translate problems 
in words that correspond with the coalition’s beliefs and problem defi-
nitions—either to strengthen internal bonding or to try to bridge be-
tween other coalitions to get others on board as coalition partners. In 
addition, a struggle between advocacy coalitions can be necessary for 
policy change because it is believed that policy change results from 
the conflict and learning of several coalitions seeking change or main-
tenance of a particular policy regime. Furthermore, external shocks to 
and internal perturbations within a policy system, often generated by a 
crisis or incident, are believed to be needed for radical change to occur 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007b).
2.3.7 Multiple streams model
Kingdon’s (1984, 2002) multiple streams model explicitly focuses on 
agents, ideas and policy change (Kingdon, 1984, 2002; Meijerink, 2005; 
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CONTINUAL CHANGE, 
RATHER THAN 
EQUILIBRIUM, IS 
THE HALLMARK OF 
AGENDA SETTING
Zahariadis, 2007). According to Kingdon (2002), continual change, 
rather than equilibrium, is the hallmark of agenda setting: ‘Therefore, 
a model needs to emphasise development and adaptation, not inertia 
and stasis’ (p. 227). Hence, Kingdon’s model is concerned with how and 
why certain issues receive attention at certain times, for which he uses 
concepts such as policy streams, windows of opportunity and policy 
entrepreneurship. Kingdon uses a revised version of Cohen, March 
and Olsen’s (1972) garbage-can model of organisational choice to view 
agenda setting as taking place in three relatively independent streams: 
problems, policies and politics (Roberts & King, 1991). In the problem 
stream, problems are recognised, promoted and discussed publicly. 
In the policy stream, proposals and solutions are generated by those 
responsible for drafting them. The political stream is characterised by 
political processes and events—such as changes in the national mood, 
election results and changes of administration—that can have power-
ful effects on politicians’ perspectives of and receptivity to issues. Dy-
namics internal to each of the streams can serve as an impetus for or 
constraint on successful agenda setting and policy change (Kingdon, 
2002, p. 18). However, effective change is most likely possible when 
streams converge—due to activity in either stream—and are coupled 
into a package by change agents—most notably ‘policy entrepreneurs’.
Kingdon defines the critical moment of the three streams collid-
ing as a policy window—also known as a ‘window of opportunity’. 
As long as the window of opportunity is open, policy entrepreneurs 
should couple problems with solutions, or vice versa, in such a way as 
to have their ideas accepted and adopted by political 
actors. Windows occasionally open predictably, and 
otherwise open unpredictably, and always for a short 
period—‘an idea’s time comes, but it also passes’ 
(Kingdon, 2002, p. 169). The occurrence of windows 
opening ‘because of some factor beyond the realm of 
the individual entrepreneur’ (Kingdon, 2002, p. 182) is 
of importance; however, Kingdon (2002) argues that 
the most explanatory power of policy change lies with the policy en-
trepreneur who recognises and quickly anticipates the right moment 
to couple the streams and ‘strikes while the iron is hot’ (p. 170). Without 
agency, policy change is unlikely to occur, even if the world is liter-
ally shaking. As stated by Mintrom and Norman (2009), ‘In any given 
instance of policy change, it is usually possible to locate an individual 
or a small team that appears to have been a driving force for action’ (p. 
651). Section 2.4 provides a more in-depth discussion of policy entre-
preneurs and their strategies to set the agenda for policy change.
2.3.8 A short résumé
The theories on agenda setting discussed above show an increasingly 
complex and dynamic perspective on agenda setting. The first theo-
ries discussed show an automated and systemic perspective on agenda 
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setting, leaving limited room for agency, while the latter—especially 
the multiple streams model—present a highly dynamic and complex 
view on agenda setting due to the involvement of all kinds of actors. 
Based on the latter, and on more recent perspectives, I regard it best to 
view agenda setting not in isolation, but as an ongoing process in which 
multiple actors try to make their issue more salient than others to gain 
influence on the agenda setting and leave their mark.
Fortunately, in many of the discussed theoretical frameworks and 
perspectives on agenda setting, the role of agency has been recog-
nised in terms of:
 O gatekeepers filtering and directing the flow of information 
(systems approach)
 O interest groups or political actors overcoming or exploiting 
various barriers (barrier model)
 O outside or inside groups initiating issues and building agendas 
(agenda-building perspective)
 O advocates of policy images (punctuated equilibrium framework)
 O coalitions competing for dominance (advocacy coalitions 
framework)
 O policy entrepreneurs coupling various streams (multiple 
streams model).
The remainder of this chapter builds on the aforementioned theories 
on agenda setting, while discussing agency in terms of policy entrepre-
neurship. However, to gain further in-depth knowledge of how policy 
entrepreneurship works, this chapter also builds on more contempo-
rary studies of policy entrepreneurship (Brouwer, Huitema & Bierman, 
2009; Christopoulos, 2006; Mackenzie, 2004; Meijerink & Huitema, 
2010a; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 
1996; Roberts, 1998; Roberts & King, 1991). These studies, which also 
depart from Kingdon’s understanding of policy entrepreneurship, help 
discern the strategies employed by policy entrepreneurs to set the 
agenda, and help understand the relationship between policy entre-
preneurs and their contexts of agency and structure.
With regard to policy entrepreneurs and their context, Kingdon 
argues that policy entrepreneurs are constrained and limited in their 
repertoire and discretionary power due to contexts. One of Kingdon’s 
(2002) final notes is that:
constraints … are not absolutes. Instead, they are conditions that 
make some events highly unlikely and other events more likely to 
occur. They do impose structure on the system, but it is structure 
that still allows room for gray areas and unpredictability. (p. 208)
Other researchers have confirmed that policy entrepreneurs can 
have influence over the course of events and change policy, but are, 
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at the same time, both constrained and enabled by the policy system 
in which they operate (Beeson & Stone, 2013; Hammond, 2013; Zhu, 
2013). The context ‘shapes the opportunities and the actions open to 
policy entrepreneurs, but not in a deterministic fashion’ (Mintrom, as 
cited in Mackenzie, 2004, p. 382). As will be elaborated later, policy 
entrepreneurs most likely act strategically by identifying and exploit-
ing opportunities and overcoming limitations imposed by their context 
(Mackenzie, 2004). Similarly, Huitema and Meijerink (2009b) state that 
policy entrepreneurs need to ‘have a full and thorough knowledge of 
the institutional system they are working in and know how to use that 
system’ (p. 388). This does not mean that contextual or institutional 
differences are irrelevant, as different contexts may offer different op-
portunity structures. In any case, policy entrepreneurs interpret and—
if possible—take advantage of their context to undertake a course of 
actions that help them reach their objectives effectively (Mackenzie, 
2004). Consequently, when studying policy entrepreneurship, it is 
important to take into account how policy entrepreneurs deal with 
their context in order to set the agenda to change policies or prevent 
change from occurring, as discussed in the next section. The following 
section examines policy entrepreneurship by discussing its origins and 
characteristics. In addition, two types of strategies are distinguished: 
framing and networking.
2.4 Policy entrepreneurship
2.4.1 Entrepreneurship
The term ‘entrepreneur’ comes from the French word ‘entreprendre’, 
which means ‘to undertake’ (deLeon, 1996, p. 496). The French econo-
mist JB Say first used the term in 1800 and defined it as an individual or 
businessperson who ‘shifts economic resources out of an area of low-
er and into an area of higher productivity and greater yield’ (Drucker 
1985, as cited in Brouwer & Biermann, 2011, p. 2). In the 1930s, Schum-
peter (1934) used the term to identify innovation—it is the entrepre-
neur who creates disequilibria to generate innovative change (deLeon, 
1996; Kuhnert, 2001; Lewis, 1980; Roberts & King, 1991). Later, Kirzner 
(1973, 1979) stated that the entrepreneur exploits disequilibria to gen-
erate change (Schneider, Teske & Mintrom, 1995; Shockley, Stough, 
Haynes & Frank, 2006). Bringing these views together, we can regard 
entrepreneurs as being alert to overlooked opportunities—such as the 
unfulfilled demand for a new product—and thus keen to innovate by 
introducing new products, new production techniques or new markets 
(Sheingate, 2003).
The use of the concept of entrepreneurship in political science can 
be traced back to Dahl (1961) who described ‘political entrepreneurs’ 
as political leaders who use their resources to the maximum to cre-
ate political change (Sheingate, 2003). The adoption of the agency 
approach in the political domain became important for further study 
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of change as scholars began to conduct studies on Cabinet members, 
congressional staff, the executive and members of parliament, and 
showed that agency had explanatory power for policy and political 
change (Bardach, 1972; Carter et al., 2004; Christopoulos, 2006; Doig 
& Hargrove, 1997; Eyestone, 1978; Kuhnert, 2001; Meydani, 2010; Price, 
1971; Thompson, 1994; Uslaner, 1978; Walker, 1974; Weissert, 1991). At 
first, these entrepreneurs—such as legislative entrepreneurs—were 
regarded as rational, economic calculators who just happened to be in 
an authoritative position (Schiller, 1995; Shockley et al., 2006; Wawro, 
2000). Later, scholars such as Sheingate (2003) highlighted a more 
voluntaristic and instrumental perspective on entrepreneurs, viewing 
them as ‘creative, resourceful, and opportunistic leaders whose skil-
ful manipulation of politics result in the creation of a new policy or a 
new bureaucratic agency, creates a new institution, or transforms an 
existing one’ (p. 188). As Roberts (1998) states, ‘Entrepreneurial design 
begins with conscious, deliberate activities of policy actors who have a 
radically new idea that they want to see implemented’ (p. 115). Schnei-
der and Teske (1992) regard political entrepreneurs as individuals who 
want to change the direction and flow of politics, making it possible for 
scholars to not only study heroic figures or leaders, but also ‘a larger 
class of individuals who help propel political and policy change’ (p. 737).
The above shows that policy entrepreneurship has its origins in 
business studies and political sciences, which reveals that entrepre-
neurs are opportunity seekers who want to leave their mark, either in 
business or politics. The next section introduces policy entrepreneurs 
as understood in policy sciences.
2.4.2 Policy entrepreneurs
The concept of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ was introduced to policy anal-
ysis by Kingdon (2002), who portrays them as ‘advocates for pro-
posals or for the prominence of ideas’ and notes that ‘their defining 
characteristic, much in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their 
willingness to invest their resources—time, energy, reputation, and 
sometimes money—in the hope of a future return’ (p. 122). According 
to Kingdon, the function of policy entrepreneurs is crucial in the poli-
cymaking process, especially in agenda setting. As indicated above, 
Kingdon views agenda setting in three independent streams that are 
all governed by their own logic. Sometimes the streams converge, 
thereby creating the possibility for an issue to gain priority on the 
agenda. On such occasions, a policy window opens, giving entrepre-
neurs the opportunity to couple streams and present their own ideas 
(Olsson et al., 2006).
According to Kingdon, linking streams and setting the agenda 
may not take place absent skilful coupling or pushing by policy entre-
preneurs. Additionally, like surfers waiting for a great wave to come, 
policy entrepreneurs are influenced by events over which they have 
no control (Kingdon, 2002, p. 165). However, more recent studies 
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into policy entrepreneurship show that streams and strategies are 
interlinked, and policy entrepreneurs can control the sequence of 
events, or at least seize the opportunity and have influence, giving 
them an even more central position in the analysis of policy dynamics 
(Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009b; John, 1998; 
Olsson et al., 2006; Roberts, 1998). External shocks (Sabatier & Wei-
ble, 2007b; Weible et al., 2009), crises (Birkland, 2008; Boin, ‘t Hart 
& McConnell, 2009; Lowry, 2006) or punctuations (True et al., 2007) 
can be anticipated or even—at least discursively—created (Verduijn, 
Meijerink & Leroy, 2012).
While building on the aforementioned theories and studies, I need 
to account for two issues. First, while not extensively discussed in the 
literature, policy entrepreneurs, according to my understanding, may 
also strive to preserve the status quo, rather than advocate change 
(Dery, 2000; Simmons, Yonk & Thomas, 2011). Due to dependence on 
those in elected positions with authority over the decision-making 
process, interest groups or various participants outside the govern-
ment are even more likely to block, rather than promote, agenda is-
sues (Kingdon, 2002). Moreover, they often try to create attention 
for their issues once the agenda is already set, and from Kingdon’s 
(2002, p. 67) perspective, thus operate more reactively than proac-
tively. If one only looks at the agency in pursuit of change, one may 
miss important antagonists of changing the status quo. Partly for this 
reason, I have broadened my understanding of policy entrepreneur-
ship, as introduced in the previous chapter, by including not only 
strategies aimed at changing policy, but also those aimed at blocking 
policy (Crow, 2010). Key in all this is that, as I view it, policy entre-
preneurs eagerly try to leave their mark on agenda setting. They are 
well aware of the fact that effectively influencing agenda setting can 
prove crucial for accomplishing success.
Second, I am mindful of the fact that there are different types of 
entrepreneurs, such as public (Lewis, 1980; Ostrom, 1965; Roberts & 
King, 1991; Schneider et al., 1995), social (Westley & Antadze, 2010), 
legislative (Wawro, 2000; Weissert, 1991), civic (Leadbeater & Goss, 
1998), bureaucratic (Teske & Schneider, 1994), institutional (Battilana 
et al., 2009) and business (Zott & Huy, 2007) entrepreneurs. In my 
view, the main difference between the different types of entrepre-
neurships, and policy entrepreneurship, is the object of the desired 
or opposed change. There have been attempts to distinguish types of 
entrepreneurs based on positions held (Roberts & King, 1991). How-
ever, to differentiate entrepreneurs based on their positions is not 
particularly useful because, as Kingdon (2002) highlights, an entre-
preneur can be any person in any position—a civil servant, expert, 
interest group, politician or even the head of state. In addition, all 
types of entrepreneurs display common characteristics and strate-
gies, even though they might differ in their position and focus of de-
sired or opposed policy change (Crow, 2010). Hence, it makes more 
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sense to differentiate types of entrepreneurship on factors other than 
position held—notably the entrepreneur’s object.
Now that the policy entrepreneurship concept has been explained, 
it is important to further examine the role of the personal characteris-
tics of policy entrepreneurs.
2.4.3 Personal characteristics
Alongside a risk-taking attitude, policy entrepreneurs need to exhibit 
the appropriate skills and motivation to persevere and continue try-
ing to set the agenda. Thus, what are the personal characteristics of a 
policy entrepreneur? What kind of people are they? In the literature, 
policy entrepreneurs are often described as opportunistic, alert to the 
opening of policy windows, assertive, risk taking, persistent, persever-
ant, competitive, wayward, creative, knowledgeable, innovative and 
socially skilled to relate to other people’s perspectives and interests. 
Due to their often highly complex and uncertain environments, they 
must be able to thrive under uncertainty; be strong in networking; be 
attentive to building and maintaining relationships with important ac-
tors, such as politicians and experts; and be willing and able to learn 
and reflect on their actions (Christopoulos, 2006; Crow, 2010; deLe-
on, 1996; Fligstein, 1997, 2001; Kingdon, 1984; Lovell, 2009; Mintrom, 
2000; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Roberts, 
1998; Roberts & King, 1991; Weissert, 1991). Policy entrepreneurs are 
not ‘superhumanly clever’ (Kingdon, 2002, p. 183), and thus seldom 
exhibit all of these skills at the same level. Not all policy entrepreneurs 
are ‘geniuses struck by the fire of the gods’ (deLeon, 1996, p. 496). 
Additionally, policy entrepreneurs are not always effective, and often 
fail before succeeding (Oborn et al., 2011). They can also easily mises-
timate or misperceive the likelihood of a future window of opportunity 
(Kingdon, 2002, p. 171). However, as Kingdon (2002, p. 122) notes, all 
policy entrepreneurs display a willingness to invest resources, such as 
time, energy, reputation and sometimes money, in the hope of a future 
return.
However, what exactly drives individuals to partake in this risk-tak-
ing endeavour remains unclear. For example, in the political science 
literature, politicians are often described as self-maximising agents 
whose only aim is to gain electoral support and remain in office (Ar-
nold, 1989; Schiller, 1995; Shockley et al., 2006; 
Wawro, 2000). Yet this perspective overlooks 
people whose prospects for future return may 
be minimal, but still deliberately persist in 
policy entrepreneurship. Kingdon (2002) notes 
that future return may also be described differently: ‘some entrepre-
neurs simply like the game. They enjoy advocacy, they enjoy being at 
or near the seat of power, they enjoy being part of the action’ (p. 123). 
Other motives could be desire for power or the drive to prove oneself 
superior to others, or even to oneself, ‘as an inter-temporal competi-
‘SOME ENTREPRENEURS 
SIMPLY LIKE THE GAME’
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tion between future and past selves stemming from the desire of the 
present self to test self-ability’—that is, self-satisfaction and self-com-
petition (Khalil, 1997, as cited in Kuhnert, 2001, p. 23).
A future return or profit might also be ideological—such as to pro-
mote certain values to society or the desire to make a difference in 
the world (Christopoulos, 2006; Kingdon, 2002; Thompson, 1994). In 
an interesting study by Arnold (1989) on policy entrepreneurs’ self-in-
terest and moral commitment to aiding the homeless, he argues that 
these notions do not necessarily rule each other out, but can be both 
relevant and equally strong, depending on the issue at stake. However, 
insofar as policy entrepreneurs will even speak about their motives, 
they may still ‘use frames to conceal their true motives from others 
whom they are trying to persuade’ (Campbell, 2002, p. 28). In other 
words, they could simply be saying what others want to hear their mo-
tives are, instead of expressing their true motivation (Campbell, 2002). 
Consequently, it is difficult to regard a policy entrepreneur as either a 
knight on a white horse, or a wolf in sheep’s clothing (deLeon, 1996).
Although actions can say a great deal about a person’s intentions, I 
do not study or conduct moral judgement on the policy entrepreneurs’ 
true motives. Psychoanalysis is not part of this study. A more fruitful 
approach is to better understand policy entrepreneurship by studying 
what policy entrepreneurs do since they are most clearly recognisable 
by their actions (Kingdon, 1984, 2002). Therefore, I will further opera-
tionalise the policy entrepreneurs’ strategies to set the agenda to bet-
ter understand how policy entrepreneurship is put into action.
2.5 Agenda-setting strategies
The main activity of a policy entrepreneur is the employment of strat-
egies aimed at making policy change happen, or preventing change 
from occurring, by setting the agenda. I regard strategies as courses 
of actions or sequences of moves available to a policy entrepreneur 
(cf. Brouwer, 2013, pp. 34-36; Scharpf, 1997, p. 7). This section offers 
various categorisations and typologies of strategies, and then presents 
my own conceptual distinctions.
Roberts and King (1991) discuss what policy entrepreneurs actually 
do in terms of advocating new ideas and developing proposals, defin-
ing and reframing problems, specifying policy alternatives, brokering 
ideas among policy actors, mobilising public opinion and helping to 
set the decision-making agenda. Inductively, based on their own em-
pirical research, Roberts and King highlight various activities under-
taken by policy entrepreneurs, including:
 O idea generation activities
 O problem framing activities
 O dissemination activities
 O strategic activities
 O demonstration project activities
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 O activities cultivating bureaucratic insiders and advocates
 O collaborative activities with specific high-profile elite groups
 O activities enlisting support from elected officials
 O lobbying activities
 O activities attracting media attention and support
 O administrative and evaluative activities (Roberts, 1998; 
Roberts & King, 1991).
Mintrom and Vergari (1996) and Mintrom and Norman (2009) discuss 
four elements central to policy entrepreneurship and corroborate these 
with types of strategies. They define these strategies as ‘displaying so-
cial acuity’ (seeking and recognising opportunities, and networking), 
‘defining problems’ (framing and being socially perceptive), ‘building 
teams’ (coalition building) and ‘leading by example’ (having assertive-
ness and commitment). Based on Mintrom’s earlier work, Brouwer and 
Bierman (2011) argue that strategies can be grouped according to the 
following four categories:
 1 ‘attention- and support-seeking strategies’ in order to 
demonstrate the significance of a problem and convince a wide 
range of participants about their preferred policy
 2 ‘linking strategies’ because policy entrepreneurs are mostly 
unable to accomplish their objectives alone and thus link with 
other parties in coalitions, projects, ideas and policy games
 3 ‘relational management strategies’ because the relational factor 
is critical in policy change trajectories
 4 ‘arena strategies’ in order to influence the time and place in 
which policy entrepreneurs play their policy game.
Brouwer and Bierman (2011) state that, if these strategies are timed 
correctly, the development of policy streams and their coupling can, 
to some extent, be influenced and steered. Meijerink and Huitema 
(2010b) offer an alternative categorisation and distinguish between 
categories covering strategies for developing and disseminating new 
ideas within multi-level governance networks; building coalitions; 
anticipating, manipulating and exploiting windows of opportunities; 
connecting informal to formal networks; and exploiting, manipulating 
and/or creating venues’.
Overall, although categories may differ, there is much overlap be-
tween these different categorisations of strategies. However, Roberts 
and King (1991) regard ‘strategic activities’ as part of a broader rep-
ertoire. As elaborated below, I view policy entrepreneurs’ strategies 
as central to policy entrepreneurs’ behaviour. All policy entrepreneurs’ 
activities, tactics or actions are strategic and aimed at setting the 
agenda and making policy change occur or preventing change from 
taking place. If there is one thing the policy entrepreneur could not do 
with a clear mind, it is acting not strategically.
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Based on the above different categorisations of strategies, I dis-
tinguish between two broad sets of strategies to encompass them 
all: framing strategies and networking strategies. First, policy entre-
preneurs use framing strategies to create what they believe to be a 
coherent, attractive and convincing framing of the problems at hand, 
and their deemed possible, desirable and feasible solutions. Second, 
through networking, these entrepreneurs try to mobilise people, gain 
support for their vision, and get their vision accepted and implement-
ed. While the first relates to a discursive approach of policymaking 
that emphasises framing as an empowering instrument, the second 
emphasises the mobilisation of resources as an important asset of 
gaining influence on the agenda.
To attain a better understanding of both framing and network-
ing strategies, I expanded my literature research beyond the scope 
of policy entrepreneurship studies. To discuss the various strategies, 
I employ the advantage of network theory (Börzel, 1998; Compston, 
2009; Kickert, Klijn & Koppenjan, 1997; Van Waarden, 1992) and post-
positivistic theoretical frameworks, such as social constructionism 
(Ingram, Schneider & deLeon, 2007; Yanow, 1996), discourse theory 
(Hajer, 1995; Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Howarth, 2009) and the narrative 
policy framework (Jones & McBeth, 2010; McBeth, Shanahan, Arnell & 
Hathaway, 2007; Shanahan, Jones & McBeth, 2011; Van Eeten, 2007). 
These theoretical perspectives offer additional insight to the strate-
gies employed by policy entrepreneurs, and agency in general, to set 
the agenda. Below, I first discuss various framing strategies, and then 
various networking strategies.
2.5.1 Framing strategies
Policy ideas can come from anywhere, are seldom totally new, and of-
ten originate from a recombination of known elements (Kingdon, 2002; 
Sheingate, 2003). Therefore, the critical issue to understand with ideas 
in policymaking ‘is not where the seed comes from, but what makes the 
soil fertile’ (Kingdon, 2002, p. 77). Policy entrepreneurs try to make the 
soil fertile by framing so that their ideas are considered seriously and 
gain agenda status (Princen, 2007; Rochefort & Cobb, 1993). Framing 
is regarded as the process through which producers and receivers of 
messages transform information into a meaningful whole or frame. It 
demonstrates the way actors link issues to suit their political purposes 
and visions of future policy directions (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Hence, 
framing is always influenced by the normative belief system and inter-
ests of policy entrepreneurs, and is therefore prone to rhetoric, emotion 
and manipulation. Policy entrepreneurs know that the skilful framing of 
an issue as a problem can create awareness, recognition and acknowl-
edgement (Verduijn et al., 2012). It is not only the framing of a problem 
that can be regarded a strategy, but also the framing of the most ef-
fective ways of dealing with the perceived situations—that is, the best 
suitable solutions from the policy entrepreneurs’ perspective (Allison, 
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1971; Birkland, 1998, 2004, 2008; Boin et al., 2009; Lowry, 2006; Min-
trom & Norman, 2009; Rochefort & Cobb, 1993; Schön & Rein, 1995; 
True et al., 2007). However, framing can also induce negative emo-
tions, resistance and conflict (Boin et al., 2009; Mintrom & Norman, 
2009). The goal for a policy entrepreneur is to ensure that the policy 
idea or frame he or she favours is adopted without too much opposition 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Stone, 2002; True et al., 2007).
The framing perspective is part of the discursive turn in the social 
sciences that has gained momentum since the mid-1990s (Dewulf et 
al., 2009; Dryzek, 1997; Fischer, 2003; Hajer, 1995; Hajer & Versteeg, 
2005; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). All these scholars affirm the constitu-
tive role and pertinence of discourses and frames. While a Foucauldian 
approach emphasises the structuring character of largely hegemonic 
discourses, framing theories instead focus on the use, performance 
and effectiveness of deliberate discursive strategies of agency. The lat-
ter is mainly the case in policy sciences, where framing is looked on as 
one of the strategies agency can employ to either fix or alter frames.
In this study, the focus is on the notion of policy frames and fram-
ing. It defines framing as ‘to select some aspects of a perceived reality 
and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way 
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman, 1993, 
p. 52). I regard framing as a means for actors to interpret events, their 
causes and the responsibilities and lessons involved in ways that suit 
their political purposes and visions of future directions for policymak-
ing. Hence, I do not focus here on ontological and epistemological dis-
cussions of discourses and frames (cf. Van den Brink, 2009), but on the 
way policy entrepreneurs seek to strategically promote a certain policy 
frame—including meanings given to a problem and its causes, moral 
evaluation and suggested solutions—while setting the agenda. Inter-
estingly, in the current policy entrepreneurship literature, networking 
strategies are often elaborately discussed and empirically studied, 
while framing strategies are not (Brouwer, 2013; Brouwer & Biermann, 
2011; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009b; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). This is 
a knowledge gap that this study seeks to help fill. Distinguishing the 
various framing strategies, as discussed below, is the first step towards 
accomplishing this.
Narratives and stories
Narratives and stories have a constitutive role in policymaking, and 
are thus often used as framing strategies (Battilana et al., 2009; Fis-
cher, 2003; Steen, 2009; Van der Stoep, 2014). There is no clear differ-
ence between what is understood as a narrative or a story; thus, I use 
them interchangeably (Dicke, 2001; Lejano, Ingram & Ingram, 2013). 
Stone (2002, pp. 138–145) distinguishes two types of policy narratives 
or stories: the first focuses on the ‘decline or crisis’, while the second 
emphasises the need for ‘social control’. The first portrays a situation 
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as a matter of fate, while the second asks for convincing stories and 
narratives that appeal for change through political or policy action.
Stories ‘help to identify both the responsible culprits and the vir-
tuous saviours capable of leading us to high ground’ (Fischer, 2003, 
p. 169), while a storyline is ‘a generative sort of narrative that allows 
actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to 
specific or social phenomena’ (Hajer, 1995, p. 56). Creating alternative 
and new narratives or stories, which are actually still linguistic con-
structions, helps convince an audience of the necessity of political ac-
tion or policy implications. The primary function of these is that they 
suggest a unity on which people can rely. One can voice narratives 
and stories through using rhetoric, symbols and crisis exploitation. 
These strategies, as discussed in the next sections, help invigorate and 
spread the policy frame in an appealing manner, and gain support for a 
political or policy action (Fischer, 2003).
Rhetoric
Rhetoric is the art of persuading and influencing people through the 
use of spoken or written speech (cf. Corbett, 1990; The Free Diction-
ary, 2011). As such, rhetoric consists of structuring and presenting the 
arguments made (Gottweis, 2007). The arena in which rhetoric is used 
most obviously is politics (Riker, 1986), where it can be important in 
forging or disrupting political coalitions. Rhetoric used by politicians 
can resemble political manipulation, which has negative connotations 
(Riker, 1986, 1995; Schneider & Teske, 1992; Teske & Schneider, 1994). 
However, in itself, the art of rhetoric is a way of telling a story or mak-
ing a point, regardless of any moral judgement. One could say that it 
depends on the verity of the content, the reliability of the storyteller, 
and the storyteller’s intended objective to determine whether the rhe-
torical strategies are used to inform and persuade, or deceive and 
manipulate. Howarth (2009) describes rhetoric as follows:
Politicians use a variety of strategic devices to bring about favour-
able outcomes … [I]nventing new actions and political practices 
that circumvent existing ones; framing and reframing the evalua-
tion of outcomes by others so that actors can improve their pros-
pects of achieving goals; altering the perceptions and character of 
individual preferences by various rhetorical operations and inter-
ventions; and so on. (pp. 318–319)
Examples of rhetorical devices include the use of metaphors (Fis-
cher, 2003; Stone, 2002) via implied comparisons, understanding and 
presenting one kind of thing in terms of another, and visual means. 
They also include presenting situations as trade-offs, in which one 
thing must be decreased for another to be increased. Other rhe-
torical devices present situations as paradoxes via statements that 
appear contradictory or absurd, yet may be true (Stone, 2002). As 
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aforementioned, rhetoric can support narratives or stories in spoken or 
written speech.
Symbols
Symbols may be helpful in communicating and gaining support for a 
specific frame. A symbol can be defined as ‘anything that stands for 
something else’ (Stone, 2002, p. 137). A symbol’s meaning is not intrin-
sic; meaning is invested in a symbol by those who use it—its meaning 
is created socially and is thus dependent on how people understand it. 
An important feature of symbols is their potential ambiguity, since they 
can refer to more than one thing at the same time (Stone, 2002). As 
Yanow (1996) states, ‘the power of symbols lies in their potential to ac-
commodate multiple meanings. Different individuals, different groups, 
may interpret the same symbol differently’ (p. 9). Symbols unite those 
who share meaning and create distance from those who do not, thus 
facilitating both identification and demarcation. Symbols can also be 
used to reduce complex issues into more comprehensible forms (Mc-
Beth et al., 2007).
Another possible use of symbols is to characterise opponents of a 
policy issue. For example, losing groups can benefit from negatively 
portraying both the issue and the opponents through the use of sym-
bols—or even narratives, storylines and rhetoric (Lejano et al., 2013; 
McBeth et al., 2007; Stone, 2002). Alternatively, artefacts or physical 
objects may be used as symbols to represent the frame, problem or 
solution perception of a specific group. For example, a country’s flag 
is an object or artefact because it represents similarity and unity, while 
also creating a difference between countries. Hajer (1995) analyses the 
politics of the acid rain controversy and notes that the physical phe-
nomenon of dead fish and dying trees were developed into a symbol for 
the state and pollution of the environment around the world. The acid 
rain controversy also became emblematic of the discussion between 
the ecological modernisation discourse and the traditional paradigmat-
ic discourse, both of which framed the acid rain issue differently (Hajer, 
1995). These examples illustrate that symbols can also be subject to 
discussions between advocates of different narratives or stories.
One must keep in mind that symbols—and narratives and stories—
provide not only a means to unite or demarcate issues or people, but 
also enable the synchronisation and transformation of diverse individ-
ual motivations, expectations and values into broad bases of support 
and collective action (Stone, 2002, pp. 157–162). Thus, there is a link 
here with what later will be discussed as coalition building because, 
as Stone (2002) argues, ‘symbols allow coalitions where pure material 
interests would divide people’ (p. 161).
Framing crises and focusing events
Crises are some of the most promising opportunities for advancing 
policy ideas, and are regarded the most important driver for radical 
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change (Sabatier, 2007). Crises are ‘events or developments widely 
perceived by members of relevant communities to constitute urgent 
threats to core community values and structures’ (Boin et al., 2009, pp. 
83–84). A ‘focusing’ event is described as:
an event that is sudden, relatively rare, can be reasonably defined 
as harmful or revealing the possibility of potentially greater future 
harm, inflicts harm or suggests potential harm that are or could be 
concentrated on a definable geographical area or community of 
interest, and that is known to policy makers and the public virtually 
simultaneously. (Birkland, 1998, as cited in Birkland, 2004, p. 181)
A crisis or focusing event (terms that can be used interchangeably) 
may create or trigger a ‘window of opportunity’ by dramatically high-
lighting policy failures (to which governments or other institutions 
might respond) and provide opportunities for policy learning, or for is-
sues to gain attention and move up the agenda (Boin et al., 2009; King-
don, 1984, 2002; Lowry, 2006; Wiering & Immink, 2006). As indicated 
before, this opening of windows creates an opportunity for change 
agents to link problems and solu-
tions and push certain policy plans. 
Policy entrepreneurs who seek 
change try to foresee and exploit 
the opening of a window and stimu-
late institutional attention for an is-
sue when no other actors are exploiting the event to raise attention. 
However, as Kingdon (1984, 2002) states, crises do not automatically 
equate to policy change. If an event is not picked up by agency—such 
as to highlight policy failures—to pressure the current policy frame, 
policy change is unlikely. In this situation, a possible strategy for policy 
entrepreneurs is to use the crisis as part of rhetoric persuasion or as a 
symbol that supports a story or narrative. For that reason, crises and 
focusing events are also prone to rhetoric and ‘framing contests’ (Boin 
et al., 2009).
Engaging in framing contests
Framing contests are introduced to explain the discursive game that 
often occurs in the aftermath of a crisis because crises often generate 
a contest between frames and counter-frames concerning the nature 
and severity of a crisis, its causes, the responsibilities involved and 
the implications for the future (Boin et al., 2009). Actors manipulate 
and fight to have their frame accepted as the dominant narrative in re-
sponse to the crisis, because a crisis always entails some disturbance 
of governance as usual. People who want to change the status quo 
try to defend and strengthen their positions and authority in order to 
attract or deflect public attention so they can remove old policies and 
sow the seeds of new ones.
CRISES ARE SOME OF THE MOST 
PROMISING OPPORTUNITIES FOR 
ADVANCING POLICY IDEAS
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The perceptions of crisis are likely to vary both among and within 
communities, reflecting the different biases of stakeholders as a re-
sult of their different values, positions and responsibilities (Boin et al., 
2009). Boin et al. (2009) demonstrate that crises, and all other kinds of 
windows of opportunity, do not provide sufficient conditions for policy 
change to occur. Much depends on the way actors interpret, frame 
and react to crises. Framing and blaming within the framing contest 
can be a useful tool for critics to focus or absolve blame and for politi-
cians or civil servants in office to accept or deny responsibility. Within 
the framing contest, it can be useful for status quo players to resist 
or contain policy change, and for change agents to press for a policy 
paradigm shift or incremental reform.
Aligning frames
While frame contests directly relate to crises, this does not mean that 
crises are the sole possible cause for framing contests. For example, 
Benford and Snow (2000) discuss frame contests and disputes as be-
ing part of the discursive struggles over frame alignment, in their case, 
within and between social movement organisations (Benford, 1993; 
Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden & Benford, 1986). 
‘Frame alignment’ is explained as a means and necessary condition to 
mobilise society. Benford and Snow (2000) distinguish four types of 
frame alignment: frame bridging, frame amplification, frame exten-
sion and frame transformation.
‘Frame bridging’ is defined as the linking of ‘two or more ideo-
logically congruent but structurally unconnected frames regarding a 
particular issue or problem’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). ‘Frame 
amplification’ is ‘the idealization, embellishment, clarification, or in-
vigoration of existing values or beliefs’ (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 624). 
‘Frame extension’ is described as the effort to extend the frame be-
yond primary interests to incorporate issues and concerns that are 
presumed to be important to potential supporters. If frames do not 
sufficiently resonate with others, ‘frame transformation’ may be re-
quired by changing old understandings and meanings or generating 
new ones to secure the involvement and support of others (Benford & 
Snow, 2000, p. 625).
With respect to this discussion on the alignment of frames, it is 
interesting to note that the winning actors would most likely try to 
restrict the participation or involvement of others. This is defined as 
‘issue containment’ and is undertaken by limiting the ‘scope of con-
flict’. In contrast, the losing actors would try to expand the participa-
tion and involvement of others, which is defined as issue expansion 
(Baumgartner & Jones, 1991; Birkland, 2011, pp. 177, 186; McBeth et al., 
2007, p. 89; Schattschneider, 1960; Sharp, 1994).
We already note here the relationship and overlap between fram-
ing and networking strategies. The issues of containment and expan-
sion go alongside the limiting and broadening of participation and in-
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volvement of others in agenda setting. When conducting the empirical 
analysis of this study, it is important to be aware of disputes, contests 
or struggles over conflicting policy frames, not only as a reaction to an 
event or a crisis, but also as a part of the ongoing dynamic process of 
developing and aligning frames. Additionally, one needs to realise that 
there inevitably is overlap between both the framing and networking 
strategies, as discussed below.
2.5.2 Networking strategies
Next to framing strategies, networking strategies are crucial to suc-
cessfully set the agenda because agenda setting is dynamic and em-
bedded in complex multi-level governance networks. Hence, while 
policy entrepreneurs are often portrayed as individualists, loners or 
mavericks (deLeon, 1996), they tend to operate within teams, groups, 
coalitions or networks because they need to gain support and coordi-
nate their activities aimed at setting the agenda (Blavoukos & Bouran-
tonis, 2012; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Oborn et al., 2011; Olsson et al., 
2006; Roberts, 1998; Roberts & King, 1991; Schlager, 2007). Since ‘there 
are limitations to what policy entrepreneurs can do on their own’ (Rob-
erts & King, 1991, p. 172) networking and bringing together likemind-
ed actors can open up access to the necessary resources—including 
physical, juridical, financial and knowledge resources—required in the 
policy entrepreneurs’ risk-taking pursuit for change (Roberts & King, 
1991; Zahariadis, 2007). Policy processes are rarely dominated by a sin-
gle actor, with multiple actors usually involved (Kingdon, 2002; Rob-
erts & King, 1991). Therefore, entrepreneurs need to forge coalitions 
with other groups and organisations in order to expand their societal 
support and bundle the expertise, access and resources of others. In 
order for policy entrepreneurs to gain influence, they must be involved 
in managing networks, building coalitions and exploiting venues to 
acquire the resources needed to advocate ideas and anticipate resist-
ance from others during agenda setting. These three types of network-
ing strategies are discussed below.
Managing networks
Policy entrepreneurs must develop strategies to present their ideas to 
others. For this reason, they often spend large amounts of time network-
ing in and around different arenas of decision making (Mintrom, 1997; 
Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). Networking enables policy entrepreneurs to 
understand and anticipate the preferences and worries of other actors. 
Additionally, it helps policy entrepreneurs shape their arguments to 
make them convincing and compelling to potential supporters. Through 
networking, policy entrepreneurs also increase their visibility in policy-
making circles, which can be important in building a trustworthy and 
credible reputation (Mintrom & Vergari, 1996). Therefore, policy entre-
preneurs invest great effort in relational management and building trust 
with other actors in a network (Brouwer & Biermann, 2011).
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There are many different types of networks. They can be:
 O loosely or strongly connected
 O homogenously or heterogeneously composed
 O ad hoc formed or historically path dependent
 O informal or formal
 O open or closed to newcomers
 O transparent and open, or closed
 O comprised of participants with a high or low level of commitment
 O emerging, stable or deteriorating (Compston, 2009; Howlett & 
Ramesh, 2003; Kickert et al., 1997; Van Waarden, 1992).
It is argued that, without some minimal agreement about what the 
main policy problems are and how to solve them, networks cannot 
function (Fischer, 2003, p. 33). After an extensive survey of network 
concepts, Börzel (1998) concludes that:
they all share a common understanding, a minimal or lowest com-
mon denominator definition of a policy network, as a set of rela-
tively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical and inter-
dependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common 
interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to 
pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is 
the best way to achieve common goals. (p. 254)
Networks may offer a stepping-stone to creating a coalition. Through 
networking, policy entrepreneurs can gather reliable resources rela-
tively easily and efficiently and seek support to create a coalition (Fis-
cher, 2003). A coalition is ‘characterised by an (implicit) agreement on 
particular policy ideas or objectives, either because coalition mem-
bers share similar beliefs or because they are mutually dependent’ 
(Huitema & Meijerink, 2010, p. 6). In general, networks are much big-
ger than coalitions, and network members do not necessarily share a 
common policy idea or primary objective (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier & 
Weible, 2007b). One could say that every coalition is also a network, 
but not vice versa. In short, networks and network management offer 
opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to build coalitions with other 
individuals, groups and organisations who share similar beliefs or are 
mutually dependent.
Coalition building
Meijerink and Huitema (2009b) distinguish three types of coalitions. 
The first type is comprised of those who share certain ideas, beliefs 
and convictions related to any particular discipline (such as environ-
mental coalitions). The main activity is the advocacy of a particular 
set of ideas. Ways of knowing (Feldman & Ingram, 2009), sets of story 
lines (Hajer, 1995), narratives (Lejano et al., 2013) or core and policy 
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beliefs (Sabatier, 1988) are the binding element that holds all pieces 
together in a relatively coherent manner. The second type of coalition 
is a strategic alliance between those who do not necessarily share the 
same ways of knowing, set of storylines, narratives or core and policy 
beliefs, but share the same interest. Sometimes policy entrepreneurs 
manage to convince others who do not necessarily share interests that 
what will occur is in their interest. This can involve persuading others 
to accept that the policy entrepreneurs’ vision will serve the others’ 
(possibly narrow) interests (Fligstein, 2001, p. 114). Therefore, strategic 
alliances can easily result in what could be called ‘coalitions of con-
venience’, consisting of actors who may initially seem to have diverg-
ing interests, but manage to find common interests (Meijerink, 2005; 
Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Simmons et al., 2011). In these cases, a 
policy entrepreneur could ask another person or group not to get mar-
ried, but just to have one last dance (Simmons et al., 2011). The third 
type of coalition is the primarily resource-dependent coalition. These 
coalitions involve parties who do not share a binding element, but are 
dependent on each other to realise (possibly diverging) objectives.
From a policy entrepreneurial perspective, I regard coalition build-
ing of primary importance to expand resources (physical, juridical, 
monetary and knowledge) and gain support for the policy entrepre-
neurs’ objective. This can be a delicate matter because coalition build-
ing is both inclusive and exclusive to actors, and policy entrepreneurs 
need to decide whom to include and exclude. Who is in and out at 
certain stages of the policymaking process highly influences the re-
sources and tools available. In addition, the number of participants is 
important for gaining influence—the more actors involved, the harder 
it is to gain significant influence within the coalitions; however, if con-
sensus is reached, greater external influence is possible (De Bruijn & 
Ten Heuvelhof, 2001). The type of actors involved is also of importance 
because actors with political influence can help change decision mak-
ing more directly than actors outside the formal arena (Roberts, 1998).
Central to this are resources because the more resources a coali-
tion possesses, the more power the coalition has, and the greater its 
capacity to set the agenda and change policies or prevent change from 
occurring. Coalition building also involves formulating a joint goal with 
potential coalition members and thus negotiating interests and stakes 
(Sabatier & Weible, 2007b). Policy entrepreneurs most likely aim to 
gain on certain points, and will need to give in on others. Therefore, 
policy entrepreneurs and individual actors often manoeuvre and bal-
ance between advocacy and brokerage (Kingdon, 1984, 2002). They 
need to create consensus within a coalition to keep the focus on the 
‘preferred’ direction. However, they also need to create linkages with 
potential coalition members or related coalitions and expand issues. 
Coalitions or strategic alliances could be made by linking to other is-
sues (Brouwer, 2013; Cobb et al., 1976; Princen & Rhinard, 2006). A 
policy entrepreneur could create linkages with other problems or 
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solutions, anticipating that this will generate more attention and mo-
bilise societal and political support for the issue at stake (Baumgartner 
& Jones, 1993; McBeth et al., 2007; Sharp, 1994).
Issue linking may also help break or realign existing coalitions (Sa-
batier & Weible, 2007b). Double success may be reached if several 
issues or problems are linked to each other because, if successfully 
employed, multiple problems might be placed on the agenda simulta-
neously and generate a win-win situation (Brouwer, 2013). Every coali-
tion partner has some stake in its participation, and will try to gain 
from the cooperation. However, trying to achieve a win-win situation 
may lead to stagnation, delay, conflicts and polarisation if a consensus 
or agreement cannot be reached. A policy entrepreneur can also re-
define issues by reducing or substituting linkages to redundant issues 
to gain a better focus on the main objective of the policy entrepre-
neur and/or the coalition (Cobb et al., 1976), which I earlier discussed 
in terms of issue expansion versus issue containment (Baumgartner & 
Jones, 1991; Birkland, 2011, pp. 177, 186; McBeth et al., 2007, p. 89; 
Schattschneider, 1960; Sharp, 1994). To negotiate consensus within a 
coalition policy, entrepreneurs sometimes need to contain issues by 
dropping ideas that could damage their overall goal or relationships 
and interests, without losing sight of their own primary objectives.
What must be emphasised here is the obvious connection of issue 
linkage with the notion of frame alignment. Frame alignment, just as 
issue linkage for coalition building, is a means to attain support from 
others and possibly cooperate in larger groups. The idea is to bring 
people together who share similar views, which may mean issue link-
ing or frame bridging, amplifying, extending or transforming. Hence, 
here one can again see the overlap between framing and networking 
strategies, as it is believed that framing may enable policy entrepre-
neurs to make their policy idea or concept relevant to potential sup-
porters and coalition partners.
Venue exploitation
Part of networking is the exploitation of different venues—also de-
scribed as ‘venue exploitation’ (Huitema & Meijerink, 2010; Pralle, 
2003; True et al., 2007). This can be divided into venue shopping, ven-
ue manipulation and venue creation (Huitema & Meijerink, 2010). With 
venue shopping, policy actors seek out and attend the most favour-
able venues to further their issue (Pralle, 2003; True et al., 2007), since 
agenda setting is undertaken at various venues, each providing dif-
ferent opportunities to particular groups. Thus, policy entrepreneurs 
will seek out venues at different levels that are most relevant for them 
to influence the public, policy or politics (Richardson, (2000). Venues 
can also be manipulated to push forward personal policy ideas at a 
relevant venue or to air grievances with current policy (Pralle, 2003; 
Princen & Kerremans, 2008).
Policy entrepreneurs can also create their own venues to sell their 
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ideas, such as through pilot or demonstration projects and via creat-
ing and using symbols (Huitema & Meijerink, 2010; Lovell, 2009). As 
persuasion is crucial for gaining support, pilot projects can be used to 
promote innovative ideas in an attractive manner through the policy 
entrepreneurs’ chosen venue. To prevent a sprawl of shadow networks 
or alternative venues over which the government has no influence, the 
government sometimes publicly experiments with settling its own ven-
ues (Olsson et al., 2006). Public, private and state actors are invited to 
interact and discuss policy ideas. Of course, the government hopes 
this will help create synergy of knowledge and perspectives, thereby 
leading to possible consensus, support and legitimacy regarding fu-
ture governmental decisions.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter has offered a theoretical framework for the empirical 
analysis of the case studies. It has explained the agency perspective 
taken in this research, and outlined agenda setting, policy entrepre-
neurship and the framing and networking strategies that can be em-
ployed by policy entrepreneurs in their pursuit of setting agendas and 
either realising or preventing policy change.
In this study, policy entrepreneurs are actors who advocate and 
strategically seek to change or oppose policy by setting the agenda. 
The agenda-setting process is highly complex and dynamic; there-
fore, entrepreneurs need certain skills and motivations to persevere 
in this risk-taking and demanding venture. Framing strategies can be 
employed by policy entrepreneurs 
to raise awareness of perceptions 
of the issue at stake. By network-
ing, policy entrepreneurs also aim to 
gather resources because people are 
stronger together than they are alone. Public and political support is 
deemed crucial to setting the agenda. The above theoretical review 
has also made clear that policy entrepreneurs never operate in isola-
tion and thus need to be aware of their context in order to successfully 
navigate agenda setting. The next chapter presents and explicates the 
methodical approach used in this study.
HERE ONE CAN AGAIN SEE THE 
OVERLAP BETWEEN FRAMING 
AND NETWORKING STRATEGIES
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‘There is one thing even more 
vital to science than intelligent 
methods; and that is, the sincere 
desire to find out the truth, 
whatever it may be.’
Charles Sanders Peirce
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Figure 3.1: Map overview of selected cases:
1:  Second Delta Committee
2:  Nature Development
3:  Almere’s Urban Development
4:  Wind Park Noordoostpolder.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the research design and accounts for the 
choice made to study policy entrepreneurs and their strategies to set 
the agenda in the IJsselmeer area. As indicated in the first chapter, the 
main aim of this study is to gain a better understanding of the strate-
gies used by policy entrepreneurs to advocate or oppose policy change 
by setting the agenda. The methods chosen to study policy entrepre-
neurship must be ‘shaped to the specifics of the research subjects and 
their contexts’ (Mintrom & Norman, 2009, p. 661). As explained below, 
this research considers an in-depth case study approach best to stay 
close to the policy entrepreneurs within the context of the Dutch IJs-
selmeer area and better understand their strategies to set the agenda. 
After discussing the case study approach, this chapter presents the 
cases selection criteria and the selected four cases. It then accounts 
for the qualitative data collection methods used to analyse the cases, 
and concludes with a short outline of the four empirical chapters.
3.2 Case study approach
The case study approach is a research method that, at least within 
social sciences, is gaining credibility and becoming more commonly 
used (Flyvbjerg, 2008, 2011; Mahoney, 2007; Mahoney & Goertz, 2006; 
Yin, 1981, 2009). Case studies are generally the preferred research 
method when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are posed, an in-depth descrip-
tion and analysis is desired, the researcher has little control over the 
events, and the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real-
life context (Yin, 2009, p. 3). All these conditions apply to this research 
because it aims to understand how policy entrepreneurs try to set the 
agenda, and an in-depth description and analysis of policy entrepre-
neurship is sought. Further, there is no ambition to control or influence 
policy entrepreneurs in any kind of real-life or artificial setting. Finally, 
the focus is on the contemporary phenomenon of policy entrepreneur-
ship in the real-life context of the IJsselmeer area.
A case study is defined as ‘an intensive study of a single unit where 
the purpose of that study is—at least in part—to shed light on a larger 
class of units’ (Gerring, 2004, p. 342, 2007, p. 20). According to Ger-
ring (2007), the amount of cases is just a matter of degree. Both large-
N case studies and small-N case studies have the potential to explain 
social phenomena. However, there is a difference in methodological 
design when comparing large-N or small-N cases. Obviously, for large-
N case studies, it is often better and more feasible to use data collec-
tion methods that produce a lot of quantitative data, such as surveys 
and statistics. In contrast, when seeking to gain a more in-depth in-
sight via small-N case studies, it is better to use data-collection meth-
ods that produce qualitative data, such as face-to-face interviewing 
and document analysis. Gerring (2007) states, ‘The fewer cases there 
are, and the more intensively they are studied, the more a work merits 
the appellation “case study”’ (p. 20). Of course, in comparison, ‘the 
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more case studies one has, the less intensively each one is studied’ 
(Gerring, 2007, p. 21).
By conducting a few case studies, this study aims to produce a 
‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1994) of the policy process and the policy 
entrepreneurial strategies aimed at changing policy. A detailed and 
empirically rich description of the case studies will help understand, 
analyse and possibly explain the dynamics of agenda setting and the 
role and function of change agency in the IJsselmeer context (Fly-
vbjerg, 2008). Hence, I want to gain insight into empirical ‘traces’ of 
policy entrepreneurs’ strategies leading to agenda setting (Bennett & 
Elman, 2006; Blatter & Blume, 2008; Gerring, 2007). This means that I 
not only want to understand and identify policy entrepreneurs respon-
sible for employing their strategies and setting the agenda, but I also 
try to analyse how this policy change process can be explained and 
generalised (Mahoney, 2007). While the option existed to conduct a 
single case study, multiple cases enable cross-case analysis (Yin, 2009, 
p. 156).
By conducting multiple case studies and aggregating and synthe-
sising the findings on the strategies employed by policy entrepreneurs, 
I may be able to generalise to a ‘larger class of units’ than the context 
of the case studies themselves—that is, to improve external validity 
(Blatter & Blume, 2008; Gerring, 2007). However, it must be stressed 
that external validity via cross-case comparison is not the primary goal 
of this study, as it would not have been sufficient to undertake a quali-
tative case study with few cases. A quantitative cross-case analysis 
between a large sample of different cases would better serve that pur-
pose (Gerring, 2007).
3.3 Case selection
One of the biggest challenges of conducting case studies is to identify 
the unit of analysis and select the relevant cases (Collier & Mahoney, 
1996; Mahoney, 2007; Seawright & Gerring, 2008). The object of the 
study in this research is policy entrepreneurship in the IJsselmeer area 
aimed at setting the agenda for policy change or preventing change 
from happening, which makes the criteria for selecting cases relatively 
straightforward. I identified two main criteria for selecting the cases.
First, I selected typical cases (Gerring, 2007; Seawright & Ger-
ring, 2008) that concerned the IJsselmeer area. This was partly due 
to the funder of this research project, New Land Heritage Centre, 
A DETAILED AND EMPIRICALLY RICH DESCRIPTION OF 
THE CASE STUDIES WILL HELP UNDERSTAND, ANALYSE 
AND POSSIBLY EXPLAIN THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA 
SETTING AND THE ROLE AND FUNCTION OF CHANGE 
AGENCY IN THE IJSSELMEER CONTEXT 
55
which wants to gain a better understanding of the historical, current 
and possible future developments in the IJsselmeer area. It is also in 
its interest to make the knowledge and insights produced by this re-
search understandable, applicable and accessible to citizens and the 
organisation’s governmental, private and societal partners. While I ac-
knowledge that any other area could have been chosen to study policy 
entrepreneurship, the IJsselmeer area is of particular interest. As the 
introductory chapter revealed, the IJsselmeer area has undergone a 
unique transformation in the last 100 years. The history of the area 
can be characterised by continued innovation and change, as it has 
always been a nursery for newly emerging ideas, and a space for all 
kinds of actors advocating plans regarding land reclamation, water 
management, spatial planning, architecture, agriculture, socialisation, 
nature development and so forth (Van der Ham, 2007). This makes it 
an interesting unit of analysis for studying the role of policy entrepre-
neurs in setting the agenda. In sum, I regarded a substantive link to 
the IJsselmeer area as one of my conditions for selecting cases, and, 
because it is a geographical area, it made sense to select cases that 
had a potential spatial effect on the landscape.
Second, I selected cases in which policy entrepreneurs were im-
portant in the process of setting the agenda for policy change or pre-
venting change from happening. Thus, cases had to show the pro-
cess of agenda setting with the involvement of policy entrepreneurs. 
However, I did not a priori dismiss issues that were in the process of 
implementation because the theoretical review of theories on agenda 
setting already revealed that even policy plans being implemented can 
be blocked, cancelled or again put on the agenda. This happened with 
Plan Lely, since one of Lely’s projected polders—the Markerwaard—
was never created, and the implementation had been on and off the 
agenda numerous times (Goverde, 1987). Thus, in the real-life con-
text, the policy process does not need to follow a linear process of 
sequential stages, and agenda setting can continue to occur even after 
implementation. Therefore, while focusing on the influence of policy 
entrepreneurs’ strategies on agenda setting, plans that are being im-
plemented are not disregarded—if policy entrepreneurs have been in-
volved in agenda setting. The following sections account for the four 
cases selected based on the aforementioned two criteria.
3.4 Four cases
Given the two criteria for selecting cases, I took a very open-minded 
and flexible approach to selecting cases. To attain an idea of which 
issues showed potential for further research, explorative interviews 
were conducted with people familiar with the area and the topics of 
interest. Additionally, some public events were attended to determine 
the most important issues in the IJsselmeer area (see the next sec-
tion). This also helped assess whether cases would fit the above crite-
ria. Subsequently, the following four cases were selected.
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The first selected case was the Second Delta Committee—an ad 
hoc advisory board installed by the Dutch Cabinet in 2007. This com-
mittee, which is viewed as a single policy entrepreneur, employed 
policy entrepreneurial strategies to set the agenda for climate change 
adaptation in Dutch water management. An important spinoff of the 
Delta Committee is the Delta Programme, which regards the IJssel-
meer area as an important freshwater reservoir for drinking water, 
industries and agriculture. In the anticipation of climate adaptation, 
which is to include longer periods of drought and more periods of in-
tensive rainfall—leading to higher river water discharge—the function 
of the IJsselmeer area is likely to become even more important than it 
currently is. This is caused in part by the very successful agenda set-
ting of the Delta Committee. Some of the recommendations presented 
by the committee have already been implemented, or are currently 
being implemented.
The second case concerns a change in Dutch nature policy. In 
the 1990s, after a long tradition of nature preservation, Dutch nature 
policy moved to a new policy concept called ‘nature development’. A 
relatively small group of policy entrepreneurs played a crucial role in 
realising this change. They believe nature should not be preserved, but 
restored through the facilitation of natural processes, and should not 
refer to a pre-industrial stage from the mid-nineteenth century, but to 
a pre-human era. A prime example of the type of nature development 
advocated by this group of policy entrepreneurs is found in the na-
ture area of Oostvaardersplassen, which is part of the IJsselmeer area. 
As will be explained later, developments in the Oostvaardersplassen 
played an important role in the agenda setting of the concept of nature 
development. The case offers an example of mainly successful agenda 
setting. However, while some of the nature development ideas pre-
sented by these policy entrepreneurs have already been implemented 
or are being implemented, others have been cancelled.
The third case focuses on plans to create an infrastructural con-
nection between the cities of Almere and Amsterdam, and to build 
houses outer dike in the Markermeer-IJmeer. As the youngest and 
fastest growing city of the Netherlands, Almere has become impor-
tant in Dutch spatial planning. The ambition for Almere has become 
to accommodate the growing Dutch population by creating 60,000 
houses and 100,000 work places for 160,000 people, within a few 
decades (Urgentieprogramma Randstad, 2007). Almere is willing to 
accommodate this because city development, like outer-dike urbani-
sation with an infrastructural connection, could serve as an opportu-
nity to give Almere the socio-economic boost it requires. I found four 
policy entrepreneurs advocating these plans or opting for alternatives 
to the infrastructural connection. However, the plan for the outer-
dike urbanisation and infrastructural connection are being planned in 
the protected waters of the Markermeer-IJmeer. Hence, I found two 
policy entrepreneurs employing strategies to block this change and 
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preserve the Markermeer-IJmeer as it is, as an open landscape. As of 
2014, no final decision has been made on the outer-dike development 
or infrastructural connection between Almere and Amsterdam. This 
case study offers an example of non–decision making and continued 
agenda setting without clear winners and losers.
The fourth case concentrates on the plans for the largest onshore 
wind park in the Netherlands, located in the Noordoostpolder. During 
the 1990s, farmers in the Noordoostpolder became enthusiastic about 
wind energy and, over the years, joined together to develop plans for a 
large wind turbine park along the dikes of the Noordoostpolder. While 
many actors are in favour of the plans for the wind park, including the 
local, regional and national government, opposition started to increase 
in 2008 when the plan was discussed in the national news headlines. 
I found two groups of policy entrepreneurs with various backgrounds 
trying to hinder the policy process and stop the realisation of the wind 
park. Despite this opposition, the proponents succeeded in having 
their plan accepted for implementation, and the construction of the 
wind park began in early 2012.
The above description of the four selected cases demonstrates that 
they all match the criteria stated in the previous section. All cases have 
a spatial connection to the IJsselmeer area and (potentially) affect the 
landscape. Further, all cases show policy entrepreneurs trying to leave 
their mark on agenda setting. The cases provide examples of policy en-
trepreneurs—both advocates and opponents of policy change—who 
try to set the agenda with various successes and failures. As indicated 
in the previous chapter, this study does not systematically operation-
alise and analyse the various contexts; however, it does take them into 
account. The cases reveal that the policy entrepreneurs’ context may 
offer different constraints and opportunities to set the agenda effec-
tively or successfully. Notions of ‘effective’ or ‘successful’ employment 
of agenda-setting strategies are used interchangeably. Below, the 
qualitative data collection and analysis methods are presented.
3.5 Qualitative data collection and analysis
The present study is a qualitative research entailing qualitative data 
analysis. Boeije (2009) describes qualitative research as follows:
The purpose of a qualitative research is to describe and understand 
social phenomena in terms of the meaning people bring to them. 
The research questions are studied through methods enabling con-
tact with the people involved to an extent that is necessary to grasp 
what is going on in the field. (p. 11)
In line with this description of qualitative research, I was most interest-
ed in understanding—and, where possible, explaining—policy entre-
preneurship by analysing how policy entrepreneurs employ strategies 
to set the agenda for policy change in which they do or do not believe. 
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I did not place myself in a position to judge whether, for instance, a 
certain framing perspective is credible or not, and thus whether the 
wind park should or should not be constructed. However, this does not 
mean that people—particularly the respondents—did not care about 
my judgement, with more than one respondent trying to win me over 
to their cause. Apparently, academics are regarded as credible and 
important potential supporters.
To analyse the policy entrepreneurs’ perspective and gain more in-
depth understanding of what was occurring, I used a multiple, mixed, 
qualitative data collection model. My data collection methods includ-
ed semi-structured in-depth interviews, newspaper analysis and docu-
ment analysis. First, by using various data sources, I aimed to increase 
what Yin (2009) calls ‘construct validity’ (p. 116). A multiple data col-
lection method gave me the opportunity to cross-verify the data—for 
example, whether what was said during an interview was supported 
by official written policy documents, and, conversely, whether what 
I understood from the documents was supported by the respondents’ 
interpretations. Such a data collection method is called ‘data triangula-
tion’ because of the various data sources consulted, and ‘methodologi-
cal triangulation’ because of the multiple methods used in this study 
(Yin, 2009, p. 116).
Second, by using multiple and complementary sources of data, 
lines of enquiry can converge. This process of triangulation and cor-
roboration may strengthen arguments made by respondents. It also 
proves interesting to find any discrepancy between sources of evi-
dence—for example, when a statement made in an interview does not 
corroborate with what is found in policy documents. If that was the 
case, I chose to make this discrepancy clear by showing the sources of 
evidence. Again, it was not my goal to resolve conflicts, but rather to 
gain in-depth knowledge and understanding of the different perspec-
tives and strategies employed, especially when empirical data offer 
examples of a framing contest. The following section accounts for the 
data collection methods used in this research.
3.5.1 Semi-structured interviews
To attain an initial broad understanding of the history of the IJssel-
meer area and the current sensitive topics being discussed, I attended 
public events and conducted six informative and open interviews with 
experts from knowledge institutes and government agencies. These 
events and interviews helped better grasp the current sensitive top-
ics and suitable cases for this research. Later, to gather further em-
pirical data about each case, semi-structured in-depth interviews were 
conducted with an interview guide. The interview guide was based 
on a first theoretical operationalisation of the issue at stake and its 
history, the policy entrepreneurs involved, the strategies employed, 
the agenda-setting process, and the institutional context relevant to 
the case study. These interview topics helped provide insights to the 
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policy entrepreneurs and their strategies to set the agenda within their 
respective contexts.
Since every new interview—and the data in general—provided me 
with additional insights to the case, I remained flexible with regard to 
case-specific subtopics discussed during interviews, while never los-
ing sight of my research focus. To give one example, during the data 
collection of the Almere case, I found many interesting data about the 
personal characteristics of both Verhorst and Duivesteijn. I saw the 
potential to conduct a more detailed study of the personal charac-
teristics of policy entrepreneurs, and some of my interview questions 
were subsequently focused in that direction. However, for the reasons 
discussed in the previous chapter, I decided not to include a thorough 
analysis of the policy entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics. Con-
ducting research is an iterative process providing considerable oppor-
tunities for learning.
The selection of the respondents reflected the iterative nature of 
conducting research. The respondents were selected for a number of 
reasons. Some were chosen because I kept reading or hearing their 
names in the media or at various events, and I noted them as potential 
policy entrepreneurs. Other respondents were suggested to me dur-
ing the open informative interviews or other interviews. I would always 
compare suggested respondents with my 
own list that I had made beforehand. Ulti-
mately, I always made my own assessment 
of the usefulness or added value of a po-
tential respondent, and would either fol-
low up a lead or leave it be. As described 
below, not all respondents were policy en-
trepreneurs, but were people who could 
provide additional insights to the strate-
gies employed by the policy entrepre-
neurs, the agenda-setting process, the context and so forth.
The length of the interviews varied from 30 minutes to 2.5 hours. I 
conducted as many interviews as I deemed necessary to understand 
the policy dynamics and entrepreneurial strategies. A general rule of 
the thumb was that sufficient interviews were conducted when, as re-
searcher, I kept receiving the same information repeatedly. The inter-
views also had a snow-balling effect and proved helpful to gain access 
to other relevant data, such as documents, policies, reports and hints 
for contacting new interesting respondents (as discussed above). The 
respondents were always directly approached by me, via either tel-
ephone or email, with a request for an interview. All interviews were 
conducted at a location convenient for the respondent, and one inter-
view was conducted via telephone. If a respondent gave approval, I 
recorded the interview. I made notes during the interviews to help me 
remember and interpret what was being said and meant, and compare 
it with my theoretical concepts. The recordings and notes also helped 
DATA COLLECTION 
METHODS INCLUDED 
SEMI-STRUCTURED IN-
DEPTH INTERVIEWS, 
NEWSPAPER ANALYSIS 
AND DOCUMENT 
ANALYSIS
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me use quotations during the empirical analysis. I ensured anonymity 
and did not include the names of the respondents in the text or as a list 
in the appendix. All respondents were numbered and referred to with 
codes such as ‘R11’. Since I also conducted a newspaper analysis, I was 
also able to use quotations from newspaper articles. These quotations 
are more easily accessible to readers and often better formulated than 
interview quotations; therefore, I preferred using these quotations 
than the quotations from the interviews. Draft versions of the empiri-
cal chapters were sent to the interviewed policy entrepreneurs in or-
der to check for factual mistakes or misinterpretations on my behalf. In 
some instances, this led to minor factual revisions.
For the case study on the Second Delta Committee, I based my 
analysis of the framing strategies on a content analysis of the report 
and media utterances of the committee and newspaper articles. To 
gain a better understanding of the networking strategies, I used re-
search on the Second Delta Committee conducted by my colleagues, 
Boezeman and Vink, in various studies (Boezeman, Vink & Leroy, 2013; 
Vink, Boezeman, Dewulf & Termeer, 2013). They conducted nine in-
terviews with the people directly involved in the work of the Delta 
Committee; therefore, I used their work and interviewed one of the 
authors, Daan Boezeman, to validate the overall conclusions I drafted, 
especially on the networking strategies.
For the case study on nature development, I worked with my col-
league, Huub Ploegmakers, who had undertaken previous research 
and held eight interviews with various policy entrepreneurs and advo-
cates of nature development (Ploegmakers, 2008). Together, we con-
ducted an interview with one of the policy entrepreneurs to update the 
findings and insights. I also conducted two interviews with experts on 
nature development.
For the case study on Almere, I conducted 20 interviews with ex-
perts and key people, such as stakeholder representatives, policymak-
ers, governors, aldermen and a member of the Almere City Council. 
Some of these respondents were policy entrepreneurs. The interviews 
were held to identify the policy entrepreneurs who, from different per-
spectives and during several stages, had strategically attempted to 
set the agenda. Additionally, the interviews helped offer insight to the 
strategies employed by these policy entrepreneurs. Apart from one 
policy entrepreneur, Duivesteijn, who was unwilling to provide an in-
terview, I interviewed all the policy entrepreneurs discussed.
For the case study on the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, I conducted 
16 interviews with experts and key people, such as stakeholder rep-
resentatives, policymakers, governors and politicians. Some of these 
respondents were policy entrepreneurs. I interviewed all policy entre-
preneurs discussed in this case study.
To summarise, I used seven transcripts of interviews conducted by 
a colleague, and conducted a total of 46 interviews myself.
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3.5.2 Newspaper analysis
Alongside conducting interviews, I analysed newspaper articles. I 
searched all digitally available articles from Lexis Nexis—the Dutch 
database for newspaper articles. Lexis Nexis sources range from daily 
national newspapers to less frequently distributed local newspapers 
with a digitally available archive. I searched this database with differ-
ent search criteria, depending on the issue at stake in each case, and 
allowed Lexis Nexis to leave out duplicate news articles. I analysed all 
articles based on my theoretical framework, sought examples of fram-
ing and networking strategies employed by the policy entrepreneurs 
involved, and marked all relevant passages and quotations through-
out the articles. I then aggregated all highlighted text to find patterns, 
construct the policy process, and understand the policy entrepreneurs’ 
strategies.
For the case study on the Second Delta Committee, I searched for 
newspaper articles on this committee and selected articles contain-
ing the Dutch word ‘deltacommissie’, meaning ‘Delta Committee’, from 
LexisNet. This resulted in 179 newspaper articles ranging from Sep-
tember 2008, the presentation of the committee’s report, until Octo-
ber 2010, the time of conducting the analysis.
The initial plan for the media analysis of the case study on nature 
development was to focus on robust green corridors; however, this 
gave data that were too limited to gain in-depth insight to the policy 
entrepreneurial strategies. Therefore, I decided to approach the case 
study differently and focus on the most important advocates of nature 
development, the authors of the influential ‘Plan Stork’ (De Bruin et al., 
1986) and their ideas on nature development. Hence, I searched Lexis-
Net with the key words ‘natuur’ (nature) or ‘natuurontwikkeling’ (nature 
development), conjoined with the names of the policy entrepreneurs 
behind nature development: Frans Vera, Fred Baerselman, Dick de 
Bruin, Dirk Sijmons, Willem Overmars and Dick Hamhuis. This search 
resulted in a total of 392 newspaper articles available in July 2012 (the 
time of conducting the analysis) and provided sufficient data to study 
policy entrepreneurship on nature development.
After a first exploration of the issues at stake for the case study 
of Almere, three topics clearly emerged: an up-scaling of Almere by 
outer-dike urbanisation and creating an infrastructural connection be-
tween Amsterdam and Almere, alternative ideas on the infrastructural 
connection, and keeping the Markermeer-IJmeer open as it current-
ly is. A search with keywords including ‘ijmeer’, ‘ijland’ (island in the 
Markermeer-IJmeer), ‘ijmeerverbinding’ (infrastructural connection), 
‘schaalsprong’ (boost) and ‘Almere buitendijks’ (outer-dike Almere) re-
sulted in over 1,000 newspaper articles. After an initial scan, I found 
six policy entrepreneurs and used the above keywords conjoined with 
their names to further specify the search for newspaper articles. These 
policy entrepreneurs were Manja Verhorst, Michael van der Vlis, Je-
rome Adema, Klaas Breunissen, Arie-Willem Bijl and Adri Duivesteijn. 
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A total of 269 articles available in October 2012 (the time of conduct-
ing the analysis) were selected and included in the analysis.
For the case study on the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, I searched 
for newspaper articles containing ‘windpark Noordoostpolder’ (wind 
park Noordoostpolder) or ‘windmolenpark Noordoostpolder’ (windmill 
farm Noordoostpolder). The search resulted in 587 articles available 
in June 2013 (the time of conducting the analysis) and demonstrated 
the activity of more than one policy entrepreneur. I found various peo-
ple employing policy entrepreneurial strategies, including proponents 
such as René De Rond, Piet Bootsma, Tjitte de Groot, Pieter Meulendi-
jks, Dirk Louter, Henk Tiesinga, Anne Bliek, Janneke Wijnia and so 
forth. Opposing people included Leen van Loosen, Jaap Kroon, Harrie 
Hageman, Herma Coumou, Henk Hoving, Piet Reinders and Berthoo 
Lammers.
Overall, I studied a total of at least 1,427 newspaper articles. I delib-
erately say ‘at least’ because I continued to follow the news even when 
the major component of the empirical data analysis was already com-
plete. If relevant new information arose, I included this in the analysis 
to be as current as possible, as of early 2014.
3.5.3 Document analysis
With respect to each case, I studied the relevant documents, such 
as policies, plans, project documents, websites, videos, media utter-
ances, letters, notes of discussions in parliament and much more. I 
used the documents to check facts and cross-verify arguments made 
during interviews. However, the main reason for consulting these data 
sources was to construct and understand the policy process and the 
strategies employed by policy entrepreneurs. It also helped identi-
fy when and how the concept, idea or plan was mentioned, and by 
whom. Thus, I went as far back as the earliest mention of the ideas, 
plans and concepts in each case because a case study deserves—if 
possible—at least a 10-year framework in order to explain successful 
agenda setting and policy change (Birkland, 2004; Sabatier & Weible, 
2007a). The cases revealed that the timeframe for each case study var-
ied due to the different histories or ‘issue careers’ (Downs, 1972) of 
the issues. In every empirical chapter, before discussing the policy en-
trepreneurs and their strategies, I present the policies relevant to the 
issue discussed. The subsequent analyses of the policy entrepreneurs’ 
strategies to set the agenda demonstrate that the changes in policies 
are sometimes the effect of policy entrepreneurial actions, while, at 
other times, these changes are the effect of different causes outside 
the locus of influence of policy entrepreneurs. As far as the data were 
available to substantiate it, the empirical case studies reveal whether 
policy entrepreneurs were driving certain policy changes.
The case study on the Second Delta Committee is relatively recent, 
with the committee established in 2007 and presenting its report one 
year later. However, first it is important to discuss and understand the 
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Dutch history of dealing with water management and climate change 
in order to put the ideas suggested by the committee into their histori-
cal policy context. For example, the name of the ‘Second’ Delta Com-
mittee itself is a clear reference to the ‘first’ Delta Committee that was 
established after the devastating 1953 storm surge. The study of policy 
documents revealed that the Second Delta Committee has been influ-
ential in setting the agenda and changing policy post-2009.
The case study on nature development discusses the policy change 
from nature conservation to nature development. ‘Nature develop-
ment’ is to be regarded as the Dutch counterpart of international and 
European discourses on ‘ecological restoration’ and related concepts, 
and thus I first discuss these discourses. In the Netherlands, nature 
development was coined officially for the first time in 1977. Through-
out the years thereafter, thanks to the policy entrepreneurs’ efforts, 
the concept of nature development influenced not only nature policy, 
but also water management policy. Therefore, I sketched the Dutch 
history of both nature and water management policy in relation to the 
concept of nature development.
The case study on Almere concentrates on the agenda setting of 
outer-dike urbanisation of Almere and an infrastructural connection 
from Almere to Amsterdam. Both were first mentioned in policy in 
1977. In the case study, I present the national, regional and local spatial 
planning policy on these plans. Some of the policy entrepreneurs dis-
cussed have influenced these policy changes.
The case study on the wind park focuses on the plans to build a 
wind park in the Noordoostpolder. The plan for the wind park was first 
suggested in local policy in 1998, and later taken over in provincial 
and national policy. Therefore, before going deeper into the strategies 
employed by the policy entrepreneurs involved, I present the local, 
provincial and national policies concerning wind energy in the Noor-
doostpolder. Some of the policy entrepreneurs discussed have cleverly 
induced or exploited these policy changes.
3.6 Outline of empirical chapters
All the empirical chapters follow a similar outline by first introducing 
the issue at stake, second discussing the relevant policies, third ana-
lysing the framing and networking strategies employed, and finally 
presenting the case study’s main conclusion regarding the strategies 
employed and the most important contextual factors. Although this 
outline is followed in each empirical chapter, the discussion of the 
framing and networking is presented differently in each case. This was 
done because it was believed to best fit the case characteristics.
The Second Delta Committee is regarded a single agent policy en-
trepreneur that acted during a specific, relatively short period; there-
fore, it made most sense to first discuss the framing strategies and 
then the networking strategies. There were various advocates of na-
ture development working together over a few decades, which made 
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it more straightforward to follow the sequence of events and strate-
gies employed as chronologically as possible in three fairly separate 
periods or topics. Moreover, as the case study on the Second Delta 
Committee had already begun to make clear, framing and network-
ing strategies overlap, sticking to a strict divide between framing and 
networking became more complicated for me to structure and present 
the case study findings, and less easy for readers to follow. The case 
on Almere showed an increase in complexity as six policy entrepre-
neurs advocated different ideas on the three main issues at stake that 
I identified. The six could be best discussed in pairs, related to one 
of the three issues, and their strategies are subsequently discussed 
as chronologically as possible. The case on the wind park concerned 
a clear coalition of convenience of proponents and two coalitions of 
convenience of opponents from the municipality of Urk and the Noor-
doostpolder. Therefore, the subsection on the policy entrepreneurs’ 
strategies is divided into these three coalitions of convenience and 
discussed as chronologically as possible. More about this is presented 
in each of the empirical chapters. Below, I briefly present the main 
outlines of the empirical chapters and account for the various places 
where the case studies have been published elsewhere.
The next chapter, Chapter 4, discusses the case on the Second Del-
ta Committee, which is regarded as a single policy entrepreneur. After 
introducing the issue at stake and describing the relevant policies, the 
framing and networking strategies of this committee are analysed. It is 
concluded that the agenda was set successfully thanks to the strate-
gies employed by the Delta Committee. This case study was published 
in four different ways. First, it was published in Water Alternatives 
(Verduijn et al., 2012). Second, it was translated and adjusted to be 
presented in the year book on the cultural heritage of the Province of 
Flevoland (Verduijn, 2011). Third, it was published in a revised form as 
a chapter in an edited volume on water governance as connective ca-
pacity (Verduijn, 2013b). Fourth, it was shortened, translated and pub-
lished in the Dutch professional journal, Geography (Verduijn, 2013a).
Chapter 5 presents the case on nature development. After intro-
ducing the concept of nature development and sketching the relevant 
policy developments, the empirical analysis is structured in three top-
ics: the triggers for the new nature development concept; the develop-
ing and disseminating of nature development along the major rivers; 
and the implementation of the ecological infrastructure (Ecologische 
Hoofdstructuur—EHS), including a robust corridor for nature in the 
southern part of the province of Flevoland. Based on the empirical 
analysis, I conclude that the policy entrepreneurs and their strategies 
were mainly successful in setting the agenda and changing policy from 
(mainly) nature conservation to nature development in both nature and 
water management policies. This case study is forthcoming in Environ-
mental Values (Verduijn, Ploegmakers, Meijerink & Leroy, in press).
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Chapter 6 focuses on the outer-dike urbanisation of Almere and an 
infrastructural connection from Almere to Amsterdam. First, it intro-
duces the case study, then it describes the national, regional and local 
policy developments with regard to the plans for the urban develop-
ment of Almere. The main section focuses on the strategies employed 
by six policy entrepreneurs. Four of these policy entrepreneurs are in 
favour of all, or part, of the plan to implement outer-dike urbanisation 
and build an infrastructural connection. Two of the policy entrepre-
neurs are against these plans and want to preserve the Markermeer-
IJmeer as it currently is. Thus, the structure of the chapter is based 
on the policy entrepreneurs and the issue for which they stand. This 
case study is forthcoming in an edited volume on entrepreneurship 
(Verduijn, in press).
Chapter 7 concentrates on the case study of the Wind Park Noor-
doostpolder. First, the issue at stake is introduced, after which the rel-
evant developments of local, provincial and national policies on wind 
energy in the Noordoostpolder are presented. The chapter then fo-
cuses on the advocates of the wind park, after which it discusses the 
policy entrepreneurs opposing the construction of the wind park, in 
two groups. One group of actors opposing the Wind Park Noordoost-
polder lives in the municipality of Urk, while the other group of oppos-
ing actors comes from the municipality of Noordoostpolder.
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter’s case study concerns the Second Delta Committee that 
formulated recommendations to anticipate climate change in water 
management. The Second Delta Committee has been successful in 
placing its recommendations on the public, policy and political agen-
da. Some of these recommendations are currently being implemented. 
The case study offers a powerful example of successful agenda setting 
induced by a policy entrepreneur in the absence of a crisis or focus-
ing event that would have clearly demonstrated a need for change in 
water management policies. Moreover, the committee—partly due to 
its successful framing and networking strategies—did not face con-
siderable opposition from others. To be able to analyse the strategies 
employed by the Second Delta Committee, this discussion must begin 
in the year 2007.
In 2007, the Dutch Cabinet installed the Second Delta Committee, 
named after its famous predecessor, the Delta Committee, which was 
established after the dramatic storm surge of 1953 that killed 1,835 
people. The Second Delta Committee, chaired by the former Minister 
of Agriculture, Cees Veerman, was asked to formulate recommenda-
tions for strategies for long-term flood protection and freshwater man-
agement. The committee subsequently issued its advice in the 2008 
publication, Working Together with Water: A Living Land Builds for 
its Future (Veerman, 2008). The committee’s main recommendations 
were that the Dutch government should:
 O prepare and implement a second Delta Programme aimed at 
maintaining and improving water safety and freshwater availability
 O institutionalise a new Delta Act
 O establish a Delta Fund of €1.2 to €1.9 billion extra per annum until 
2050 to provide the necessary resources to implement the second 
Delta Programme
 O appoint a Delta Commissioner to supervise the programme’s 
implementation.
The committee has contributed considerably to awareness of the po-
tential effect of climate change on Dutch water management, and the 
Dutch national government accepted all its main recommendations 
(Anonymous, 2008e; Boezeman et al., 2013; Brief van de staatssecre-
taris van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008; Haasnoot & Middelkoop, 2012; 
Van Kalles, 2008a, 2008b; Vink et al., 2013). Unlike earlier committees, 
the Second Delta Committee did not draft its advice in the aftermath 
of a disaster—there had been no recent flooding when the commit-
tee was installed or when it presented its report. The committee itself 
is aware of the rather unusual circumstances in which it had to issue 
recommendations—‘Our Committee’s mandate is therefore unusual: 
we have been asked to come up with recommendations, not because 
a disaster has occurred, but rather to avoid one’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 7).
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This case study offers no in-depth account of the differences be-
tween individual members of the committee, or the process leading to 
the selection of the committee’s members. Instead, the whole commit-
tee is regarded as a single policy entrepreneur and discussed as such. 
First, this chapter briefly discusses the recent history of Dutch water 
safety policy, which already points to the effect of the Second Delta 
Committee on policy change. Second is an analysis of the framing and 
networking strategies. Third, the case-specific findings are discussed.
4.2 Policy on water safety
The Dutch have a long tradition in dealing with water problems and 
the changing climate (Haasnoot & Middelkoop, 2012). This has led to 
well-experienced public authorities, such as Rijkswaterstaat and the 
water boards (waterschappen), and to world-famous knowledge insti-
tutes, both public and private, such as the Institute for Water Educa-
tion, UNESCO-IHE, Deltares, Arcadis and Royal HaskoningDHV (Bosch 
& Van der Ham, 1998; Wiering & Immink, 2006). The aftermath of the 
aforementioned storm surge of 1953 reinforced the technocratic ap-
proach undertaken by Rijkswaterstaat, and strengthened its role and 
autonomous position in the field of water management.
On 31 January 1953, the province of Zeeland was unexpectedly con-
fronted with a dramatic storm surge in which 200,000 hectares of land 
were flooded and 1,835 people died. It had already been concluded 
by the Dutch Storm Water Committee in 1941 that higher dikes were 
needed to protect the human-made lowlands in the western parts of 
the Netherlands during storm surges (Meijerink, 2005). However, this 
safety issue did not gain attention until the storm surge in 1953. Twenty 
days after this storm surge, the government established an advisory 
Delta Committee to determine smart solutions to coastal flooding. The 
result was a sixfold report called the ‘Delta Plan’ that led to the Delta 
Act and the implementation and realisation of the Dutch Delta Works. 
During the decade following 1953, dikes were strengthened and new 
dams were built to close the estuaries in the province of Zeeland. The 
Delta Works became the nation’s proudest major public work in its de-
fence against water.
During the 1970s, an ‘ecological turn’ was witnessed within Rijk-
swaterstaat and the field of water management in general (Disco, 
2002). This shift was caused partly by the publication of The Limits 
to Growth (Meadows, Meadows, Randers & Behrens III, 1972) by the 
Club of Rome, which increased attention on ecology and the limits to 
industrialisation, economic growth and welfare. In addition, the tra-
ditional view on water management was being contested because it 
was deemed harmful to ecology. With regard to the implementation 
and realisation of the Dutch Delta Works, this led to the decision to 
create a half-open, highly innovative, storm-surge barrier construction 
that would be open at all times, unless another storm surge was an-
ticipated. The ecological turn was also witnessed during part of the 
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implementation of the Zuiderzee Works (mentioned in Chapter 1) be-
cause one of the polders, called Markerwaard, was not implemented 
due to the involvement of interest groups, such as the Association for 
Preservation of the IJsselmeer (Vereniging tot Behoud van het IJs-
selmeer). Opponents of the implementation of the Markerwaard ar-
gued—among other things—that a more holistic perspective on the 
IJsselmeer was needed, in which ecological and environmental inter-
ests would also be taken into account (Goverde, 1987).
The near-flooding of the major Dutch rivers in 1993 and 1995 also 
contributed to the idea that a new approach to water management 
was needed, such as giving room to the river, as well as strengthening 
the dikes (see Chapter 5). In 1993, central parts of the Netherlands 
faced possible flooding caused by high water in the Rhine and Meuse 
rivers. Some parts of the rivers already flooded in the province of Lim-
burg, but this did not lead to the breaking of dikes, severe flooding or 
major evacuations. In 1995, there was again high water and, because 
the government feared the breaking of dikes and flooding, 250,000 
people were evacuated. While the water level lowered and the threat 
of major flooding disappeared, the government realised that some-
thing needed to be done.
Therefore, in 1995, the emergency Delta Act for Major Rivers was 
introduced to strengthen the dikes, and, in 1996, the ‘Room for River’ 
policy line was proposed to widen the rivers and create more space 
for overflow (Beleidslijn Ruimte voor de rivier, 1996). In 2000, the new 
‘Committee Water Management 21st Century’ argued that water issues 
should be prioritised when drafting policies for issues such as spatial 
planning (Tielrooij, 2000). The Dutch ‘fight against water’ paradigm 
shifted towards a more adaptive approached labelled ‘living with wa-
ter’ (Meijerink, 2005; Roth, Warner & Winnubst, 2006). With Al Gore’s 
2006 Academy Award winning documentary An Inconvenient Truth, 
and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2007 re-
ports, awareness of climate change grew. This growing awareness of 
climate change, diversity of approaches to water management and 
extensive knowledge and experience of the Dutch with water man-
agement may explain the demand by the Cabinet Balkenende IV to 
the Second Delta Committee to develop recommendations on how to 
protect the Dutch coast and low-lying hinterland against the conse-
quences of climate change (Veerman, 2008).
The National Water Plan 2009–2015 (2009) almost entirely follows 
the recommendations of the committee. More importantly, as a re-
action to the Second Delta Committee’s recommendation, a National 
Delta Programme and Delta Commissioner became operative at the 
end of 2009 in anticipation of the associated Delta Act and Delta Fund, 
which became legally enforced and effective as of 1 January 2012 (Del-
tawet waterveiligheid en zoetwatervoorziening, 2011). The Delta Com-
missioner has been explicitly trying to gain civic engagement for short- 
and long-term actions. For example, in November 2010, the Delta 
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Commissioner organised the first National Delta Congress (recurring 
yearly) to which he invited the then Dutch Royal Prince; the Secre-
tary of State; representatives from business, municipalities, provinces, 
water boards and ministerial departments; scientists; and numerous 
other actors from society. There was significant consensus between all 
parties that there was an urgency to join forces, take action and ‘work 
together with water’. Unsurprisingly, this was also the title of the Sec-
ond Delta Committee’s report. Currently, the Delta Commissioner and 
his staff prepared five ‘Delta Decisions’ to anticipate climate change 
in managing the delta for the long term. In 2015, the government will 
decide on the Delta Decisions and the implications for further policy-
making.
4.3 Framing and networking strategies
In this section, the policy entrepreneurs’ framing and networking strat-
egies are discussed. As there has been no considerable opposition, no 
opposing policy entrepreneurs are discussed. However, I will substan-
tiate the claim that the committee has successfully set the agenda. 
4.3.1 Framing strategies
Adherence to the climate adaptation discourse
According to Second Delta Committee, ‘The Netherlands delta is safe, 
but preserving this safety over the long term involves action now’ 
(Deltacommissie, 2008b). The discourse to which the committee ad-
heres and contributes is the climate adaptation discourse. There is a 
stream of research and literature emerging on the need to adapt to 
climate change, from 
the global to the local 
level (IPCC website, 
2013). The logic is that 
the climate is undenia-
bly changing and that 
society should adapt to these changes: ‘Climate change is now forcing 
itself upon us: a new reality that cannot be ignored ’ (Veerman, 2008, 
p. 5). The committee argues that, even if the international communi-
ties were to meet the goals set down by the Kyoto Protocol and its suc-
cessors, and even if greenhouse gas emissions worldwide were to be 
cut drastically tomorrow, global warming would continue for centuries 
(Veerman, 2008, p. 45).
The committee states that, ‘The predicted sea level rise and greater 
fluctuations in river discharge compel us to look far into the future, to 
widen our scope and to anticipate developments further ahead’ (Veer-
man, 2008, p. 5). In the committee’s view (Veerman, 2008, pp. 5, 44, 
88), the best way for both people and nature to stay abreast of chang-
ing conditions involves anticipating natural processes and building 
with nature, where possible:
CLIMATE CHANGE IS NOT FRAMED AS A 
MATTER OF DISCUSSION, BUT AS A PLAIN 
FACT THAT SHOULD BE ANTICIPATED
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The best long-term strategy to keep the Netherlands safe and a 
pleasant place to live is to develop along with the changing climate. 
Moving with and utilising the natural processes where possible 
leads to solutions that allow humans and nature to adapt gradually. 
This further affords better opportunities for combined, multifunc-
tional solutions for functions such as constructing infrastructure, 
reserving land for housing and business parks, using land for agri-
culture, recreation and nature.
By using the climate adaptation discourse as its starting point, the 
committee succeeded in raising awareness for its problem definition 
and solutions. This discourse unites the Netherlands and the global 
community because climate change is evident both globally and lo-
cally. Climate change is not framed as a matter of discussion, but as a 
plain fact that should be anticipated. Action is deemed urgently need-
ed (Vink et al., 2013).
Using the story of the delta identity
The proposed measures for adapting to climate change are support-
ed by a relatively implicit story of the delta identity. Throughout the 
report, the Delta itself—with its dikes, dams, mounds, sluices and 
pumping stations—is the symbol of which the Dutch are told to be 
proud because its mechanisms defend them against water and indi-
cate that they have been able to live, work, invest and recreate in a 
once vulnerable delta, for centuries (Veerman, 2008). The entire delta 
system, which is said to be the safest in the world, is presented as a 
success story—a symbol of which the people can be proud, and that 
sets them apart from other countries. The committee states:
One cannot conceive of the Netherlands without water. Through 
the centuries, and still today, the inhabitants of our delta have 
made great efforts to struggle from the grasp of the rivers and the 
sea, and it is this that sets our country apart. (Veerman, 2008, p. 5)
At the same time, this symbol of the Delta is used to remind the people 
that they also depend on it. In some sense, the committee is trying to 
communicate a double message—on the one hand, there is no reason 
for panic, but, on the other, they should feel the urgency to take ac-
tion. The dike, as a symbol of defence, is used to tell the people these 
two messages: the dike is safe, but not safe enough. As discussed be-
low, this corresponds with Stone’s (2002) descriptions of the ‘story of 
social control’ and ‘story of decline and crisis’.
The ‘story of social control’ states that, in terms of water, the Dutch 
have always been able to ensure that the country is a safe place to 
live: ‘in our interaction with the water, we, the country’s residents, can 
ourselves shape the Netherlands of the future—just as our forefathers 
have always done throughout the centuries’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 97). 
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Based on the long tradition and experience of living in a delta, the peo-
ple ‘master the long-term challenge of keeping the Netherlands a safe, 
attractive country’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 97). They are able to ‘keep the 
Netherlands a prosperous, safe country with sufficient clean water 
for humans and livestock: we have the time, the knowledge and the 
means’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 37). Thus, although the undeniable force of 
climate change is upon them, it may also offer new prospects, chances 
and opportunities. If they combine multiple functions, such as water 
safety, energy production and nature development, they will be able 
to strengthen the defence system, create new energy and create new 
forms of nature. Examples of these are multifunctional dikes, tidal sys-
tems and ecologically robust riverbanks (Anonymous, 2010a).
The committee wants the people to have this mentality of control 
and future prosperity:
It is for an attitude like this that the Committee is pleading; let eve-
rybody dare to form a clear picture of what we can expect and think 
ahead to the way we can cope with these challenges. Even better: 
how can future opportunities be created? (Veerman, 2008, p. 37)
Like their forebears, with their challenging creations—such as the 
world-famous Eastern Scheldt storm-surge barrier—the people will be 
able to secure the Netherlands, create new space for living and put the 
Netherlands on the map again. The committee hopes to open the door 
for engineering enterprises and for energy production companies to 
showcase their innovative products and solutions, while also boosting 
the Netherland’s image and economy.
The committee also tells a ‘story of decline and crisis’ alongside 
its story of control. The floods of 1953 remind the people that taking 
good care of the water defence system remains their responsibility: 
‘the disastrous floods of 1953 are still etched into our collective mem-
ory’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 7). The Netherlands is home to a rich natural 
environment and has a wealth of history and culture, which the people 
cannot run the risk of losing (Veerman, 2008, p. 46). In the committee’s 
18-minute film that supports the report (Deltacommissie, 2008a), this 
story of decline is promoted and supported with the explicit use of 
symbols. The committee asked Hans Emans Media productions to cre-
ate this film. Emans had previously made persuasive reconstructions 
of various crises with deadly casualties in the Netherlands, such as the 
2000 fireworks explosion in Enschede, the 2000/2001 New Year’s café 
fire in Volendam, and the 2005 fire at the Detention Centre Schiphol-
East (Marlet, 2006; Van der Steen, 2009). From the committee’s per-
spective, the choice of this experienced filmmaker was a success be-
cause Emans visualised the committee’s frame in a very compelling 
manner.
The film recalls and frames the flooding in 1953 to warn of the threats 
of climate change. The film includes original black and white footage 
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of the flood, with ominous background sounds. Next, the voiceover 
moves directly to discuss the measures taken by the Dutch govern-
ment to prevent that flooding from recurring. At the same time, the 
images smoothly change from black and white to colour images. The 
video then switches to the present day and discusses today’s global 
warming and climate change. The (near) river floods in 1993 and 1995 
in some parts of the Netherlands are recalled to link climate change 
to the current threat of flooding. While showing the high level of wa-
ter next to the dikes at that time, the voiceover states, ‘Fortunately, it 
didn’t come to a catastrophe, but the message was clear [silence for 
two seconds]’ (Deltacommissie, 2008a). The film then quickly moves 
to the commissioning of the Second Delta Committee in 2007, and the 
remainder of the film is devoted to explaining the committee’s frame. 
This is supported with images of the storm in 2005 in New Orleans. 
The voiceover states, ‘If we don’t anticipate the future, if we do noth-
ing, floods just like this one [emphasising tone] could also hit the Neth-
erlands, causing enormous damage and suffering, and years of disrup-
tion of our society’ (Deltacommissie, 2008a). A map is then shown of 
the Netherlands with the potential flooding effect if no action is taken. 
This explains and indicates all the critical problems this may cause. 
The film then states that water also offers significant opportunities, 
before moving on to the recommendations the committee deems nec-
essary. The video ends by repeating the committee’s main objective: 
‘How can we create the conditions that will make this country an at-
tractive place to live, work, invest and recreate, for many generations 
to come? As far as this committee is concerned, we can start realising 
those conditions, today’ (Deltacommissie, 2008a).
The use of images, in this specific order, supports the story and im-
age of the delta system that is under threat. The disasters, examples, 
footage, facts about climate change, ominous sounds and warning 
pictures create awareness of the urgency and necessity of taking ac-
tion. The committee aims for the viewer to accept this frame by using a 
certain climate change and threat rhetoric, vocabulary, argumentation 
and language in order to convince people to turn the tide of this ‘story 
of decline and crisis’. However, in the last few seconds of the video, the 
committee wants to close with a positive message of ‘control’. As the 
quotation above shows, the committee wants to assure viewers that 
they have the means available to make the country an attractive place 
to live, work, invest and recreate for many generations to come.
This story of the delta identity has bound the people together in the 
Netherlands throughout the centuries. Apart from the crisis anticipa-
tion, the people are able to exert control. History has shown that it is 
necessary to adapt and the country has always been able to do so. The 
strength of the committee’s framing is that it was able—both in the re-
port and video—to support this compelling story. The delta becomes 
part of the people’s own identity, who all live in this delta and share the 
same identity: ‘the sea and the rivers have shaped our identity and the 
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country itself: its nature and landscape, its prosperity and economy, 
and the way it is governed (the water boards; the polder model)’ (Veer-
man, 2008, p. 5). If the people want to uphold their identity, the delta 
system cannot be lost to climate change. The delta symbolises their 
identity. It is as if the committee is saying that no self-appreciating 
nation or human being would want to lose grip of its identity, and thus 
the people need to join forces to keep the spirit of the delta identity 
alive—at least over the coming decade, but preferably throughout the 
coming centuries. The committee’s own recommendations are pre-
sented as the logical next step in this history of living with water. Col-
lectively, the people should embrace the urgent challenges they face 
in the future.
Creating a sense of urgency and collectiveness
The title of the press release was indicative of one of the main con-
clusions the committee wanted to communicate: ‘Wide ranging inter-
vention for water safety urgent: Decisiveness and investment needed’ 
(Deltacommissie, 2008b). At the moment, according to the committee, 
the Netherlands is unprepared for climate change because ‘the flood 
risk will increase and the freshwater supply will come under pressure if 
no extra measures are taken’ (Veerman, 
2008, p. 29). The committee seems to 
realise that, in order to push forward 
drastic and very costly measures, a 
sense of urgency and collectiveness is 
needed, especially in times of financial 
crises. Therefore, the committee keeps 
reminding the people that the Netherlands faces an urgent, but not 
acute, threat: ‘for us, the Second Delta Committee, the threat is not 
acute, but our mandate is nevertheless urgent. There is absolutely no 
reason for panic, but we must be concerned for the future’ (Veerman, 
2008, pp. 5,7). This is included in the report several times:
[The Netherlands must] accelerate its efforts because, at present, 
even the current standards of flood protection, which are even out 
of date, are not being met everywhere. In the meanwhile climate 
is changing rapidly, the sea level is probably rising faster than has 
been assumed, and more extreme variations in river discharge are 
expected. In addition, the economic, societal and physical stakes in 
the Netherlands are great and growing still. The committee warns 
that a breach in a dike has seriously disruptive consequences for 
the entire country. (Veerman, 2008, p. 10)
The committee also states that:
[f]lood risk management is a pressing issue right now in a large 
number of places and will only become more urgent as the sea level 
THE COMMITTEE’S OWN 
RECOMMENDATIONS ARE 
PRESENTED AS THE LOGICAL 
NEXT STEP IN THIS HISTORY 
OF LIVING WITH WATER
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continues to rise, river discharges fluctuate more and more, and as 
interests that need protection increase in value. (Veerman, 2008, 
p. 23)
Instead of focusing on the Dutch coast alone, the committee broad-
ened its assignments and, accordingly, its policy recommendations 
(Boezeman et al., 2013). The committee was appointed by the Cabinet 
as a Committee of the State, called the Sustainable Coastal Develop-
ment Committee. Its mandate was to formulate a vision for the long-
term protection of the Dutch coast, not the Netherlands in its entirety. 
However, in the report, the committee proposes an integral approach 
for the Netherlands as a whole:
The Committee takes a broad view of the coast: it includes the sea 
and the coastal zone as well as the low-lying hinterland, the inter-
action with the rivers and the IJsselmeer lake, and the cross-bor-
der aspects of the rivers and the coastal zone. This broad interpre-
tation is necessary because, to a great extent, the system forms 
a single hydrological, ecological and economic entity. (Veerman, 
2008, p. 17)
By broadening the frame and viewing the challenges faced by the 
‘Dutch Delta’ as a whole, the committee succeeds in making the report 
and task a matter of national interest of utmost priority.
First, broadening the frame gave the committee room to connect 
issues and make trade-offs. One example is the recommendation to 
raise the water level of the IJsselmeer because of the growing need for 
freshwater in the future, while proposing to return part of the fresh-
water delta to the open sea at the Krammer-Volkerak Zoommeer in the 
southwest—Recommendations 8, 10 and 11 in the report. Thus, on the 
one hand, the proposal is to strengthen the hard line between freshwa-
ter and saltwater to maintain and enlarge the freshwater basis of the 
IJsselmeer, while, on the other hand, the committee suggests a salinity 
gradient—a transition between freshwater and saltwater—to create 
new ecological opportunities. The only way to ensure people support 
this is to create a sense of collectiveness and matter of national inter-
est, whereby regional, local or individual interests have to take a back 
seat.
Second, the integral approach to regard the Netherlands as a 
whole gave the committee room to make the challenges faced by the 
Netherlands an exceptional matter of national interest of utmost prior-
ity, and to state that money may not, and cannot, prevent the required 
action. The committee states that ‘money must not be an impediment’ 
and that they need a ‘national frame of reference’ to provide money 
and take action: ‘[t]he Delta Director keeps the Delta Programme on 
course, creates a national frame of reference, facilitates, and encour-
ages (nationally and in the regions) and, where necessary, is the one 
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Recommendation 1: Flood protection level
The present flood protection levels of all diked areas must be 
improved by a factor of 10. To that end, the new standards must be 
set as soon as possible (around 2013). In some areas where even 
better protection is needed, a so-called ‘Delta Dike’ concept is 
promising. These dikes are either so high or so wide and large that 
there is virtually zero probability that the dike will suddenly and 
uncontrollably fail. With regard to specific or local conditions, this 
will require a tailor-made approach. All measures to increase the 
flood protection levels must be implemented before 2050. Post-2050, 
the flood protection levels must be updated regularly.
Recommendation 2: New urban development plans
The decision of whether to build in low-lying flood-prone locations 
must be based on a cost-benefit analysis. This must reveal present 
and future costs for all parties. Costs resulting from local decisions 
must not be passed on to another administrative level, or to society 
as a whole. They must be borne by those who benefit from these 
plans.
Recommendation 3: Areas outside the dikes
New development in unprotected areas lying outside the dikes must 
not impede the river’s discharge capacity or the future levels of water 
in the lakes. Residents/users are responsible for the measures that 
may be needed to avoid adverse consequences. The government 
plays a facilitating role in such areas as public information, setting 
building standards and flood warnings.
Recommendation 4: North Sea coast
Build with nature. Off the coasts of Zeeland, Holland and the 
Wadden Sea Islands, flood protection will be maintained by beach 
nourishments, possibly with relocation of the tidal channels. Beach 
nourishments must be undertaken in such a manner that the coast 
can expand seaward in the next century. This will provide great 
added value to society. Sand extraction sites in the North Sea 
must be reserved in the short term. The ecological, economic and 
energy requirements needed to nourish such large volumes must be 
investigated. Post-2050, beach nourishments continue, with more or 
less sand required, depending on sea level rise.
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Recommendation 5: Wadden Sea area
The beach nourishments along the North Sea coast may contribute 
to the adaptation of the Wadden Sea area to sea level rise. However, 
the existence of the Wadden Sea area as it is currently known is by 
no means assured, and depends entirely on the actual rate of sea 
level rise over the next 50 to 100 years. Developments will have to be 
monitored and analysed in an international context. The protection of 
the island polders and North Holland coast must remain assured.
Recommendation 6: South-western Delta, Eastern Scheldt
The Eastern Scheldt storm-surge barrier keeps its function. The 
disadvantage of the barrier is its restriction of tidal movement and, 
as a result, the loss of the intertidal zone. This is to be countered by 
additional sand nourishment from outside (as from the Outer Delta). 
Post-2050, the lifespan of the Eastern Scheldt storm-surge barrier will 
be extended by technical interventions. This can be done up to a sea 
level rise of approximately one metre (by 2075 at the earliest). If the 
Eastern Scheldt storm-surge barrier is no longer adequate, a solution 
will be sought that largely restores the tidal dynamics with its natural 
estuarine regime, while maintaining safety against flooding.
Recommendation 7: South-western Delta, Western Scheldt
This must remain an open tidal system to maintain the valuable 
estuary and the navigation to Antwerp. Safety against flooding must 
be maintained by enforcement of the dikes.
Recommendation 8: South-western Delta, Krammer-Volkerak 
Zoommeer
The Krammer-Volkerak Zoommeer, together with the Grevelingen 
and possibly also the Eastern Scheldt, must provide temporary 
storage of excess water from the Rhine and Meuse when discharge to 
the sea is blocked by closed storm-surge barriers. A salinity gradient 
(a transition between fresh and saltwater) in this area is a satisfactory 
solution to the water quality problem and can offer new ecological 
opportunities. In this case, an alternative fresh water supply system 
must be developed.
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Recommendation 9: The major rivers area
The programmes ‘Room for the River’ and Maaswerken (Meuse 
Works) must be implemented without further delays. Subject to cost 
effectiveness, measures must be taken immediately to accommodate 
discharges of 18,000 m3/s from the Rhine and 4,600 m3/s from the 
Meuse. In this context, it will be necessary to conduct negotiations 
with neighbouring countries under the European Directive on the 
Assessment and Management of Flood Risks in order to harmonise 
the measures. Further, room must be reserved and, if necessary, land 
purchased so that the river system will be able to discharge safely the 
18,000 m3/s of Rhine water and 4,600 m3/s of Meuse water. From 2050 
to 2100, measures to accommodate the Rhine to discharge 18,000 m3/s 
and the Meuse to discharge 4,600 m3/s must be completed.
Recommendation 10: Rijnmond (mouth of the river Rhine)
For the Rijnmond, an open system that can be closed in emergencies 
offers good prospects for combining safety against flooding, 
freshwater supply, urban development and nature development in this 
region. The extreme discharges of the Rhine and Meuse will then have 
to be re-routed via the south-western delta. The freshwater for the 
Western Netherlands will have to be supplied from the IJsselmeer. The 
necessary infrastructure will have to be built. Room must be created 
for local storage in deep polders. Further research into the ‘closable-
open’ Rijnmond system should be initiated soon.
Recommendation 11: IJsselmeer area
The level of the lake IJsselmeer will be raised by a maximum of 1.5 
metres. This will allow gravity-driven drainage from IJselmeer into the 
Wadden Sea beyond 2100. The level of the Markermeer lake will not 
be raised. The IJsselmeer retains its strategic function as a freshwater 
reservoir for the Northern Netherlands, North Holland and—in view 
of the progression of the salt tongue in the Nieuwe Waterweg—the 
Western Netherlands. Until 2050, measures must be implemented to 
achieve an elevated water level, which can be done gradually. The aim 
must be to achieve the largest possible freshwater reservoir around 
2050. The measures needed to adapt the lower reaches of the river 
IJssel and the Zwarte Water to a 1.5-metre higher water level in the 
IJsselmeer must be investigated. Post-2050, depending on the phased 
approach adopted, follow-up measures may be needed to actually 
implement a maximum water level increase of 1.5 metres.
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Recommendation 12: Political-administrative, legal and financial
1. The political-administrative organisation of water safety should 
be strengthened by:
a. providing cohesive national direction and regional 
responsibility for execution (ministerial steering committee 
chaired by prime minister; political responsibility lying 
with the Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management; the Delta Director for cohesion and progress; 
regional administrators for interpretation and implementation 
of the (individual) regional assignments)
b. instituting a permanent parliamentary committee on the 
theme.
2. Guarantee funding by:
a. creating a Delta Fund, managed by the Minister of Finance
b. supplying the Delta Fund with a combination of loans and 
transfer of (part of) the natural gas benefits
c. making national funding available and drafting rules for 
withdrawals from the fund.
3. A Delta Act will anchor the political-administrative organisation 
and funding within the present political system and current 
legal framework. This must, in any case, include the Delta Fund 
and its supply, the director’s tasks and authority, the provision 
that a Delta Programme be set up, regulations for strategic land 
acquisition, and compensation for damages or the gradual loss of 
benefits due to the implementation of measures under the Delta 
Programme.
Figure 4.2: The Second Delta Committee’s ‘Twelve Recommendations 
for the Future’. Adapted from Veerman (2008).
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to take decisions’ (Veerman, 2008, p. 79).1 According to the commit-
tee, a special Delta Commissioner, Delta Act, Delta Programme and 
Delta Fund are needed to support the implementation of the recom-
mendations. In addition, a ministerial steering committee, chaired by 
the prime minister, should be made responsible for its implementation, 
and a permanent parliamentary committee must be installed to keep 
it at arm’s length from the national budget and other funds. Accord-
ing to the committee, this will guarantee the resources needed to en-
sure flood protection and the security of the freshwater supply, while 
avoiding trade-offs and competition with short-term policy agenda 
topics (Veerman, 2008, p. 81). In this respect, the committee links 
the huge expenses to the costs and benefits of the Zuiderzee Works, 
which resulted from the flooding in 1953. In this case, there were also 
complaints regarding the finances of the public works. In fact, both 
the costs and benefits were many times greater than predicted at the 
inception of the Zuiderzee Works (Veerman, 2008). By pointing this 
out in the report, the committee seems to imply that the exceptional 
goals legitimise the great expenses needed to implement the proposed 
measures—because nowadays, who could honestly say that the costs 
of the Zuiderzee Works were not worth the effort? 
Crafting a crisis narrative
Prior to commissioning the Second Delta Committee, there had been 
no disaster, which made it particularly tough for the committee to cre-
ate the sense of urgency and collectiveness required for drastic meas-
ures to adapt to climate change. The committee is well aware of this 
and states that it:
realises that its message is a difficult one: after a disaster, there tends 
to be a widespread feeling of urgency that something must be done 
to prevent a repetition of events … The general public takes it for 
granted that government guarantees its protection against flooding, 
but the public does not see the matter as urgent, or of high political 
priority. The people of the Netherlands are not apprehensive of a 
natural catastrophe; the risks of climate change are only gradually 
becoming manifest and there is a general feeling that effects will 
only be felt in the distant future. (Veerman, 2008, p. 77)
For this reason, the committee exploits several crises and focusing 
events to create its own crisis narrative. First, it recalls a number of 
historical examples in the Netherlands. Second, recent examples else-
where are named. Third, it points out possible future disasters due to 
current climate change trends.
First, to create a sense of urgency and urge people to take action, 
the committee tries to recall past focusing events. The floods in 1916 
(Zuiderzee) and 1953 (southwest Delta) are recalled to show the effect 
of such flooding. The floods are also recalled to highlight the positive 
1 Pralle (2009) 
discussed the 
way in which an 
agency could 
and—according to 
her—should place 
climate change 
in the forefront 
of government 
decision agendas. 
There is much 
overlap between 
her suggested 
‘strategies’ and the 
strategies employed 
by the Second 
Delta Committee 
in this case—that 
is, the emphasis on 
scientific consensus 
and knowledge, 
growing public 
concern, the 
moral and ethical 
issues related to 
the problems and 
the cost of doing 
nothing.
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influence of the measures in response to those events. The 1916 and 
1953 floods led to radical policy measures to shorten the coastline: 
construction of the Afsluitdijk (the IJsselmeer’s sealing dam) and Delta 
Works. Nowadays, the Wadden Sea and Western Scheldt are the only 
two natural systems that remain open to the influence of currents, tides 
and waves. Implementing these measures, which were multifunctional 
and integral, provided major benefits for the freshwater supply (via the 
IJsselmeer), agriculture (via vast tracts of new land) and flood protec-
tion (up to and including Amsterdam). The committee continues that 
the measures also resulted in the islands in Zeeland being connected 
to the mainland and each other, and to the development of recreation, 
water sports and nature reserves (Veerman, 2008).
Second, apart from recalling historic focusing events, the com-
mittee also makes a connection to recent disasters around the globe. 
Although it is almost 5,000 miles away from the Netherlands, New 
Orleans is mentioned as a focusing example of climate change world-
wide, and how that lower delta region was unprepared for climate 
change (Veerman, 2008). In 2005, Hurricane Katrina caused a tropical 
storm in which at least 1,464 people lost their lives in the hurricane 
and subsequent floods (Anonymous, 2010n). The Delta Committee fo-
Figure 4.3: Hurricane Katrina over the Gulf of Mexico just prior to hitting New Orleans on August 
28, 2005. This satellite image is provided by the NOAA public domain archives and has been 
enhanced and optimized by Acclaim Images. Photo: United States Government Works.
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cuses on the severe economic damage this hurricane caused. Prior to 
the Hurricane Katrina disaster, potential damage in New Orleans was 
estimated at US$16.8 billion. Following the disaster, direct damage to 
houses, government buildings and public infrastructure alone was es-
timated at US$27 billion (Veerman, 2008, p. 22).
Third, after recalling historical and recent disasters in its report, 
the committee highlights the possible harm caused by flooding and 
climate change in the future. For example, it states that an estimated 
65 per cent of national wealth is located in flood-prone areas, so that 
the wealth potentially under threat is in the order of €1,800 billion. 
This gives an impression of the capital that needs to be insured against 
flood risk (Veerman, 2008). The committee warns that future flooding 
in the Netherlands could result in more severe damage than past and 
recent disasters. In this regard, the committee exploits potential dis-
asters as a means of introducing a combination of measurements that 
need to be implemented in the Netherlands. The fundamental prem-
ise also adheres to the risk management approach that the first Delta 
Committee raised, whereby flood risks are managed by a combination 
of measures that reduce the probability (such as high and strong flood 
defences) and limit the consequences (such as regulating spatial plan-
ning or zoning, compartmentalisation, early warning, crisis manage-
ment and contingency planning). The committee states that the com-
bination of measures is adjusted to the nature of the potential disaster 
and the characteristics of the relevant dike-enclosed area (Veerman, 
2008, pp. 41–42). In brief, by exploiting historical and recent crises 
and anticipating future disasters, the committee succeeds in creating 
a sense of urgency and collectiveness.
4.3.2 Networking strategies
Alongside employing framing strategies, the committee also employed 
networking strategies. As explained in the previous chapter, research 
conducted by others helped offer insight to the committee’s network-
ing strategies (Boezeman et al., 2013; Van Rijswoud, 2012; Vink et al., 
2013). Vink et al. (2013) show how the committee can be placed in 
the recent history of Dutch water management. Van Rijswoud (2012) 
discusses the role of the scientists and experts in the preparation of 
the report and the media discussion following the advice. Based on 
nine interviews with committee members and their secretariat, and a 
content analysis of the committee’s report, press releases, media ut-
terances, commissioned background reports and website, Boezeman 
et al. (2013) demonstrate how the interaction within the committee, 
and interaction between the committee and other actors, shaped the 
final policy report and its presentation. Boezeman et al. (2013) present 
the Delta Committee as a boundary organisation on the interface of 
science and policy, and show how the committee operated to strate-
gically set the agenda and anticipate a warm reception of the recom-
mendations by the public, policymakers and politicians.
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With regard to the networking of the committee during its one-year 
lifetime from September 2007 to September 2008, I distinguish two 
kinds of networking strategies, which are discussed below. First, the 
committee, as a team, was cleverly built and maintained. Second, its 
external positioning and continued interactions with political, depart-
mental, scientific and public actors was deliberately practised to set 
the agenda.
Building and maintaining the team
The committee’s chair, Cees Veerman, knows his way around various 
arenas. He has a political background and was the Minister of Agricul-
ture, Nature and Food Quality for the Dutch Christian Democrat Party 
from 2002 to 2007. He is also familiar with the scientific world; before 
becoming minister, he was chairperson of the Board of Directors of 
the Wageningen University and held several affiliate professorships. 
His link with the water management community was less obvious, but 
with his many committee, directorate and board memberships, he was 
more than suitable for the task. Together with a high-ranked official of 
the then Ministry Transport, Public Works and Water Management, 
who had become the secretary of the committee, Veerman was free to 
Figure 4.4: The Second Delta Committee. Front: Kabat, Fresco, Veerman, Metz and Parmet.
Back: Stive, Van Duijn, Heidema, Bakker and Van Oord (Veerman, 2008, p. 100).
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select the other eight committee members, and he chose representa-
tives from politics, science, engineering and civil service.
Some of these committee members had the same political affilia-
tion as the majority in parliament at the time. Three of the committee 
members were active, reputed and renowned scientists in the Nether-
lands with a multidisciplinary focus, yet with considerable experience 
in climate science, water engineering, sustainability and agriculture: 
Pavel Kabat, Marcel Stive and Louise Fresco. The inclusion of these 
scientists helped Veerman have state-of-the-art knowledge on these 
issues. It also helped the committee anticipate critique from scien-
tists later on. Member Van Oord, chief executive officer of a leading 
dredging company, helped connect the recommendations to the wa-
ter industry and its community. Jaap Van Duijn, with a career in fi-
nance and economics, most likely helped assess economic scenarios 
and calculate budgeting. Andries Heidema is the Mayor of Deventer 
and a member of the Christian Union—the same political party as the 
then State Secretary of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management. Heidema helped understand the local implica-
tions of the committee’s recommendations. Ineke Bakker is the former 
Directorate-General on Spatial Planning at the Ministry of Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment, and probably contributed main-
ly to assessing the implications of the committee’s recommendations 
on spatial planning and environmental policy. Finally, Tracy Metz, an 
experienced publicist and journalist on spatial issues, completed the 
team with her expertise.
Another deliberate choice was the composition of the supporting 
staff of the committee. Eight high-quality and experienced senior civil 
servants from several departments contributed to the coupling of the 
issues discussed in the committee with current and upcoming policy 
plans from their respective departments. Through the membership 
of people from different networks and communities, the committee 
granted itself access to various sources of information and support.
Veerman realised that it was not enough to draft a univocal re-
port by just placing people with different backgrounds together in 
one room. Four meetings were organised to allow everyone to openly 
share thoughts and ideas on the committee’s assignment and goal 
(Anonymous, 2008g). By organising meetings at Veerman’s own farm, 
and even in the air via a plane flight over the Dutch Delta, the group 
built its identity and team spirit. The investments in creating shared 
belief, ownership and team spirit paid off, and Veerman would later 
state that the committee members became friends and continued to 
VEERMAN WAS AWARE THAT, IN THE END, THE CLIENT 
AND FIRST TARGET GROUP OF THE COMMITTEE WAS 
POLITICAL IN NATURE 
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meet, even after the publication of the report (Anonymous, 2008g). 
However, this did not mean that no discussion or conflict arose be-
tween the committee members. For example, the recommendation to 
assign a government commissioner, institutionally distant from poli-
tics, was not favoured by one of the committee members. All commit-
tee members had the legal right to distance themselves from specific 
recommendations made by publishing a minority position; however, 
this would undermine the strategically created harmony and support 
of the whole group. Eventually, shortly before the presentation of the 
report, the negotiated majority opinion was agreed on to institution-
alise a Delta Commissioner (R40). As a result, the image of a univocal 
team was well maintained.
Involving a wider network of actors
The committee was well aware of the need to create support both in-
ternally and externally. To set the policy agenda, support was needed 
from the policymakers who had to work with the committee’s recom-
mendations. However, the political agenda was considered equally 
important. If no solid scientifically legitimate and credible case was 
made, the advice would have been open to scientific scrutiny and pos-
sibly rejected by politics. Additionally, if the water industry was not 
given workable and feasible solutions, the chances of implementing 
the committee’s recommendations would drastically decrease. How-
ever, if the recommendations were specific and solid, there would 
be no room for political negotiation. Veerman was aware that, in the 
end, the client and first target group of the committee was political in 
nature (Anonymous, 2008g). Therefore, the final report of the com-
mittee could best be read as a vision or grand design, rather than a 
concrete plan with detailed and clear-cut recommendations. This 
was deliberately done to make the vision all-inclusive, and to secure 
support among other target groups (R40). Thus, alongside creating a 
strong team and having access to important resources via committee 
memberships and personnel, the committee was also keen to involve 
a wider network of actors.
During the committee’s lifetime, it engaged in ongoing interaction 
with a wide array of actors. It managed relationships, both formally 
and informally, with community groups, experts and policymakers 
from multiple government levels. Workshops, meetings and field trips 
were organised and advice was sought from consultancy firms, knowl-
edge institutes, scientists and many more. Fifteen background docu-
ments, mostly advisory reports, were used to draft the report and pre-
sent a strong argument. Through the interactions, which Boezeman et 
al. (2013) describe as a two-way road, the committee also exchanged 
preliminary ideas. The committee members wanted to be sensitive to 
areas that should be avoided, and to popular, scientific, policy and po-
litical thoughts and ideas. One example of this was the popular idea to 
construct tulip-shaped islands in front of the Dutch coast to increase 
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water safety. While this idea was popular among many actors—nota-
bly the then Prime Minister Balkenende and Veerman’s own political 
party, the Christian Democrats—one of the committee members had 
doubts (R40). Consequently, the committee invested effort in substan-
tiating the argument in the final report to not include the idea for the 
tulip-shaped islands.
Yet, most policy, institutional and practical recommendations did 
find enough support within and outside the committee. Due to the 
committee’s networking and discussing preliminary thoughts with 
others, the committee dared to use an extreme high-end worst-case 
scenario with a maximum of 1.3-metre sea level rise by 2100, and even 
a 1.5- to three-metre sea level rise by 2200 (Veerman, 2008). It would 
have been more scientifically correct to estimate a sea level rise be-
tween 0.25 and 0.85 meter, but the committee’s estimations went well 
beyond the IPCC’s 2007 global, and the Royal Dutch Meteorological 
Institute’s (Koninklijk Nederlands Meteorologisch Instituut—KNMI) 
2006 regional scenarios for sea level rise. A team of 20 leading na-
tional and international climate experts was asked to conduct addi-
tional research for the committee. In nine pages of the appendix of the 
committee’s report, based on the research conducted by these climate 
experts, the committee attempted to justify the estimated upper limit 
calculations of sea level rise (Katsman et al., 2009; Veerman, 2008; 
Vellinga et al., 2008).
Further participation was also sought from the KNMI. The KNMI’s 
participation was carefully arranged because, without the support of 
the KNMI, the committee would have difficulty defending its calcula-
tions. Additionally, the report was reviewed by a range of critical ex-
perts to identify mistakes or blind spots. The continued dialogue with 
these actors contributed to a form of co-ownership of the committee’s 
recommendations, helped make the report recognisable for a broad 
range of actors, and averted strong criticism by actors involved in its 
making. Overall, I concur with Boezeman et al. (2013) that ‘gradually 
building, testing and positioning the advice was pivotal in maintaining 
support after its publication’ (p. 169). Without the external positioning 
of the committee and contextualising the advice, it would probably 
not have been enthusiastically received by the various actors.
My media analysis supports the above findings. The committee’s 
report was accepted warmly by media, politicians and scientists 
(Anonymous, 2008e; Van Kalles, 2008a, 2008b). This concurs with 
Boezeman et al.’s (2013) conclusion that the report provoked little op-
position, but contrasts the conclusion by Van Rijswoud (2012), who 
argues that much controversy occurred. In my opinion, Van Rijswoud 
dramatises by speaking of ‘fierce debate’, ‘political quarrel’, ‘friction’, 
‘tension in the Cabinet coalition’ and ‘dispute between scientists’ af-
fecting the credibility of the committee (Van Rijswoud, 2012). I found 
only serious discussions on the high-end scenario of the sea level rise 
that the committee used. Some critics claimed that the committee 
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exaggerated the sea level rise and purposefully neglected the uncer-
tainties that surround predictions about climate change (De Koning, 
2008; Hazeleger, 2008; Huisman, 2008; Knip, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; 
Rijcken, 2008; Tamboer, 2008). Surprisingly, among these critics was 
the head of the KNMI and co-author of one of the supporting research 
reports who pleaded not to lose sight of scientific scrutiny when trans-
lating the committee’s recommendations into actual policy (Hazeleger, 
2008).
However, given the committee’s careful preparation of the calcula-
tions leading to the use of the high-end scenario—the expert advice 
and lengthy appendix—this was no more than anticipated critique 
and it cannot slightly be regarded as undermining the whole report. 
Few questioned the composition of the committee because consid-
erable recommendations of the committee included technological 
solutions regarding coastal engineering (Anonymous, 2008d, 2008i; 
Huisman, 2008). However, these discussions were instigated by few 
individual scientists and journalists, and not by other actors (Leroy, 
2009; Schreuder, 2008; Warner, 2008; Warner & Vink, 2008). An as-
pect that elicited little disagreement in politics was the financing of 
the Delta Programme via the Delta Fund, but not so much whether a 
Delta Programme was really necessary (Chavannes, 2008). In addition, 
there was some critique about the need to improve the safety level for 
all dike-enclosed areas by a factor of at least 10, and some warned that 
the committee’s focus was too much on preventive measures, rather 
than on the exposure and vulnerability measures commonly used in 
water engineering (Chavannes, 2008; Warner & Vink, 2008). However, 
apart from these secondary points, the overall frame presented, prob-
lem definition, diagnosed causes, moral judgements and suggested 
remedies were accepted relatively easily and quickly (Anonymous, 
2008e; Van Kalles, 2008a, 2008b). Most importantly, the political tar-
get group supported the recommendations and helped set the politi-
cal agenda.
The Prime Minister at the time said, ‘The government takes on the 
challenge’2 (Anonymous, 2008e), after which he announced the estab-
lishment of a Delta Act and Delta Fund: ‘If we take on the challenge 
wisely, the Netherlands will become stronger through this struggle 
with water … [The report] forces us to face facts about what must 
be done in the Netherlands to maintain water safety’ (Anonymous, 
2008e). The Secretary of State for Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management agreed with the message the committee presented:
we must take action now and not wait for the next disaster. Let 
2008 go down in history as the year in which the future of this low 
country was placed high on the agenda. (Anonymous, 2008b)
Within nine days, the Cabinet presented an official statement embrac-
ing the challenges posed by the Delta Committee and announcing the 
2 All quotations 
from Dutch 
sources are the 
author’s own 
translation.
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National Water Plan, Delta Act, Delta Programme and Delta Commis-
sioner (Brief van de staatssecretaris van Verkeer en Waterstaat, 2008; 
Nationaal Waterplan 2009-2015, 2009). Most opposition parties in the 
parliament also accepted the frame of the committee (Anonymous, 
2008e). Moreover, there was no opposing coalition of actors who tried 
to raise attention for a contesting frame. However, it is possible that 
the advice on the coming Delta Decisions will elicit more controversy 
(Vink et al., 2013). That remains to be seen, since the Delta Commis-
sioner has already taken a more level-headed and incremental ap-
proach, called ‘adaptive delta management’, that avoids short-term 
drastic measures (Zevenbergen et al., 2013). The Delta Commissioner 
has also taken time to create co-ownership of the Delta Programme by 
involving stakeholders in its implementation (Deltacommissaris web-
site, 2011).
With regard to the committee’s reporting and reception, I conclude 
that this was a great success due to the employed framing strategies. 
However, as indicated, it cannot be ascribed solely to the committee’s 
framing strategies, since the composition of the committee, the team 
building and the external positioning and networking also contributed 
considerably to its effectiveness in setting the public, policy and politi-
cal agenda.
4.4 Conclusion
This case study shows that a single policy entrepreneur, as the Delta 
Committee has been regarded, can effectively set the agenda for pol-
icy change. No strongly opposing policy entrepreneurs or actors were 
witnessed. I contend that the committee has been successful in set-
ting the agenda by cleverly exploiting various framing and networking 
strategies.
The case study revealed that framing strategies were closely related 
and used in an integrated and intertwined matter. Narratives, symbols, 
rhetoric and crises were used in cooperation to adhere to the climate 
adaptation narrative, build on the story of the delta identity, create a 
sense of urgency and collectiveness, and create a crisis narrative due 
to the absence of a concrete and recent crisis event. The committee 
obviously sought an integral, adaptive and flexible approach, given its 
responsiveness to economic welfare, tourism, nature, ecology, land-
scape and culture. The facts, examples, figures and images were all 
presented in such a way as to strengthen the committee’s main as-
sumption and frame that climate change is a pressing issue to which 
the country must adapt. This resulted in a coherent frame in which 
water safety and climate change had the highest priority as a matter of 
national interest that should be protected, at arm’s length, against dai-
ly politics. The story of the delta identity, constructed with the ‘story of 
social control’ and ‘story of decline and crisis’, was convincing enough 
to set the public, policy and political agenda. It helped resonate with 
people’s perception of the society’s relationship with water. The result 
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was a public sense of urgency and a political call for action and policy 
change. There was significant consensus between all kinds of actors 
that there is urgency to join forces, take action and ‘work together with 
water’ (Veerman, 2008).
To realise this effective employment of framing strategies, the com-
mittee was keen to align its framing (Snow et al., 1986). Frame bridging 
was practised by linking climate change to water safety. Frame ampli-
fication was sought by making extensive use of symbols, stories and 
crisis rhetoric to invigorate the committee’s frame. Additionally, frame 
extension and broadening was realised by not only focusing on the 
Dutch flood protection water defence system, but also viewing the 
issues at stake from a national perspective, which helped create the 
urgency and collectiveness needed. Frame transformation was sought 
by boldly recommending setting aside between €1.2 to €1.9 billion 
yearly, outside the normal governmental budgets, to implement the 
recommendations the coming decades. Surprisingly, most recommen-
dations were more like a recombination of currently existing ideas on 
dealing with climate change and water safety, rather than a complete-
ly innovative transformative set of ideas: continuing the Room for the 
River programme, applying sand suppletion, strengthening dikes and 
so forth. The recombination of currently existing ideas was the result 
of ongoing interactions, both formally and informally, with community 
groups, experts and policymakers from multiple government levels. 
Some ideas were incorporated in the committee’s frame, while other 
ideas were dropped and considered no-go areas. This would not have 
happened if the committee had not employed networking strategies.
Therefore, this case revealed that framing in itself was not suffi-
cient to successfully set the agenda for policy change. In addition to 
its framing strategies, the committee employed various networking 
strategies. Committee members and supporting staff were carefully 
selected based on expertise, proven track record and quality, but also 
on access to various arenas and reputed resources, such as the KNMI. 
Building and maintaining team spirit and consensus on the task helped 
the committee create a grand vision and develop abstract, yet suffi-
ciently specific, recommendations that all committee members could 
support. While there was some disagreement, this did not lead to 
members publishing a minority position. Alongside team building, the 
committee was keen to involve a broad array of actors and networks: 
scientists, policymakers, experts and politicians. Continued interac-
tions took place to tackle conflicts or highlight popular policy ideas 
and gradually build arguments. Without the committee’s teambuilding 
and deliberate external positioning, the committee would have had a 
hard time defending its recommendations in the wake of the publica-
tion of the report.
While the framing and networking strategies were crucial in setting 
the agenda successfully, there were also two important contextual 
factors. First, the national government acted as an initiator of setting 
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the agenda, as it drafted an assignment and established a committee. 
Apart from one high-ranked civil servant who had become the secre-
tary of the committee, none of the other committee members or sup-
porting staff were involved in the founding of the committee. In other 
words, it seems highly unlikely that any of the committee members or 
actors involved would have tried to set the agenda on their own. The 
national government created the opportunity for the committee to set 
the agenda—a change in the political stream induced and enabled the 
agenda setting.
Here, one can see the application of the mobilisation model as 
explained by Cobb et al. (1976) because the decision makers tried to 
expand the issue of climate change and water safety from the politi-
cal to the policy and public agendas, and to mobilise various societal 
stakeholders. Although I do not have sufficient empirical data to sup-
port this claim, it seems to have been a deliberate strategy by the 
national government to lay the ground to implement a national Delta 
Programme with a Delta Commissioner who will make some crucial 
Delta Decisions on climate adaptation and water safety in the coming 
years. Without the support and compliance of various local and re-
gional actors, such as municipalities, provinces, water boards and Ri-
jkswaterstaat, implementation was doomed to fail. As the committee’s 
recommendations have shown, trade-offs have to be made, whereby a 
sense of urgency and collectiveness is needed, and regional, local and 
individual interests have to take a back seat.
The second contextual factor that mattered was—strangely 
enough—the absence of recent crisis. As has been argued, while this 
would normally be experienced by a policy entrepreneur as an imposi-
tion and constraint, the committee, against the odds, successfully used 
it to turn the situation to its advantage. The committee exploited the 
opportunity to frame its own crisis narrative. The committee recalled 
a number of historical examples and recent examples elsewhere, and 
pointed out possible future disasters due to current climate change 
trends. Surprisingly, the crisis narrative was not severely contested 
and relatively easily adopted by the various recipients. What contrib-
uted to this strong presentation of the frame were the visual tools used 
by the committee. The use of an experienced moviemaker who cre-
ated a compelling film and helped invigorate the frame of the commit-
tee proved helpful in setting the agenda. Here, the phrase ‘a picture is 
worth a thousand words’ clearly applies because the images presented 
in the movie helped create a sense of urgency and call for action.
The above success story does not imply that all recommenda-
tions of the committee have been followed. The Delta Commissioner 
responsible for the Delta Programme takes a relatively level-headed 
approach by not adopting the worst-case scenario presented by the 
Delta Committee. Additionally, the sense of urgency and effect of cli-
mate change are not felt significantly anymore. At the time of writing, 
European crises, financial crisis, healthcare, employment and other 
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domestic affairs are being discussed on the policy and political agen-
da. However, the major and most important achievement and effect of 
the committee remains to be the agenda setting of institutionalising 
a Delta Act, Delta Fund and Delta Programme with a Delta Commis-
sioner. All of these latter political-administrative, legal and financial 
recommendations were packed into Recommendation 12. The first 11 
recommendations seem to have served as a strategy for setting the 
agenda and paving the way to implement the aforementioned most 
influential recommendations.
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‘What’s the most resilient form of 
parasite? An idea. An idea has the 
power to build a city … to change 
the world, and re-write all the rules 
… and that’s why I need to steal it.
Leonardo DiCaprio in the movie 
Inception (2010) 5
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Legend
Existing nature 
New nature
Veluwe
Main waterway
Main road
Village/City
IJsselmeer
Oostvaardersplassen
Oostvaarderswold
Veluwe
Horsterwold
Almere
Lelystad
0 105 Km
Figure 5.1: The drafted plan for the Oostvaarderwold 
as being part of the Oostvaardersland.
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5.1 Introduction
The present case study concerns a small group of policy entrepre-
neurs who collectively set the agenda for nature development. This 
group has been successful in setting the public, policy and political 
agenda and, to a certain extent, changing nature policy from nature 
preservation to nature development. There has been no considerable 
public opposition from opposing policy entrepreneurs, although the 
context did not always favour the effective employment of the fram-
ing and networking strategies. Some of the plans presented under the 
umbrella of nature development have already been or are currently 
being implemented, while others have been cancelled or altered. To 
understand the transformation from nature preservation to nature de-
velopment and the strategies employed by the policy entrepreneurs, 
this discussion begins in the 1990s.
In the 1990s, after a long tradition of nature preservation, Dutch 
nature policy gradually adopted a new policy concept called ‘nature 
development’. Until then, nature policy in the Netherlands mainly fo-
cused on preserving natural values as these were known before 1850, 
when Dutch society underwent large-scale industrialisation, urbanisa-
tion and intensified land use (Keulartz, 1999; Keulartz, Van der Windt & 
Swart, 2004). However, according to a handful of academic research-
ers and civil servants in the then Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and 
Fisheries and the Directorate-General for Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management, it was time to break with this past.
First, they believed nature should not be preserved, but restored 
through the facilitation of natural processes. Second, nature restora-
tion or development should not refer to a pre-industrial stage from the 
mid-nineteenth century, but to a pre-human era. This group argued 
that human domestication of the landscape has made humankind for-
get what real or primeval nature was like. Third, areas for nature de-
velopment should be clearly separated from other, conflicting forms 
of land use—particularly agriculture. The latter meant a break with 
practices in which nature preservation was interwoven with other 
functions. However, the governmental departments then responsible 
for nature preservation still advocated a conservationist approach, 
and were not particularly receptive to these ideas. Hence, this small 
group of individuals sought other ways to place large-scale nature de-
velopment on the agenda. Eventually, they were relatively successful, 
with the concept of nature development adopted in policy documents 
from the late 1980 onwards, and gradually implemented into concrete 
policy plans as of the 1990s (see below).
Other scholars, ranging from natural sciences, such as (landscape) 
ecology, to philosophy of sciences, comprehensively discussed the 
concepts and values of nature development, ecological restoration, 
creative conservation and the like. In this case study, the scientific 
background and context of these concepts are briefly touched on. In-
stead of focusing on the meaning, ontology and methodology of these 
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concepts, I focus on their advocacy and strategies employed to share 
these concepts and mobilise support. Earlier accounts of the role of 
policy entrepreneurs in the water policy domain (De Jonge & Van der 
Windt, 2007; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008; see 
Chapter 4) proved useful because changes in Dutch nature policies 
cannot be understood without addressing the dynamics within the wa-
ter policy domain. First, I sketch how the concept of nature develop-
ment influenced governmental policies and implementation through 
the past decades. Subsequently, an analysis is made of the policy en-
trepreneurs’ framing and networking strategies, after which the find-
ings are discussed in the conclusion.
5.2 Policy on nature development 
5.2.1 International and European discourses on nature development
‘Nature development’ is regarded the Dutch counterpart of interna-
tional and European discourses on ‘ecological restoration’ and related 
concepts. Ecological restoration is defined ‘as the complete structural 
and functional return of an ecosystem to a pre-disturbance state’ (Ad-
ams, Perrow & Carpenter, 2004, p. 1934). It is about assisted recovery 
to accelerate natural processes by creating conditions that might take 
years, decades or even centuries to occur without human disturbance 
(Higgs, 2003). While the history of ecological restoration in the United 
States dates back as far as the 1930s, its current popularity stems from 
the mid-1980s (Adams et al., 2004). Since then, ecological restoration 
has also gained momentum in other regions, such as the United King-
dom (Battershill & Gilg, 1996; Eden, Tunstall & Tapsell, 2000; Sheail, 
Treweek & Mountford, 1997), Denmark (Pedersen, 2010), Hungary (Lip-
schutz & Mayer, 1996) and Belgium (Bogaert, 2004; Bogaert & Gersie, 
2006). However, the concepts may differ, with ecological restoration 
sometimes also labelled ‘creative conservation’ (Battershill & Gilg, 
1996; Sheail et al., 1997), ‘habitat creation’ (Van der Heijden, 2005) and 
so forth.
Since ecological restoration and related concepts deliberately op-
pose traditional ecological preservation discourses, their introduction 
provoked fierce debate in the academic arena. Two issues were mainly 
at stake. First was the relationship between restoration and conserva-
tion, the naturalness of ‘preserved’ and ‘restored’ nature, and so forth 
(Bijker, 2004; Birch, 1990; Chapman, 2006; Elliot, 1997; Higgs, 1997; 
Katz, 1992; Light & Higgs, 1993; O’Brien & McIvor, 2007; Swart, Van der 
Windt & Keulartz, 2001; Turnhout, Hisschemöller & Eijsackers, 2004; 
Van der Heijden, 2005). Second, the question was raised whether ‘de-
veloping nature’, which appears to be a contradictio in terminis, is possi-
ble at all (Drenthen, 2009a, 2009b, 2013; Drenthen, Keulartz & Proctor, 
2009; Keulartz, van Der Windt & Swart, 2004; Ladkin, 2005). Chap-
man (2006) refers to the latter debate as the ‘paradox of restoration’ 
because ecological restoration inevitably urges for human intervention.
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The debate in the Netherlands largely echoed these international 
debates and centred on the opposition between the well-known ‘con-
servation discourse’ and the newly emerging ‘nature development dis-
course’. The opposition between these was fuelled by a long-standing 
debate on the spatial claims that these divergent discourses implied: 
the interweaving versus the separation of functions, particularly vis-à-
vis agricultural land use (Koppen, 2002; Van der Heijden, 2005; Van der 
Windt, 1995). The conservation discourse takes as a point of reference 
the cultural landscape of around 1850, which was strongly influenced 
by agricultural land use (Keulartz, 1999; Van der Heijden, 2005; Van der 
Windt, 1995). It thereby acknowledges a certain degree of interwoven 
cultural and natural landscapes. Nature preservation then would en-
tail the restoration of habitats and landscapes, including heaths, chalk 
grasslands, hedges, trees, ditches and so forth.
The advocates of nature development strongly oppose this pre-
industrial, yet agricultural, landscape as a benchmark; they envisage 
developing nature from a pre-human perspective, with the reference 
being ‘how nature in the Netherlands might be under the present cli-
matologically and bio-geographical conditions, if ecosystems were not 
affected by all kinds of cultivation measures’ (Baerselman & Vera, 1989, 
p. 25). This benchmark asks for careful reconstruction based on his-
torical evidence and unaffected ecosystems in neighbouring countries 
(Baerselman & Vera, 1989; Helmer, Litjens & Overmars, 1995; Overmars 
& Helmer, 1998). In any case, it does not tolerate any interweaving with 
agricultural functions. Rather, it implies the reintroduction of wild ani-
mals and (large) herbivores, such as the European bison, other primitive 
bovines, horses, beavers and wolves. Further, this discourse implies the 
redesigning of large rivers by removing embankments, digging out 
clay and gravel depositions, and creating side channels in ancient river 
branches. As discussed below, the above discourse largely excludes 
coalitions with any agricultural interests, while leaving opportunities 
for coalitions in the water management domain.
5.2.2 Nature development in Dutch policy
In 1977, nature development was first mentioned in the Third Memoran-
dum on Spatial Planning—the ‘Memorandum Rural Areas’ (Nota Lan-
delijke Gebieden, 1977). A few years later, nature development became 
formally acknowledged in the 1981 Nature and Landscape Conservation 
Plan (Beleidsvoornemen Structuurschema Natuur- en Landschapsbe-
houd, 1981) that suggested including nature development as a goal for 
future policy. In 1990, the ‘Nature Policy Plan’ (Natuurbeleidsplan, 1990) 
considered nature development as a means to create the earlier men-
tioned EHS—an ecological network of large connected nature areas. 
In the Nature Policy Plan, and subsequent policy documents, nature 
development was described as ‘a complex of human interventions in 
nature and the landscape and regulation of practical activities aimed 
at desirable ecological development’ (Baerselman & Vera, 1995, p. 7).
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In 2000, the next governmental plan, which replaced the 1990 
Nature Policy Plan (Natuurbeleidsplan, 1990), was the memorandum 
‘Nature for People, People for Nature’ (Natuur voor mensen mensen 
voor natuur, 2000). This suggested continuing implementing the EHS 
and making additional robust nature corridors to further improve the 
mobility and interaction of animal species across Dutch nature areas. 
The overall EHS was to become the cornerstone of Dutch nature poli-
cies for the decades to come, aimed at creating large nature reserves 
interlinked with green corridors. However, in a context of lower en-
vironmental concern and budget cuts, the 2012 ‘Nature Agreement’ 
(Uitvoeringsafspraken decentralisatie natuur, 2012) between the na-
tional government and provinces concluded on a firm devolution of 
competencies towards the provinces, with a substantially decreased 
budget, causing a much slower implementation of the ecological net-
work.
Nature development and its accompanying concept of an ecologi-
cal network also influenced spatial planning policies, as witnessed in 
the 1988 ‘Fourth Memorandum on Spatial Planning’ (Vierde nota over 
de ruimtelijke ordening, 1988) and 1993 ‘Policy Plan on Green Spaces’ 
(Structuurschema Groene Ruimte, 1993). However, the most profound 
effect of the concept is observed in the area of water management re-
garding the major rivers. Nature development in the riverine areas was 
first adopted in the fairly environmentally focused 1989 ‘Third Memo-
randum on Water Management’ (Derde Nota Waterhuishouding, 1989) 
and further elaborated in the 1991 ‘Fourth Memorandum on Spatial 
Planning Extra’ (Stuurgroep Nadere Uitwerking Rivierengebied, 1991; 
Vierde nota over de ruimtelijke ordening Extra, 1990). In 1996, the 
government launched a new river policy entitled ‘Room for the River’ 
(Beleidslijn Ruimte voor de rivier, 1996). This enlarged the total river 
area by digging side channels and excavating clay and sand deposits in 
the river floodplains, which became a central part of a new strategy for 
guaranteeing water safety (Beleidslijn grote rivieren, 2006; Planolo-
gische Kernbeslissing Deel 4 Ruimte voor de Rivier 2007; Rooij, Klijn & 
Higler, 2000). As described below, Room for the River also meant pro-
viding room for nature development because the advocates of these 
convergent discourses forged an influential coalition.
5.3 Framing and networking strategies
This section discusses the framing and networking strategies em-
ployed by a small group of individual policy entrepreneurs. The strate-
gies that were employed cover a couple of decades; thus, I have cho-
sen to discuss the course of events and employment of the framing 
and networking as chronologically as possible. Additionally, by pre-
senting the empirical analysis in this form, the case study invigorates 
the finding of the previous case study on the Second Delta Committee, 
which states that framing and networking strategies are often used in 
an integrated and intertwined manner.
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5.3.1 Triggers for a new concept: The Oostvaardersplassen
Vera and Baerselman, two civil servants at the then Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Nature Management and Fisheries (Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en 
Visserij), were greatly influenced by a sequence of events in the Oost-
vaardersplassen during the 1970s. This large wetland area emerged 
quasi-spontaneously after the creation of the Southern Flevopolder. 
This Oostvaardersplassen area was initially, in 1968, planned as an in-
dustrial park. However, it was left alone and not drained due to the lack 
of investments in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis (Wigbels, 2003). 
Yet, while policymakers did nothing, birds claimed the area as their 
summer habitat. The invasion of grey geese particularly proved to be 
key in this ecosystem, as the geese prevented the area from turning 
into a swamp forest (Vera, 1988). In addition, dynamic water fluctua-
tions in the lowest area of the polder allowed natural processes to de-
velop, and gave birth to this nature area (Vera, 1979a). These develop-
ments delivered evidence that it was possible to create or facilitate 
nature, and that, under the right circumstances, it was possible for for-
mer ecosystems to re-emerge and develop nature (Baerselman & Vera, 
1989; Cörvers, 2001, p. 25; Van der Heijden, 2005).
Based on this evidence, in 1979, Vera wrote a public article to reach 
the policymakers and politicians in The Hague (Pruntel, 2007; Vera, 
1979b). The then head of the governmental agency responsible for the 
polders (Rijksdienst voor de IJsselmeerpolders—RIJP) was delighted 
by the article because he hoped it would convince nature conserva-
tion organisations to support the plans to create the final polder, the 
Markerwaard, and build new nature areas there. 
However, Vera’s article had the opposite effect: 
it convinced nature proponents that the Oost-
vaardersplassen were here to stay, whereas the 
creation of the last polder would do more dam-
age than good to nature. In the article, Vera also 
framed the Oostvaardersplassen as a ‘unique ecological experiment’ 
that spatial planning should leave alone (Pruntel, 2007, p. 24; Vera, 
1979a). He also undertook a study for the National Forest Service 
(Staatsbosbeheer) of the possibilities to further develop the ecosystem 
in the Oostvaardersplassen (Vera, 1980). Throughout the 1980s, Vera 
continued working for Staatsbosbeheer and the Ministry of Agricul-
ture, Nature Management and Fisheries, strengthening his argument 
for the Oostvaardersplassen, and starting to collaborate with other 
policy entrepreneurs (who will be discussed below).
When, in 1986, the Oostvaardersplassen became a state monument 
and Staatsbosbeheer was made responsible for its management, na-
ture development was the guiding concept (Beheerscommissie Oost-
vaardersplassen, 1987, 1995). Nature was regarded as a ‘creative power, 
flexible and resourceful, if we give it space and time’ (Wigbels, 2003, 
p. 7). While some human intervention was deemed necessary, its man-
agement is still largely based on nature’s spontaneous development. 
WHILE POLICYMAKERS 
DID NOTHING, BIRDS 
CLAIMED THE AREA AS 
THEIR SUMMER HABITAT
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In other words, the Oostvaardersplassen increasingly became the em-
blematic area of Dutch nature development.
In 1989, Vera and Baerselman launched a proposal for an ecologi-
cal network—the aforementioned EHS—including current and yet 
to be developed large-scale nature areas and ecological corridors 
disentangled from competing forms of land use (Baerselman & Vera, 
1989, pp. 45–48). Their report was published by the ministry as an an-
nex document to the 1990 Nature Policy Plan, heralding a formal ac-
knowledgement that placed nature development and the EHS on the 
agenda. Academia enthusiastically embraced these concepts, as they 
were the Dutch counterparts of an already ongoing scientific debate, 
as discussed in the previous section. However, within the ministry, the 
study elicited discussion. Some stakeholders, including the executive 
chiefs of department and opposing traditional conservation-minded 
bureaucrats, considered nature development too radical (De Jong, 
1999). Nevertheless, nature development and the EHS were incorpo-
rated quite successfully into Dutch policies.
Part of this successful setting of the policy and political agenda 
could be ascribed to the way these policy entrepreneurs framed the 
concepts of nature development and EHS in traditionally scientific, 
modernist and technical terms, deliberately close to the language of 
the responsible policymakers. For similar reasons, Vera (1995) and col-
leagues (in Vera’s doctorate thesis) carefully framed and legitimised 
nature development in scientific and managerial terms as a sound 
and feasible policy goal. Consequently, they often referred to scien-
tific concepts such as the ‘theory of island biogeography’ (De Boer, 
Kuindersma, Van der Zouwen & Van Tatenhove, 2008; Keulartz, 1999; 
MacArthur & Wilson, 1967).
In the final 1990 Nature Policy Plan, nature development was less 
extensively elaborated than Vera and Baerselman had hoped for, and 
some of the ideas were taken out (Van der Windt, 1995, p. 205). As 
an annex, their study was acknowledged, yet presented as explora-
tory research. As a result, the concept and its proposed separation of 
nature and agriculture were not fully incorporated in the final policy 
document. In contrast, some large areas of extensive agricultural land 
were included in the ecological network, such as 10,000 hectares of 
‘agricultural management areas’ (Cörvers, 2001, p. 26; Koppen, 2002). 
In summary, rather than substituting traditional preservation with na-
ture development, the 1990 Nature Policy Plan considers nature de-
velopment a complementary strategy. Against the wishes of Vera and 
Baerselman, nature conservation would remain the main goal in nature 
policy. The two entrepreneurs did not hesitate to publicise their dis-
content. Vera (as cited in Schmit, 2003) later stated in a newspaper 
article:
In the Nature Policy Plan of 1990, the concept of the ecological 
network was endorsed, but the principle of division in functions 
103
was neglected. The ecological principles were partly left out, and 
in regions of the EHS other activities are allowed, such as forestry 
for timber production, military sites and agriculture. The appealing 
power of the Nature Policy Plan is currently used to legitimise dam-
age to nature.
Even though the policy entrepreneurs were dissatisfied, I still assess 
this as a successful setting of the public, policy and political agendas, 
since the concept of nature development did have a profound effect 
on Dutch policy and decision making. Within a short time, the EHS be-
came the centrepiece of the Nature Policy Plan (De Boer et al., 2008); 
was enthusiastically embraced by nature conservation academics; and 
gave rise to a series of symposia, conferences and scientific publica-
tions, followed shortly by the implementation of (parts of) the EHS.
Baerselman remained a civil servant for years and, in 1997, was sec-
onded to set up the new international World Wildlife Fund for Nature 
(WWF) Large Herbivore Initiative (Van ‘t Hoog, 2010). Vera stayed with 
Staatsbosbeheer and was partly responsible for the visionary manage-
ment plans for the Oostvaardersplassen until 2011 (Staatsbosbeheer, 
2008). Vera, while critical about the Nature Policy Plan, remained en-
thusiastic about his ‘love child’—the Oostvaardersplassen (Schreuder, 
2005). For example, he stated that, ‘when we are guiding foreign del-
egations through the area, they always conclude that if nature devel-
opment is possible within the neatly planned Netherlands, it should 
be possible in their country as well’ (Van den Berg, 2004). The Oost-
vaardersplassen would remain the prime example of nature develop-
ment as advocated by the policy entrepreneurs.
Figure 5.2: Large herbivores grazing in the Oostvaardersplassen. Photo: Hans van Kleinwee.
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In 2013, a stylistic documentary on the Oostvaardersplassen was 
broadcast in Dutch cinema and watched by over 100,000 people after 
one week, and over 600,000 after two months (De nieuwe wildernis 
website, 2013). The public and most movie critics were amazed by 
the beauty of the nature in the Oostvaardersplassen (Beekman, 2013; 
Coevert, 2013) and there were critical reviews and columns in news-
papers arguing that the negative effects of developing nature in the 
Oostvaardersplassen were not given any attention (Schaper, 2013a, 
2013b; Schoonen, 2013; Zeilmaker, 2013). Vera (2013) responded an-
grily and defensively, arguing that the critics did not know what they 
were talking about. Further, Vera seized the opportunity to make a 
public plea to nominate the Oostvaardersplassen for a place on the 
UNESCO World Heritage List (Anonymous, 2013). There is probably 
not much that would make Vera more proud than getting the Oost-
vaardersplassen on that list.
5.3.2 Developing and disseminating radical ideas on the major rivers
While Vera and Baerselman were successful in setting nature develop-
ment on the agenda of nature policy, their biggest success was ac-
complished in the field of water management—in the management 
of the major rivers. The idea of nature development along the major 
rivers dates back to 1985, when the then newly established EO Wijers 
Foundation issued a landscape design competition for the rivers area. 
Vera, together with Overmars, De Bruin, Hamhuis, Van Nieuwenhuijze 
and Sijmons, seized the opportunity to draft and submit ‘Plan Stork’ 
in their spare time (De Bruin et al., 1986). The name of the plan refers 
to the habitat of the black stork that once populated the Dutch rivers 
area (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a). Building on the events in the Oost-
vaardersplassen, and accompanied by Vera and Baerselman’s action, 
this plan furthered the concept of nature development, but framed it 
in the context of landscape design and river management. Plan Stork 
comprehended a new spatial configuration of the Dutch major rivers 
area, and was strongly rooted in the realm of nature development, 
with the Oostvaardersplassen still the emblematic example. The plan 
essentially aimed to re-naturalise the river floodplains, which had been 
transformed into agricultural land, but also had a container full of other 
ideas meant to inspire the public, policymakers and politicians. To give 
the EO Wijers jury and any other reader an impression of how nature 
development along the rivers could look, Plan Stork included designs 
for the major rivers and showed where nature development could be 
implemented. Additionally, it included pictures of major rivers in Eu-
rope to show how the rivers could and should appear. Plan Stork won 
the competition, which led to a stream of positive responses and be-
came a source of inspiration (see below).
Plan Stork led to a series of pilot projects along the Rhine and 
Meuse rivers (e.g. Helmer, Litjens & Overmars, 1991; Helmer, Meiss-
ner, Overmars & Van Winden, 1999; Helmer, Overmars & Litjens, 1990; 
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Helmer & Smeets, 1987; Litjens, Helmer & Overmars, 1994, 1996; 
Litjens, Helmer, Van Winden & Overmars, 2000; Overmars, Helmer & 
Litjens, 1994; Overmars, Litjes & Helmer, 1990; Van Winden, Overmars 
& Braakhekke, 2003; Van Winden, Overmars & Litjens, 1998). Simul-
taneously, these projects created venues where advocates met and 
discussed nature development and its effects, and where scientific 
concepts were demonstrated and multiplied onto a larger audience 
(Anonymous, 2004; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a). Images of the Oost-
vaardersplassen as the prime example of nature development were of-
ten shown to impress the public with the potential of nature develop-
ment. Overmars rightly said that the plan and the pilot projects caused 
a ‘conversational drift’ (LNV website, 2011) among a larger class of in-
dividuals in the Netherlands, such as policymakers at municipalities, 
who also became passionate about nature development.
One example is the city of Arnhem, which commissioned Overmars 
to develop a plan for the floodplains near the city in line with the Plan 
Stork philosophy, which would become the country’s first large urban 
nature development project (Overmars et al., 1990). Overmars subse-
quently involved others in his endeavour, multiplying the ideas onto 
other places. Eventually, the collaboration between the policy entre-
preneurs resulted in the establishment of the landscape consultancy 
bureau, Stroming (in English: ‘Flow’), and the related management 
company association, ARK—as in Noah’s ark. These organisations and 
their names are not only part of a framing strategy but also of a net-
working strategy, as resources were shared between them (Huitema 
& Meijerink, 2009a). The policy entrepreneurs translated scientific 
concepts into policy concepts, and the latter were translated as main 
fields of expertise and investments of the two companies. All these 
framing and networking strategies proved highly influential.
However, in addition to the success and considerable support, 
there was also criticism, not least from the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature and Fisheries. Some politicians were concerned about nature 
development gaining momentum and leading to developing nature at 
the expense of agricultural land. Due to the critical mood within the 
ministry, some of the policy entrepreneurs decided to quit their job 
at the ministry (De Jonge & Van der Windt, 2007). In contrast, nature 
development, including its operationalisation in Plan Stork, was en-
dorsed by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Manage-
ment. This support was largely due to the personal interactions be-
tween the then Minister Smit-Kroes and De Bruin—the first author of 
Plan Stork and employee at the ministry (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; 
Ploegmakers, 2008). The other authors of Plan Stork deliberately and 
strategically requested the help of De Bruin because they knew that, if 
they were to convince the water management sector, they would need 
the support and involvement of a water expert.
De Bruijn, who had direct contact with Smit-Kroes during sev-
eral trips abroad, managed to discuss with the minister the policy 
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entrepreneurs’ ideas on nature development along the rivers (Huitema 
& Meijerink, 2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008). As a result, about six months 
after Plan Stork was published, the minister announced the decision 
to puncture a number of river dikes (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a). This 
attracted a great deal of media attention and surprised both the na-
tional and international community. However, the minister was misun-
derstood by journalists because she was only referring to the summer 
dikes, which are the lower dikes that are closest to the river, and not—
in terms of water safety—the most important winter dikes (Ploegmak-
ers, 2008). Another important event was Smit-Kroes’s visit to the site 
of one of the few river sand dunes in the Netherlands that were be-
ing moved by river managers to support farmers’ interests (Huitema 
& Meijerink, 2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008). De Bruin convinced Smit-
Kroes that this was unnecessary, and she subsequently requested that 
the provincial deputy stop the move. Many regard Smit-Kroes as an 
ambassador for nature development (De Jonge & Van der Windt, 2007; 
Ploegmakers, 2008), and her political commitment and support culmi-
nated in the aforementioned ambitious and environmentally friendly 
national river management policy document under the 1989 Third 
Memorandum on Water Management (Derde Nota Waterhuishoud-
ing, 1989) and 1991 Fourth Memorandum on Spatial Planning Extra 
(Stuurgroep Nadere Uitwerking Rivierengebied, 1991; Vierde nota over 
de ruimtelijke ordening Extra, 1990).
While the ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Manage-
ment—via its Minister Smit-Kroes—proved an important supporter of 
the ideas presented in Plan Stork, most traditional nature conservation 
organisations were initially not particularly enthusiastic about them, 
like the policymakers at the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fish-
eries. The exception was the Dutch branch of Bird Life International. 
Nature development’s unpopularity among traditional nature conver-
sation organisations changed in the early 1990s when the new Dutch 
WWF chairperson, Nijpels—the former Minister of Housing, Spatial 
Planning and the Environment—proposed to focus on the banks of the 
rivers Meuse and Rhine (De Jonge & Van der Windt, 2007; De Ruiter, 
1995; Ploegmakers, 2008). The WWF published the ‘Living Rivers Plan’ 
in 1992 (Helmer et al., 1992) to further the nature development concept 
along rivers (De Ruiter, 1995). Living Rivers was an elaboration of Plan 
Stork, written mainly by members of Stroming. Thus, the policy entre-
preneurs increasingly broadened their network and engaged in forging 
coalitions with others. Non-government organisations (NGOs) such as 
WWF were among them, rapidly followed by market agencies, such as 
the clay and gravel industry (fabricating stone from river clay) and the 
Royal Dutch Touring Club (Koninklijke Nederlandse Toeristenbond—
ANWB) (Anonymous, 2004). This was a coalition of convenience, since 
mineral extraction was now framed as an important financial resource 
for nature development, whereas earlier gravel extractors had been 
blamed for spoiling the river landscape (De Ruiter, 1995; Schmit, 1995). 
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While Plan Stork already included this reframing, Living Rivers elabo-
rated it by providing precise calculations. The ANWB became involved 
because it forecasted opportunities for new forms of tourism.
Living Rivers was presented while the Boertien committee was at 
work, which was no coincidence. This advisory committee was in-
stalled in 1992 by the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water 
Management to overcome the impasse between ‘dike builders’ and 
river landscape preservationists regarding dike reinforcement (De 
Jonge & Van der Windt, 2007; Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; Wiering 
& Driessen, 2001; Wiering & Immink, 2006). The Boertien committee 
embraced the Living Rivers suggestions as a long-term contribution 
to water safety. Nijpels, as a member of this committee, exploited the 
new venue of the Boertien committee to fully endorse this alternative 
approach to water safety along the rivers (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; 
Ploegmakers, 2008). Even though the committee accepted this Living 
Rivers/WWF idea, it did not help set the national political agenda until 
the high waters occurred in the country’s major rivers in 1993 and 1995. 
These high waters, which resulted in massive evacuations and public 
attention, created a policy window that resulted in a reframing of wa-
ter safety, allowing alternative approaches to water safety other than 
mere dike reinforcements (see Chapter 4).
On 8 February 1995, only two days after the last evacuees returned, 
Nijpels again suggested the approach presented in Living Rivers as the 
best way to deal with river floods. Two weeks later, the WWF pre-
sented a specific list of locations where water safety enhancements 
and nature development could operate together, and suggested that 
the new Delta Plan that was under consideration by politics should 
not focus solely on strengthening dikes, but encompass the river area 
as a whole (Huitema & Meijerink, 2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008). In the 
aftermath of the high waters, which are regarded as crises or focus-
ing events, Nijpels and the WWF did not frame the then predominant 
policy of dike reinforcements as a policy failure, but rather invigorated 
the benefits of coupling dike reinforcements with nature development 
(Ploegmakers, 2008). The clever timing and smart framing proved ef-
fective, partly because it was combined with networking. The WWF 
arranged for a visit by the then Dutch Prime Minister Kok to one of the 
locations featured in their alternative approach (Huitema & Meijerink, 
2009a; Ploegmakers, 2008). Kok was impressed and suggested incor-
porating the WWF approach in the new Delta Plan and Delta Act for 
the Major Rivers, with the main conditions that water safety would not 
be compromised and the implementation would not cause any delays 
(Ploegmakers, 2008).
These alternative approaches to the management of the major 
rivers were institutionalised in the 1995 Delta Plan and Delta Act for 
the Major Rivers and the 1996 Room for the River policy. In the same 
period, Rijkswaterstaat had gradually become more receptive to eco-
logical solutions, partly due to an inflow of biologists and ecologists 
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(see the ‘ecological turn’ discussed in the previous chapter). Water 
management engineers gradually took a more positive stance on the 
potential gains in linking water safety and nature development policy 
(e.g. Luiten, as cited in Feddes, 2012, p. 19). This was partly caused by 
the policy entrepreneurs’ strategies and the strategic intervention of 
the WWF (De Jong, 1999; Van der Windt, 1995). However, this is not to 
say that someone like Vera, who was one of the first pioneers in nature 
development, was completely satisfied. Vera remained critical about 
Dutch river policies because, rather than digging out the floodplains, 
he preferred to relocate dikes in order to create even greater opportu-
nities for nature development (Schmit, 1993; Vera, 1993).
5.3.3 Implementing the EHS and its robust green corridors
Although the Oostvaardersplassen and the riverine areas offer the 
most outstanding examples of nature development in the Netherlands 
thus far, the implementation of the ecological network EHS is relevant 
as well. From 1990 to 2010, successive cabinets embraced the idea 
to further develop the EHS. However, while the concept is generally 
perceived as successful (e.g. Willems & De Zeeuw, as cited in Fed-
des, 2012), the discussion on its interpretation continues, particularly 
with regard to agriculture. Most advocates of the concept, including 
Vera, persistently claim that areas designated for nature development 
should be clearly separated from other forms of land use—most no-
tably agriculture (Schimmelpenninck, 2000; Schmit, 2003; Schreuder, 
2000; Vera, 1993). Therefore, despite the rather stable policy aimed at 
both preserving and creating nature in the Oostvaardersplassen and 
the riverine area, policy implementation in rural areas turned out more 
problematic.
As indicated in the previous sections, the policy entrepreneurs 
deliberately engaged in framing and networking to win support for 
nature development in the Oostvaardersplassen and along the main 
rivers. With regard to the latter, they even succeeded in reaching 
package deals with tourist organisations and sand and clay industries 
to which nature development was presented as a win-win situation. 
This turned out to be far more difficult in dry rural areas, where it was 
much harder to find parties who would gain from nature development 
if agricultural land use remained out of the question. In 1998, new eval-
uation studies indicated that the ecological corridors, which had been 
initially proposed in 1990, would not suffice to realise the interaction 
and mobility across the targeted Dutch nature areas. In response to 
these evaluation studies, the 2000 Nature for People, People for Na-
ture memorandum (Natuur voor mensen mensen voor natuur, 2000) 
proposed robust corridors that had to be wider—thus implying even 
more land use claims—and better protected. As a consequence, the 
competition for scarce land became fiercer after 2000.
Despite the difficulties, some ambitious local plans built on the idea 
to create robust nature corridors. Unsurprisingly, one of these plans 
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related to the greatest symbol of nature development in the Nether-
lands—the Oostvaardersplassen. Under supervision of the province of 
Flevoland, Staatsbosbeheer, municipalities, nature organisations and 
land owners drafted plans to create a robust connection between the 
Oostvaardersplassen and—via the Horsterworld—the largest Dutch 
forest area, the Veluwe (MCWStudios, 2010). This connection, called 
the Oostvaarderswold, would enable the migration of large herbivores 
(Schmit, 2001; Schreuder, 2001). Together, the Oostvaardersplassen, 
Oostvaarderswold and Horsterworld were named the Oostvaarders-
land. The province of Flevoland succeeded in reaching an agreement 
with the national government on the funding of the project, while ARK 
issued a report on its strategic development and management. Vera, 
the alleged godfather of the Oostvaardersplassen, was (of course) also 
consulted (ARK Natuurontwikkeling, 2010).
In the first years of the twenty-first century, the perspectives for 
realising the Oostvaarderswold were very promising. However, this 
changed after 2005, when parliament discussed the necessity and 
feasibility of the robust corridors, as proposed in the 1990 Nature Pol-
icy Plan (Natuurbeleidsplan, 1990) and the 2000 Nature for People, 
People for Nature memorandum (Natuur voor mensen mensen voor 
natuur, 2000). Moreover, farmers, who would have to give up their 
land for the robust corridors, started to protest (Anonymous, 2006a, 
2010i; Bogaert & Gersie, 2006; Janssen, 2010a, 2010b; Severt, 2007a, 
2007b). The farmers were supported by some members of parliament, 
such as Schreijer-Pierik—a farmer herself—who complained: ‘Deer 
get freedom, while farmers are put behind fences’ (Severt, 2007b). An-
other member of parliament, Koppejan, argued that the most beautiful 
nature is often agricultural land. This made Vera angry, who stated that 
it was appalling that this member of parliament ‘dares to demonstrate 
his ignorance’ (Janssen, 2008). In 
Vera’s vision, farmers are only do-
ing harm to nature and thus are the 
last people on earth able to con-
tribute to it.
In 2010, when a new government was installed, the political context 
changed. Bleker, the newly appointed State Secretary for Agriculture 
and Nature Management, strongly believed in ‘farmers’ nature’ and the 
national government no longer wanted to give up agricultural land for 
nature development (Ariese, 2010; Broer & Vanheste, 2011; Folmer & 
Piersma, 2011; Van Roessel, 2011; Wams, 2010). This resulted, among 
other things, in the national government’s withdrawal of financial sup-
port for robust corridors, such as the Oostvaarderswold (Anonymous, 
2011n; Karimi, 2010). Nevertheless, the province of Flevoland—still a 
strong supporter of the Oostvaarderswold—wanted to continue with 
the implementation. Local farmers opposed the provincial plan for the 
Oostvaarderswold at the Dutch Administrative Council of State, ar-
guing that the plan was no longer financially feasible and should be 
‘DEER GET FREEDOM, WHILE 
FARMERS ARE PUT BEHIND FENCES’
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cancelled accordingly. In March 2012, the Council of State ruled in fa-
vour of the farmers and assessed the plan as being unfeasible (Raad 
van State, 2012a). The regional farmers’ association, also one of the op-
ponents, was delighted that the Oostvaarderswold was cancelled, and 
claimed victory (LTO Noord, 2012). However, the province of Flevol-
and—with whom the national government had earlier reached finan-
cial agreements, and who had put considerable effort into generat-
ing support for realising the Oostvaarderswold—was furious, as were 
most nature organisations and experts (Berentsen & Trappenburg, 
2011; Provincie Flevoland, 2012; Tonkens, 2011; Van Roessel, 2011). 
They all regarded the 2010 to 2011 governmental policy turn a radical 
discontinuation (Buijs, Mattijssen & Arts, 2014; Dokter, 2010; Janssen, 
2010a). Nevertheless, and although in somewhat milder phrasing, the 
aforementioned 2012 Nature Agreement (Uitvoeringsafspraken decen-
tralisatie natuur, 2012) confirmed the policy change that the EHS would 
be downscaled (in official terms, ‘reassessed’) and its implementation 
would be decentralised to the provinces, partly postponed and partly 
put on hold. The EHS was reframed and no longer aimed at creating 
new large-scale nature development areas or robust green connec-
tions, but rather to preserve what is currently there.
While nature development is still a widely echoed concept as of 
2014, its influence is no longer what it was in the 1990s. The changing 
economic and political context clearly poses new challenges to those 
advocating large-scale nature development. Nevertheless, policy en-
trepreneurs are not without engagement, nor employment. Most are 
still active as applied scientists, landscape architects and consultants 
on nature development, partly within the aforementioned organisa-
tions and partly in newly established consultancy firms and not-for-
profit organisations. Thus, most remain passionate about nature de-
velopment and are still professionally engaged in this field. 
A recent reframing and impetus for new networking considers the 
link between climate change and nature development, as the latter is 
said to potentially contribute to both the mitigation and adaptation 
of the former (Klimaatbuffers website, 2012). It remains to be seen 
whether this reframing will make the concept of nature development 
as influential as it was in the 1990s.
5.4 Conclusion
The above analysis indicated that a small group of individuals have 
been important in setting the agenda for nature development and re-
alising policy change by collectively employing framing and network-
ing strategies. The policy entrepreneurs were personally committed 
(sometimes even willing to risk their jobs), persistent and continuously 
involved in developing a concept, raising awareness of and commit-
Figure 5.3 (previous page): A graphic visualisation of the envisioned robust green corridor, the 
Oostvaarderswold (Marijnissen, 2011).
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ment to the concept, trying to introduce and translate the concept into 
feasible policy actions, and mobilising support. Together, the group 
did a remarkable job of employing framing and networking strategies 
and setting the agenda on nature policies in the last decades.
In this case study, there are multiple examples of the successful em-
ployment of framing strategies. First, the concept of nature develop-
ment was aligned with the international and European discourses on 
nature development and concepts alike. However, the nature develop-
ment concept itself was defined in a different way by not tolerating any 
interweaving with agriculture land-use functions. In the Netherlands, 
the introduction of nature development would be regarded a radical 
new view on how to deal with nature—for example, in respect to other 
possible land uses. The frame of nature development was amplified by 
the policy entrepreneurs as an alternative to farmers’ nature—a type 
of nature they openly despised. The developments in the Oostvaarder-
splassen served as a trigger in that regard because, according to the 
policy entrepreneurs, it delivered evidence that it was possible to cre-
ate or facilitate nature, and that, under the right circumstances, it was 
possible for former ecosystems to re-emerge. Moreover, it showed 
what nature would look like without a connection with the traditional 
farmers’ nature. The Oostvaardersplassen became a powerful symbol 
for the advocates of large-scale nature development, and the policy 
entrepreneurs involved continued to refer to this area as the prime 
example and symbol of how nature could and should appear in the 
Netherlands. The agenda was successfully set and the policy change 
followed the policy entrepreneurs’ preference of nature development 
over nature preservation.
With regard to networking strategies, the case reveals overlap of 
networking with framing strategies. For instance, while the agricultural 
sector and its farmers’ nature was portrayed as ‘the enemy’, other sec-
tors were sought out as privileged partners in the design and imple-
mentation of the projects. Plan Stork read as the formulation of a frame 
searching for coalitions with the water, tourism and even sand and clay 
industries, which demonstrates the practice of frame alignment. The 
concept of nature development was adopted successfully in policies 
for the major rivers. The policy entrepreneurs’ suggestion to enlarge 
the river areas by digging side channels and excavating clay and sand 
deposits in the river floodplains became a new strategy for guarantee-
ing water safety in the 1996 Room for the River policy. Moreover, the 
case study revealed that, due to the policy entrepreneurs’ efforts, na-
ture development also became a sensitising topic, whereby the group 
of adherents began to grow incrementally from the late 1980s onwards.
The numerous plans and reports on nature development conducted 
by the policy entrepreneurs’ own management company association, 
ARK, and the landscape consultancy bureau, Stroming, clearly helped 
spread the concept of nature development and have it incorporated 
into local and regional governmental policies. The move by one of the 
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policy entrepreneurs to win over the support of Smit-Kroes, the then 
Minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management, also 
proved helpful to raise public and especially political support. Along-
side the external positioning of the concept of nature development, 
the policy entrepreneurs were keen to create their own small coalition 
for nature development. For example, they were keen to settle an ef-
fective allocation of tasks. Each policy entrepreneur had his or her own 
task, matching capacities and locus of influence. There were policy en-
trepreneurs pioneering, early adopting, translating and popularising, 
yet I also observed people making business plans, calculating profits 
for nature and for adjacent sectors, and trying to convince others by 
adopting their rhetoric and aligning the frame. A lesson to learn here 
is that policy entrepreneurship need not be an individual endeavour—
policy entrepreneurs can work together and rely on others to fulfil a 
shared common mission.
In short, it seems that a proper and continuously updated combi-
nation of framing and networking strategies is a prerequisite for suc-
cessful agenda setting. However, context also influences the agenda 
setting because it both enables and constrains the effective setting of 
the agenda. 
First, the case study demonstrated that windows of opportuni-
ties—some of which were largely caused by chance—are very helpful 
in gaining attention for ideas. Yet, policy entrepreneurs have to recog-
nise and seize these moments. The spontaneous developments in the 
Oostvaardersplassen provided such an opportunity by creating an un-
intended pilot project and unexpected venue. It also helped convince 
the public, policymakers and politicians that large-scale nature devel-
opment was possible, even in the densely populated Netherlands. The 
establishment of the EO Wijers Foundation was another opportunity 
that invited people to submit innovative plans. The high waters in the 
main rivers in 1993 and 1995 provided a third window, allowing nature 
development to be linked to river management and water safety.
Conveniently, in 1991, the change in chairperson at the Dutch WWF 
also helped the policy entrepreneurs realise their goals because this or-
ganisation became a strong advocate of nature development, focused 
on creating additional nature areas in the Netherlands, and was will-
ing to provide a large share of the necessary resources in that regard. 
Moreover, the new chair had become part of the 1992 Boertien com-
mittee—a venue that he would exploit to plead for adopting nature 
development in policy for the major rivers. After the 1995 high waters, 
he effectively seized the opportunity to frame nature development as 
an alternative solution to water safety for the major rivers. The sup-
port of political heavyweights, such as Nijpels and the aforementioned 
Smit-Kroes, proved crucial to successfully setting the public, policy 
and political agendas for implementing nature development. However, 
whereas the context of water management especially proved to offer 
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opportunities to set the agenda, the context of nature management 
proved to be rather constraining in that respect.
Thus, second, apart from opportunities, most of the policy en-
trepreneurs under investigation here were constrained by their con-
texts. Within their governmental departments, they often faced path 
dependency and—at least latent—resistance to policy change. Fully 
committed to their cause, the policy entrepreneurs proved that they 
were adaptive by crossing institutional borders and seeking support-
ers in other spheres, be it other governmental bodies, market repre-
sentatives or NGOs. However, while the policy entrepreneurs were 
successful in framing and networking until the second half of the 
2000s, the economic and political context changed and placed even 
more constraints on effectively employing their strategies. The year 
2010 was particularly crucial because the need to implement the EHS 
and Oostvaarderswold, and nature development in general, was ques-
tioned. Historically, the agricultural sector has a strong lobby in the 
Netherlands, and some farmers owning land that would be used for the 
creation of the Oostvaarderswold were opposed to implementing this 
robust green corridor. In addition, the 2010 newly established Cabinet 
changed policy by cancelling substantial financial support to imple-
menting the EHS and projects such as the Oostvaarderswold. Conse-
quently, given the changing economic and political context, it became 
difficult for the policy entrepreneurs, and other advocates of nature 
development, to present a convincing argument to remove agricultural 
land and replace it with nature development areas.
A final observation made in this case study is the inherently am-
biguous and tentative nature of any claims on success or effectiveness 
in setting the agenda. By looking only at the events in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, one could substantiate the claim that nature development 
has successfully been set on the public, policy and political agendas. 
However, the course of events during the last decade reveals that the 
implementation has been under pressure due to the changing con-
texts. This could result in assessing the effectiveness of the concept of 
nature development in a different way, which makes claiming success 
or failure rather arbitrary. Moreover, an effective agenda setting of na-
ture development in water management is far more controversial than 
the agenda setting in nature management. The policy entrepreneur, 
Vera, was also ambiguous in claiming his successes. On the one hand, 
he was pleased and proud with the results of his own agenda setting, 
while, on the other hand, he remained dissatisfied with his success 
because the concept of nature development—as he envisioned—had 
not yet reached its full potential in the Netherlands (regarding stricter 
division of land uses and more large-scale nature development areas). 
A dedicated policy entrepreneur is probably never finished because he 
or she will always find need for further improvement or implementa-
tion of his or her visions and ideas.
6.1 Introduction
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Bereikbaar, 2011), Van der Vlis’s (2012b)—or Rover’s—plan, and the 2013 State’s Vision on 
Infrastructure (Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013).
Legend
Existing public transportation hub 
Suggested public transportation hub
New infrastructural connection
Main waterway
Village/City
IJsselmeer
lan Adema (Tunnel)
lan Adema (Bridge)
Plan Almere (Tunnel or Bridge)
lmere IJland
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The following case study concerns the plans to create an infrastruc-
tural connection (IJmeerverbinding) between the municipalities Am-
sterdam and an outer-dike3 urban area (IJland) in Almere. These plans 
have been successfully placed on the political agenda, but not yet im-
plemented. Therefore, this case study contrasts the case study dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, since the previous case study entailed 
the concept of nature development being adopted into policy, then 
implemented, altered or cancelled in some areas. Moreover, while the 
two previously discussed case studies offered examples of (in many 
ways) successful policy entrepreneurship, this case study presents a 
more dynamic process of agenda setting with the active involvement 
of various policy entrepreneurs adhering to conflicting frames. This 
chapter discusses the most prominent policy entrepreneurs and their 
employed framing and networking strategies. To understand the issue 
at stake, it is necessary to understand the role of Almere in the recent 
history of Dutch spatial planning.
As the youngest and fastest growing city in the Netherlands, Alm-
ere has become important in Dutch spatial planning. In 2007, the na-
tional government expressed the ambition to accommodate the grow-
ing Dutch population by creating 60,000 houses and 100,000 working 
places for 160,000 people within a few decades in Almere (Urgentie-
programma Randstad, 2007). Almere is very willing to adhere to this 
ambition because profound city development, like outer-dike urbanisa-
tion, could serve as an opportunity to give Almere the socio-economic 
boost for which it longs. However, Almere is only willing to comply if 
the national government supports and allows a more than 25-kilome-
tre infrastructural connection with the Dutch capital, Amsterdam. The 
Markermeer-IJmeer part of the infrastructural connection, could be a 
bridge, tunnel or combination of both. There are also several alterna-
tive routes suggested; however, all run through the protected waters of 
the Markermeer-IJmeer. Almere is facing strong opposition because, 
according to neighbouring municipalities, nature conservationists, ac-
tion groups and others, outer-dike urbanisation and the infrastructural 
connection will harm the ecology and pose threats to the environment 
and open landscape. At present, no final decision has been made on 
the outer-dike development and infrastructural connection between 
Almere and Amsterdam.
This chapter is structured as follows. First, it presents a brief over-
view of the plans for Almere to build houses outer dike and create an 
infrastructural connection, from the 1970s onwards. The subsequent 
analysis of policy entrepreneurs and their strategies is at the core of 
this section. Following this, it discusses the main findings.
6.2 Policy on outer-dike urbanisation and the infrastructural connection
In the 1970s, the Dutch national government founded the Project Bu-
reau Almere to create a long-term spatial planning vision for a new 
city located in the southern part of the province of Flevoland, next to 
3 Please note 
that I do not 
speak of a 
coastal dike, 
but a dike 
next to the 
Markermeer-
IJmeer, 
enclosing the 
reclaimed 
lands (polder).
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Amsterdam. The whole province of Flevoland is reclaimed land, cre-
ated during the twentieth century. As the population of Amsterdam 
was expected to increase, the long-term goal for this youngest city of 
the Netherlands (officially founded in 1984) became to accommodate 
250,000 people by 2000 (RIJP, 1977). In 1988, in the national govern-
ment’s Fourth Memorandum on Spatial Planning (Vierde nota over de 
ruimtelijke ordening, 1988), Almere was assigned to accommodate af-
fordable houses for the whole region. In the years from 1995 to 2010, 
an additional 40,000 houses were to be built.
In 2001, with the national government’s ‘Fifth Policy Memorandum 
on Spatial Planning’ (Vijfde Nota over de Ruimtelijke Ordening, 2001), 
Almere was again given the task of accommodating an extra 60,000 
to 70,000 houses. However, this policy never reached final agreement 
because the cabinet lost power. In 2006, in the new Spatial Memoran-
dum ‘Space for Development’ (Nota Ruimte, 2006), the national gov-
ernment proposed to further investigate the possibilities to gradually 
let Almere expand and become fully accessible by motor vehicle and 
public transport. In the same year, the national government developed 
a new vision for the northern part of the Randstad region (Noordv-
leugelbrief, 2006). Urban development of Almere was deemed nec-
essary for up-scaling the whole region, and outer-dike urbanisation 
was mentioned as a ‘direction for growth’ in combination with an infra-
structural connection with Amsterdam over the IJmeer. The idea was 
that the infrastructural connection would give substance to the image 
of what was then presented as the twin-city of Amsterdam-Almere. 
Outer-dike development was deemed necessary to create a high-qual-
ity marine urban living and working environment for the upper classes 
(Noordvleugelbrief, 2006). It was also stated that a new multi-dimen-
sional vision for the Markermeer-IJmeer had to be drafted, in collabo-
ration with stakeholders and government partners.
In 2007, the cabinet developed a vision referred to as ‘Randstad 
Urgent’ (Urgentieprogramma Randstad, 2007), in which it was stated 
that the Randstad region risks losing its international status as a me-
tropolis. Therefore, the national government envisioned Almere would 
further increase its housing capacity. Almere should attain an addi-
tional 60,000 houses and 100,000 new work places to accommodate 
an increase of 160,000 people in the period up to 2030. The Northern 
Randstad region is expected to need at least 220,000 houses in total, as 
stated in the 2008 Structure Vision ‘Randstad 2040’. Almere, together 
with the region, was asked to draft its own vision for the city in 2030 
called the ‘Concept Structure Vision Almere 2.0’ (Almere, 2009a). Next 
to Almere’s vision, a steering committee—representing local, provin-
cial and national governments and a few NGOs—developed a vision 
to make the ecological system in the Markermeer and IJmeer future-
proof (Samenwerkingsverband Toekomst Markermeer IJmeer, 2009). 
These reports served as input for the ‘RAAM-letter’ (Randstad Urgent 
Randstad-besluiten Amsterdam–Almere–Markermeer, 2009), which 
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was presented to the national government in November 2009. In this 
letter, the cabinet opted for a future vision that included an ecological, 
infrastructural and urban expansion of the Northern Randstad with a 
focus on Almere. However, it was stated that further investigation was 
needed regarding outer-dike development and a possible, yet afford-
able, infrastructural connection between Almere and Amsterdam.
In 2010, the national government, Almere and the province of Flevol-
and developed an agreement called ‘IAK Almere’ (Integraal Afspraken-
kader Almere, 2010) that confirmed the ambitions stated in Randstad 
Urgent (Urgentieprogramma Randstad, 2007), the Concept Structure 
Vision Almere 2.0 (Almere, 2009a) and the RAAM-letter (Randstad 
Urgent Randstad-besluiten Amsterdam–Almere–Markermeer, 2009). 
In the agreement, it was decided that the policy process would pro-
gress under the programme title ‘RRAAM’ (Rijk-regioprogramma Am-
sterdam-Almere-Markermeer). Together with stakeholders, several 
‘Working Programmes’ were started with the aim of providing advice 
to Minister Schultz van Haegen of Infrastructure and the Environment 
regarding the 2013 ‘State’s Vision on Infrastructure’ (Rijksstructuurvisie 
Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013). In the 2013 State’s Vision on 
Infrastructure (Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 
2013), the minister chose an ‘adaptive’ and ‘phased’ approach based on 
projected future demands for housing in the region. However, outer-
dike development was not viewed as a promising idea because of costs 
and lack of support. An infrastructural connection was regarded a ‘dot 
on the horizon’, while decision making was postponed for at least 15 
years (Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013; Ur-
gentieprogramma Randstad: Lijst van vragen en antwoorden, 2013).
6.3 Framing and networking strategies
In this section, six policy entrepreneurs’ framing and networking strat-
egies are discussed. First, I discuss the strategies of two subsequent 
aldermen for spatial planning in Almere who tried to place Almere’s 
ambitions on the regional and national agendas. Their main interest is 
boosting the socio-economic quality of the city by urban development 
and creating a new infrastructural connection with Amsterdam. Sec-
ond, I analyse the strategies of two advocates of two different alterna-
tives for the infrastructural connection. Third, I discuss the strategies 
of two advocates for keeping the Markermeer-IJmeer open. These ad-
vocates oppose the plans made by the other actors.
6.3.1 Infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation
Almere and Amsterdam did not always have good interrelations. In the 
1980s and 1990s, when Almere was trying to settle the city and build 
houses as the national government requested, it was not fond of col-
laborating with Amsterdam—and vice versa. This changed around the 
time that Almere got Mayor Ouwerkerk in 1998, and Amsterdam was 
planning to build a new neighbourhood in the IJmeer, called IJburg 
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(Van Diepen, 2007). Governors from both municipalities realised that 
collaboration was needed at least on regional issues, particularly given 
the demand in the Fifth Memorandum on Spatial Planning (Vijfde Nota 
over de Ruimtelijke Ordening, 2001) for Almere to grow. A growing 
Almere would lead to more traffic between Almere and Amsterdam, 
causing subsequent congestion on the only bridge between the cit-
ies—the Hollandse Brug. Therefore, in 2003, the Project Bureau Fu-
ture Almere was founded by the national government, the provinces 
of Noord-Holland and Flevoland, and the municipalities of Amsterdam 
and Almere to consider how to develop Almere from a joint perspec-
tive (Pots, 2003).
Municipality of Almere, Arie-Willem Bijl
In the view of Arie-Willem Bijl, the alderman of spatial planning in Alm-
ere from 1999 to 2006, sufficient support for intensive collaboration 
between Amsterdam and Almere was lacking. He argued that a joint 
framework on the future of Almere was needed quickly, especially 
considering Almere’s specific needs. As Bijl framed the issue, Almere 
had been dominated too long by a traditional perspective on urban 
development. There had been too much focus on the quantity of hous-
es and population, and on the geographical size of Almere, thereby 
neglecting the sociocultural dimensions of the developing city. For 
example, there are few good restaurants, theatres, cinemas or public 
events bonding the people living in Almere. Most houses, streets and 
neighbourhoods look alike and are monotonous and lacking diversity. 
Further, most people, who have moderate incomes, live in Almere and 
work in Amsterdam, which causes severe traffic jams and daily con-
gestion. For this reason, Almere is also often called a ‘sleepy town’ 
that lacks social cohesion and an enriching heterogeneous culture 
(Hoekstra, 2011; Steinmetz, 2007). Therefore, the public image and 
profile of the municipality is somewhat shallow and vulnerable, and 
lacks robustness. According to Bijl, Almere faces so-called ‘new town’ 
problems.
Bijl knew that his own civil servants had been responsible for ne-
glecting the sociocultural dimensions of the developing city, and sub-
sequently sought initially to change the mindset and culture within his 
own department. Bijl tried to stimulate innovative thinking and attract 
young, creative and open-minded spatial planners. He also wanted 
to set the public agenda by including the public, local parties and 
city council to jointly draft the 2003 ‘City Manifest’ on the future of 
Almere. The City Manifest expressed the ambition that the people of 
THE MOMENTUM WAS THERE, AND ALMERE’S AMBITIONS 
WERE SUCCESSFULLY PLACED ON THE LOCAL AND 
REGIONAL POLICY AND POLITICAL AGENDA
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Almere want to build a versatile, lively and safe city next to and in 
the water. A good relationship and connection with Amsterdam was 
framed as necessary for the city to develop and manage its problems. 
Bijl asked the renowned headstrong city architect, Koolhaas—who 
was involved in laying the framework for Almere in the 1970s—and 
the ambitious city architect, Marcusse, to envision how a connection 
between the two cities could appear, and to draft an artist’s impression 
and create a large maquette. Bijl’s counterpart, Stadig—the alderman 
of Spatial Planning in Amsterdam from 1994 to 2006—was at first not 
particularly enthusiastic about the idea to connect the cities, either 
symbolically or physically (R05). To win over Amsterdam and Stadig’s 
support, Bijl hired a penthouse office on Amsterdam’s city quay, giving 
a beautiful overview of the Markermeer-IJmeer and Almere’s skyline. 
The project was called ‘Atelier IJmeer 2030+’, and ministers, majors, 
experts, administrators, governors, policymakers, experts, politicians, 
stakeholders and many more were invited to come and see the idea 
evolve, and provide input and feedback.
This relatively aggressive networking tactic—by using a venue on 
the other’s territory—proved effective for setting the policy and po-
litical agenda of Amsterdam. With Atelier IJmeer 2030+, Bijl won Sta-
dig’s support, who subsequently convinced Amsterdam’s city council 
and policymakers to support and officially contribute to the idea of an 
infrastructural connection. The momentum was there, and Almere’s 
ambitions were successfully placed on the local and regional policy 
and political agenda. In 2005, this was reinforced when Almere, Am-
sterdam, the ANWB, Staatsbosbeheer, Nature Monuments (Natuurm-
onumenten) and the provinces of Noord-Holland and Flevoland—after 
two years of work—presented a Future Vision for the IJmeer (Stuur-
groep Verkenning IJmeer, 2005), in which they unanimously support-
ed the plans to allow outer-dike urbanisation and create an infrastruc-
tural connection. The main condition stipulated was that ecology also 
needed to be taken into account. Unfortunately for Bijl, the national 
government was lagging behind and inattentive in response to Atelier 
IJmeer 2030+ and the Almere plans in general. Bijl had failed to secure 
political support on the national level; thus, it would take until 2006 
before Almere’s ambitions were placed on the national political agen-
da again—by which time, Bijl, after his second term in office, resigned 
and recommended Duivesteijn as his successor.
Municipality of Almere, Adri Duivesteijn
Adri Duivesteijn became alderman for Almere in 2006, and followed 
the path that was prepared by Bijl. Before Duivesteijn became alder-
man for Almere, he had been a member of the city council of The 
Hague, alderman in The Hague and member of the Dutch Parliament. 
As shown below, Duivesteijn used his political experience and con-
nections to seek opportunities to place Almere on the national politi-
cal agenda. When Duivesteijn came to Almere, he was surprised that 
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the IJmeer waterfront was not fully exploited. He longed to change 
this and became a strong advocate of outer-dike urbanisation and the 
infrastructural connection (Anonymous, 2006c; Steinmetz, 2006). 
While Bijl framed the problem from the perspective of Almere, with 
its new town problems (see above), Duivesteijn took the continued 
demand for housing in the Amsterdam metropolis as his primary ref-
erence point to frame the issue. According to Duivesteijn, Amsterdam 
and Almere are expected to attract more and more people, and grow 
accordingly. Almere is the solution to the national housing problem 
because it is close to Amsterdam and has sufficient space. Duivesteijn 
was very willing to comply with the government’s call to accommo-
date housing in the region and Almere because, as indicated in the 
introduction of this chapter, profound city development could serve 
as an opportunity to give Almere the socio-economic boost for which 
it longs.
However, as Duivesteijn framed it, Almere cannot grow without 
appropriate infrastructure bringing Almere closer to Amsterdam and 
making it an attractive place to live. Therefore, in line with the ideas 
propagated by Bijl, Duivesteijn envisioned giving the city a new sky-
line, an urban character and an infrastructural connection between 
Almere and Amsterdam that could serve as a stepping-stone to travel 
back and forth from Almere to Amsterdam. A Golden Gate—or Öster-
sund-like bridge and landmark—would certainly help make Almere 
part of the Amsterdam metropolitan area (Huisman, 2008; Van Engel-
en, 2009). Duivesteijn also used the municipality’s financial resources 
to ask the urban architects of the renowned MVRDV urban architec-
ture bureau to draft the Concept Structure Vision for Almere in 2030 
(Almere, 2009a). Duivesteijn used this to visualise and symbolise his 
vision on the future of Almere, including an infrastructural connec-
tion and outer-dike urbanisation (Almere, 2009b, 2009d). However, 
as will be discussed below, Duivesteijn’s opponents framed his vision 
for Almere as megalomania and delusions of grandeur (Anonymous, 
2006c; Hoekstra, 2011; Huisman, 2008; Steinmetz, 2007).
Alongside framing the issue, Duivesteijn was keen to try and set 
the public agenda by using various venues—such as public meetings, 
receptions, formal meetings or informal chats—to pitch and share his 
story and vision for Almere (Anonymous, 2006b, 2011c, 2011f; Hoek-
stra, 2011; Huisman, 2009; Steinmetz, 2007; Ten Hooven, 2006). He 
also networked and exploited his political connections with members 
of his political party, the Labour Party, members of parliament, minis-
ters, local councillors and so forth to set the political agenda (Anony-
mous, 2006c; Hoekstra, 2011). He arranged bilateral meetings, invited 
people to his home, or approached people at various events to win 
Figure 6.2: Atelier Almere 2030+’s maquette of the envisioned infrastructural connection and 
outer-dike urbanisation. Photo: IJburg.nl.
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over political friends for the Almere cause (R04; Van den Boomen, 
2010). His reputation and position as an alderman gave him access 
to key venues and a podium to share his plans (Anonymous, 2010d).
Duivesteijn’s rhetorical skills, combined with his knowledge and re-
lational skills, helped him pitch persuasive talks, and generated public 
and political attention. One of the respondents to this study stated, 
‘Duivesteijn is a passionate advocate, a real negotiator, with status and 
power’ (R04). A government representative stated that, ‘[Duivesteijn] 
has many entrances, issue knowledge and is very much able to gain 
attention for Almere and to shape that in an innovative way’ (R18). For 
example, in 2007, when a new Cabinet was installed, Duivesteijn ex-
ploited his political connections to gain access to the national political 
agenda setting. He was able to arrange a meeting with his political 
party colleague and Minister Cramer of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment to win her over to his ambitions for Almere. Cramer, 
having other political priorities and just beginning her term in office, 
indicated that she had no interest in taking up this policy issue at that 
time. However, Duivesteijn convinced her of the importance of making 
Almere focal in national policymaking (R12). Within one year, a con-
tract was signed to focus on Almere in national policymaking, and, in 
2008, Cramer presented the Almere Principles with Duivesteijn. The 
governmental RAAM-letter (2009) and IAK (2010) soon followed. Thus, 
Duivesteijn proved to be very effective in his framing and networking 
strategies to set the public, policy and political agenda, at least up 
until 2010.
The year 2010 marked a turning point in the realisation of 
Duivesteijn’s ambitions. In October 2010, a new Cabinet took office 
with the Christian Democrats  and the Liberal Party. The economic cri-
sis was continuing to affect policies, and the new national government 
was cautious about spending millions on infrastructural projects with 
a long-term effect. The political stream had changed and Duivesteijn 
now had to deal with the 
liberal party member, 
Schultz van Haegen, who 
was the Minister of Infra-
structure and the Environ-
ment. Nonetheless, follow-
ing the RAAM-letter (2009) and IAK (2010), negotiations were initiated 
between the national government and Almere to discuss the plans for 
the northern part of the Randstad region. Duivesteijn used these ne-
gotiations to bring the interests of Almere into focus; however, these 
negotiations did not proceed smoothly.
As he argued before 2010, Duivesteijn stated that if other parties 
would not agree to build the infrastructural connection, Almere would 
not comply with the government’s need to accommodate additional 
houses (Anonymous, 2006c, 2008c, 2009d, 2010b; Huisman, 2008; 
Schreuder, 2006). By continuously reiterating these threats publicly 
THE YEAR 2010 MARKED A TURNING 
POINT IN THE REALISATION OF 
DUIVESTEIJN’S AMBITIONS
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and during negotiations, he placed himself in a powerful position. 
However, he ran the risk of making threats he could not keep because, 
in the end, it is up to the national 
government to decide. The re-
lationship between Almere and 
the national government was put 
at risk because of these threats 
and the occasional outbursts of Duivesteijn during negotiations. It 
has been said by people involved in the negotiations that sometimes 
Duivesteijn’s temperament took control, which was expressed by 
thumping the table and threatening to leave the conversation room 
(R18; Anonymous, 2006c). At one moment, a mediator was even asked 
to bring both parties on speaking terms because the relationship was 
so damaged (R18). The mediator concluded that there were cultural 
differences between the national government and Almere that could 
explain the clash (R18); however, clashes in personalities may also have 
contributed to the conflict.
While Duivesteijn’s relationships with political counterparts had 
grown fragile, he was also sometimes criticised by local Almere City 
Council members who felt uninformed, and argued that Duivesteijn 
acted solitarily without accounting for his actions to the city council 
(Boogers & Drosterij, 2012). His relationship with his own civil servants 
was also complicated. It was said that he carefully selected the people 
with whom he wanted to work, and those people shared his ambitions 
and opinions and tended to think like him (R04). Colleagues who did 
not align with these were forced away, or left out of free will or due 
to social pressure (R04; R18). Duivesteijn seemed to remain in control 
by steering his subordinates. Due to his own expert knowledge, he 
exerted power by pushing forward his own opinion. This was appreci-
ated by some, while others found it difficult. For example, his civil serv-
ants were limited in their discretionary power to negotiate with the 
national government because the issues discussed sometimes contra-
dicted Duivesteijn’s expressed opinion (R18). As a result, according to a 
government representative, Duivesteijn, by having too much steering 
ambition, risked losing power due to his civil servants trying to by-
pass him (R18). Therefore, Duivesteijn’s tight control seems to have its 
downsides, such as when taking trust into account.
This image of Duivesteijn aligns with an article in a national 
newspaper that was based on quotations from people with whom 
Duivesteijn had worked. The article was given the expressive title: 
‘Man with vision, boldness and a drive to work is also a big pain in the 
neck’ (Anonymous, 2006c). Thus, while Duivesteijn was respected for 
his passion, ambition, perseverance, daring attitude and willingness 
to act, he was also—in this article—described as a troublemaker and 
a pain in the neck who ‘you would rather immure than have a drink 
with’ (Anonymous, 2006c). Unsurprisingly, Duivesteijn’s relationship 
with his opponents was also not easy. A representative of one of the 
‘MAN WITH VISION, BOLDNESS 
AND A DRIVE TO WORK IS 
ALSO A BIG PAIN IN THE NECK’
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action groups mentioned that he felt ridiculed and marginalised by 
Duivesteijn: ‘Duivesteijn sets us apart as a negativistic club with whom 
you cannot talk reasonably … He tried to corner us by separating the 
reasonable nature organisations from the unreasonable ones’ (R14; cf. 
Bezemer, 2009; Meershoek, 2009; Soetenhorst, 2009). Later, I discuss 
the framing and networking strategies of these opponents in detail.
Ultimately, while Duivesteijn’s framing and networking strategies 
helped set the public, policy and political agenda, he was unable to have 
his favoured solutions—the outer-dike development and infrastructur-
al connection—accepted for implementation. Outer-dike urbanisation 
was taken off the political agenda by Minister Schultz van Haegen in 
December 2011 because the plan was deemed too harmful for ecology 
and too costly. However, in the 2013 State Vision for the future of the 
region, outer-dike urbanisation was not completely removed from the 
policy agenda, as it was still mentioned as an issue for consideration in 
the future (Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013). 
The minister chose an ‘adaptive’ and ‘phased’ approach based on future 
developments of the demand for housing in the region.
Decision making on the infrastructural connection was postponed 
for at least 15 years (Urgentieprogramma Randstad: Lijst van vragen 
en antwoorden, 2013). Contrary to what Duivesteijn and Almere had 
aimed for, the minister argued that accommodating additional housing 
in Almere was a prerequisite for making a decision on the infrastruc-
tural connection between Amsterdam and Almere—not the other way 
around. While Almere had wished that the minister would make an 
outspoken decision regarding the infrastructural connection through 
the Markermeer-IJmeer, the minister wanted to maintain alternative 
solutions for the problems of congestion. The minister framed a new 
infrastructural connection as a ‘dot on the horizon’ (Rijksstructuurvisie 
Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013, pp. 7, 35, 42). In response to 
the presentation of the State Vision for the region, Albert de Vries—
a member of parliament for the labour party—instigated a motion to 
pressure the minister to consciously opt for an infrastructural connec-
tion through the Markermeer-IJmeer. Minister Schultz van Haegen re-
plied that the infrastructural connection as a ‘dot on the horizon’ can 
be understood as ‘the alternative preferred’ (12 RRAAM, 2013). Never-
theless the minister wants to conduct new research into the various 
alternatives in order to make a knowledgeable decision, in due time. 
This decision will be made only if Almere, compared to the situation in 
2010, has built an additional 25,000 houses, which is expected to oc-
cur by 2025 at the earliest.
As of February 2013, Duivesteijn is a member of the Dutch senate. 
He resigned as alderman for Almere because he believed he could not 
do both jobs. His successor in Almere is a likeminded protagonist for 
the ambitions of Almere who previously led the Almere Department 
on Urban Development (Oosterheert, 2013).
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6.3.2 Specific routes and character of an infrastructural connection
With the 2009 RAAM-letter, the national government decided to in-
stigate the RRAAM process and reach consensus and gain support 
for a final governmental decision. From 2010 to 2012, various stake-
holders were involved. The setup of the RRAAM process reflected 
ideas presented by the Dutch Elverding Commission. This commis-
sion advised the government to actively involve stakeholders in the 
early phase of the planning process to shorten its duration and gain 
wide support as early as possible. Members of the RRAAM steering 
committee included, among others, the Director-General of the Min-
istry of Infrastructure and the Environment; Director-General of the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation; and alder-
men Duivesteijn and Van Poelgeest. Van Poelgeest was Duivesteijn’s 
counterpart in Amsterdam. Van Poelgeest became, like Duivesteijn, an 
alderman in 2006.
There was also the ‘RRAAM-work’ (implying the Dutch word for 
‘framework’). In the RRAAM-work, only the stakeholder representa-
tives were involved who had a direct link to the area, could support 
the fundamental principles of the RAAM-letter, and had the capacity 
Figure 6.3: Duivesteijn, in the centre, talking about the plans developed by Almere with Minister 
Schultz van Haegen of Infrastructure and the Environment. Next to Schultz van Haegen are 
Bliek, the executive representative of the province of Flevoland, and Van Woerkom, leader of the 
RRAAM network. Source: Municipality of Almere.
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to participate. In the ‘RRAAM network’, a broader range of stakehold-
ers was invited to participate in the discussions. Anyone could join the 
RRAAM network, including civilians, representatives from municipali-
ties, private companies, expert organisations, nature conservationists, 
interest groups and others (Notitie Kansrijke Oplossingsrichtingen, 
2011). Parallel to this, several Working Programmes were established 
for different issues. For example, one Working Programme focused 
on the infrastructural connection, while another focused on the eco-
logical condition of the Markermeer-IJmeer. The open setup of the 
RRAAM process gave actors the venue and opportunity to lobby, opt 
for new plans and reflect on ideas. As indicated below, two policy en-
trepreneurs used it to openly advocate a specific route and character 
of the infrastructural connection.
Urban Architect, Jerome Adema
Jerome Adema, an urban architect and inhabitant of Almere, devel-
oped an alternative for the infrastructural connection. He was inspired 
by the historically famous Dutch engineer, Cornelis Lely, who, in the 
nineteenth century, drafted a plan to create the largest polders in the 
Netherlands (see Chapter 1). Aside from the polder in the Marker-
meer—called the Markerwaard—all other polders in Lely’s plan were 
created. Adema’s dream was to continue the work of Lely. Thus, in 
2002, Adema started drafting a grand design for the IJsselmeer area 
as a whole, including the IJsselmeer, Markermeer and IJmeer. Part of 
his plan was to create a large prime swamp, or wetland, in the Marker-
waard; a dike from Almere to Edam-Volendam; and a combination of a 
bridge and tunnel to Amsterdam through the IJmeer. In 2008, during a 
participatory policy process for the ‘SAMM-project’ (meaning ‘Mark-
ermeer Collaboration’), which was started after the Randstad Urgent 
agreement (Urgentieprogramma Randstad, 2007), he submitted the 
plan ‘Markermeer Plus’, together with the association Friends of the 
Markerwaard (Vereniging Vrienden van de Markerwaard, 2008).
The association Friends of the Markerwaard was led by the retired 
and renowned city architect, Dirk Frieling, who was also the former 
head of the Project Bureau Almere and the RIJP, and had always ad-
vocated the creation of the last polder until his death in 2011. When 
Adema and Frieling’s plan was not incorporated in the advice by the 
Markermeer Collaboration for the RAAM-letter, they unsuccessfully 
networked to raise support from policymakers, governors, politicians 
and many more. In addition, their renewed plan ‘Markermeer More 
Worth’ (Frieling & Adema, 2011) did not raise the desired attention. 
Adema then joined the people behind the citizen initiative Build the IJ-
meer Bridge (Bouw de IJmeerbrug, 2011) and founded the association 
‘Almere Better Accessible’ (Stichting Almere Beter Bereikbaar, 2011) in 
October 2010. Undiscouraged by previous failures, Adema seized the 
opportunity when three private consortia offered suggestions for a 
bridge over the IJmeer, in September 2011 (R06).
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According to Adema, these proposed plans were far too expensive; 
thus, he submitted a downscaled alternative focused on the infrastruc-
tural connection itself, instead of a transformation of the IJsselmeer 
area as a whole (Adema, 2012). He realised that his initial grand de-
sign would never raise the desired support and was an unrealistic goal. 
Thus, he decided to focus on the infrastructural connection, and his 
renewed plan was to create a connection located more to the south, 
closer to the Hollandse Brug. The connection would be partly a bridge 
and partly a tunnel, with a road and metro line to arrive more to the 
south in Amsterdam (Adema, 2012; Stichting Almere Beter Bereikbaar, 
2011). Adema also suggested creating a new peninsula west of Almere, 
suitable for housing and tourism. He posited that his alternative would 
be less expensive than the other alternatives, would serve commuters 
better, and would have limited effect on the open landscape of the 
Markermeer-IJmeer because it would be located more to the south 
and take into account water flows and the quality of the ecosystem.
Adema networked for support from local political parties in Alm-
ere. Adema indicated that, while nearly everyone was enthusiastic 
about his plan, only one political party—Livable Almere (Leefbaar 
Almere)—dared to publicly support it (R06; R07). Van Duijn, the Alm-
ere city councillor for this political party, enabled Adema to present his 
plan to other parties’ representatives during an open and local public 
round table (Leefbaar Almere, 2012). The day before, on 18 January 
2012, Adema was able to present his plan at a RRAAM network meet-
ing. He succeeded in having his plan considered a serious policy al-
ternative to the plans submitted by the private consortia. While the 
cost-benefit analysis and effects on nature were not positive, his plan 
was still considered a serious alternative because of its innovative de-
sign and alternative routing. However, in the final RRAAM advice, his 
alternative was not presented as the preferred infrastructural connec-
tion (RRAAM, 2012). In the 2013 State Vision for the region, the minis-
ter argued that Adema’s alternative was no longer considered because 
there was not enough local support, especially from Almere (R39; 
Rijksstructuurvisie Amsterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013). It was 
deemed too costly, too harmful to nature and too close to the coast 
of Muiden and Muiderberg. Thus, while Adema succeeded in gaining 
access to the policy and political agendas—and was able to have his 
plan presented and considered—he failed to pressure and consolidate 
his plan higher on these agendas because it was then disregarded.
Pensioner, Michael Van der Vlis
Michael Van der Vlis is an econometrist, pensioner, former alderman 
for Spatial Planning and Public Transport in Amsterdam from 1978 to 
1990, and former head of the ROVER association for public transport 
travellers from 2004 to 2010. He developed an alternative plan for the 
infrastructural connection: a bridge with a light rail from Amsterdam 
Central Station to Almere (Van der Vlis, 2012b). He argued that the 
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Figure 6.4: A graphic visualisation of Adema's infrastructural connection. Source: Jerome Adema 
Architects.
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plans presented by the consortia are too technocratic, expensive and 
unsuitable because they forget that people who travel by metro or 
tram have different travelling patterns than people travelling by train 
(Van der Vlis, 2012a). Most people do not enter and exit the metro at 
the beginning or end of the line, but somewhere in between. In addi-
tion, Van der Vlis argued that the main starting point and destination 
for most travellers is Amsterdam Central Station, not the southern part 
of Amsterdam, as is stated in the other alternatives.
Thus, Van der Vlis argued that the only option worth pursuing is 
a direct connection—preferably a bridge, for travelling comfort—be-
tween Amsterdam Central Station and Almere Central Station, with 
sufficient stations in between. According to Van der Vlis, outer-dike 
urbanisation is absurd, unrealistic and should not be related to the dis-
cussion on whether or not an infrastructural connection is necessary 
because it relates to different problems (housing and accessibility). He 
argued that Adema’s plan is not a viable option because it does not 
have enough public support, is too complex and does not incorporate 
IJburg and a connection to Amsterdam Central Station. Van der Vlis 
submitted his own plan to the steering committee of the RRAAM pro-
cess and its members announced that they would consider his plan. 
However, when he did not hear back from the committee and received 
an invitation for a meeting to discuss Adema’s plan, he was furious to 
learn that his plan was forgotten and thus neglected.
He summoned the overall steering committee to consider his plan, 
and wrote a letter to the responsible minister and to Duivesteijn, whom 
he knew personally (R11). This ‘top-over’ strategy proved effective be-
cause he was invited for a talk, apologised to and 
promised that his suggestions would seriously be 
taken into account and assessed (R04). However, 
in the final RRAAM advice, his alternative did not 
stand out (RRAAM, 2012). In the 2013 State Vision, 
the minister did not yet want to make a decision, 
but stated that Van der Vlis’s alternative would be considered in due 
time. Thus, Van der Vlis succeeded in gaining access to the policy and 
political agendas, as his alternative was considered, but he failed to 
pressure and consolidate his plan higher on these agendas. However, 
his alternative is not yet completely disregarded and is still considered 
a viable option for the infrastructural connection.
6.3.3 Markermeer-IJmeer’s open landscape
Breunissen of Friends of the Earth Netherlands (Milieudefensie) and 
Verhorst of the Angry Swan (De Kwade Zwaan) were not convinced by 
Almere’s need to urbanise outer dike and build an infrastructural con-
nection. They opposed the change and tried to undermine the fram-
ing employed by the proponents. Rather than focusing on the ben-
efits that outer-dike urbanisation and the infrastructural connection 
would have for Almere, Breunissen and Verhorst focused primarily on 
THIS ‘TOP-OVER’ 
STRATEGY PROVED 
EFFECTIVE 
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Figure 6.5: Campaigning to keep the IJmeer open: ‘Is this going to be your view?’
(Photo: Watersportbank).
the threats the plans pose for the quality of the open landscape of the 
Markermeer-IJmeer. Below, these two policy entrepreneurs and their 
strategies are discussed.
Friends of the Earth Netherlands, Klaas Breunissen
When, in mid-2008, Klaas Breunissen—the team leader of a public 
campaigning division of Friends of the Earth Netherlands—learnt of 
plans to create an island, build houses outer dike and create an in-
frastructural connection through the Markermeer-IJmeer, he was trig-
gered to act and mobilise the public. The public seemed to be una-
ware of the proposed changes and had no idea what was going on, or 
when they would have the opportunity to voice an opinion. Breunissen 
questioned the framing implied by the assumption that the demand for 
housing would grow. However, after Friends of the Earth conducted 
research, they had to admit that the assumption was justified, but this 
is not to say that they agreed with the plan to accommodate the hous-
ing in the Almere outer dike, or create a bridge or tunnel through the 
Markermeer-IJmeer. According to Breunissen, there are plenty of al-
ternative options.
Breunissen argued that the daily congestion could be easily solved 
by increasing the capacity of the current bridge between Amsterdam 
and Almere. Breunissen also argued that European legislation does not 
allow the implementation of Almere’s plans, since the European Un-
ion (EU) only allows changes to a protected nature area when there 
is national urgency and no other solutions are possible, given the re-
quirement that nature is appropriately compensated (Anonymous, 
2009r; Natura 2000). As Breunissen wanted to have the public in-
formed, he and his team organised public meetings in Muiden, IJburg, 
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Monnickkendam and Almere to facilitate public discussion. Local poli-
ticians were invited to join these discussions. Breunissen succeeded in 
attaining support from all kinds of actors, including nature conserva-
tion associations, the Dutch recreational fishery association, the water 
sports association and local citizens groups. Together, they formed a 
loosely coupled coalition of convenience because most of these actors 
did not actively engage in the debate, but were, for example, willing 
to sign the Pamphlet of Pampus during a public event on the symboli-
cally chosen island Pampus in the centre of the IJmeer. This event was 
organised by Breunissen and his team. With Friends of the Earth, Bre-
unissen also set up a campaign with the slogan, ‘Keep the IJmeer open’ 
(‘Houd het IJmeer open’).
Trips were organised for members of the parliament to visit the 
area, and an original song ‘Tribute to the IJmeer’ was sung with lo-
cal representatives and engaged citizens to make a statement to the 
responsible minister and members of the parliament. Further, via cam-
paigning on the streets, distributing pamphlets and advertising with 
large plates and posters, Breunissen and other concerned actors tried 
to frame and visualise the effect of a bridge and outer-dike devel-
opment in order to mobilise people, raise media attention, increase 
awareness, evoke emotion and gain support. Their main framing strat-
egy was to tell people what they would lose when the plans to build 
outer dike, together with a bridge, would become real. Partly thanks 
to Breunissen’s efforts, support was found from neighbouring munici-
palities, such as Muiden, Hoorn, Edam-Volendam, Waterland, people 
from IJburg (Werkgroep Stop de IJmeerbrug website, 2009) and the 
aforementioned stakeholders. Although most of these stakeholders 
did not actively engage in the discussion, they did oppose the infra-
structural connection and outer-dike development.
Angry Swan, Manja Verhorst
Manja Verhorst leads the small action group, the Angry Swan. Since 
1984, she has lived in the village, Uitdam, part of the municipality of 
Waterland, nearby Amsterdam and next to the Markermeer-IJmeer, 
opposite to Almere. Verhorst regards the nature and landscape of the 
lake as her precious legacy and she campaigns to keep the lake open, 
for her and future generations (Anony-
mous, 2009m, 2010h). Due to her pas-
sion, personal commitment, tireless 
efforts and perseverance, she is seen 
as the ‘guardian of the area’, fighting to 
prevent harm being done (Anonymous, 2009c). She will continue pro-
tecting the open landscape ‘to the end’ (R04; see Anonymous, 2011d).
In 1999, Verhorst started to employ activities when the national 
government intended to create a sludge deposit in the Markermeer. 
With the Angry Swan, she mobilised people and instigated a motion in 
the parliament against this deposit, leading to the cancellation of the 
SHE WILL CONTINUE 
PROTECTING THE OPEN 
LANDSCAPE ‘TO THE END’ 
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Figure 6.6: Verhorst of the Angry Swan fighting ‘Almere’s evil destroyers’.  Photo: Ella Tilgenkamp; 
cartoon: Frank Muntjewerf.
plans (R01). From then on, she has been fighting to defend the area as 
it is. With varying success, she has tried to boycott plans for a camping 
site, a yacht harbour, a bicycle path on the dike, windmills and many 
other issues. This always led to local and regional media attention. 
During the last years, she has been trying to prevent the Almere plans. 
Her reasoning is similar to Breunissen—as elaborated above—and it 
is no surprise that they have been collaborating on the campaign to 
keep the IJmeer open. Verhorst also formed her own team with Kuit 
(a Dutch linguist and report analyst) and Kasanmoentalib (a biologist), 
with whom she has proven effective in raising attention for the Mark-
ermeer-IJmeer.
However, the group lacks the expert knowledge and resources to 
employ extensive activities, such as hiring lawyers, pressing charges 
and setting legal proceedings in motion. The resources they have are 
limited because everything is paid by the individuals undertaking the 
action. Despite these limited resources, Verhorst is keen to exploit 
every opportunity to be involved in the decision-making process con-
cerning the Markermeer-IJmeer and the area in general. Networking, 
aided by her natural charm, is one of her main and strongest strate-
gies. She is very sociable and able to make new friends and acquaint-
ances. One respondent stated, ‘She is a great person’ (R08). Her man-
ner of campaigning and activism is respected by friends and foes alike 
(Anonymous, 2008h, 2009c, 2011b, 2011g).
Verhorst not only shouts from the sidelines, but also tries to be 
involved in the policy process as much as possible in order to inter-
vene and gain interest in her goal (Anonymous, 2011a). She attends 
every meeting that is somehow related to this issue, including (for ex-
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ample) the public RRAAM meetings. Gathering information is not the 
only reason she attends; she also tries to be involved in the process by 
contacting the press, experts, policymakers, governors and politicians 
(Schreuder, 2009b). At various venues, she always sits in a chair in the 
second row, behind the invited speakers, and in front of the speaking 
stand. One respondent said, ‘I have done over 50 talks and she was 
always there, right in front of me in the second row, and very attentive’ 
(R08).
Verhorst tries to prepare extensively for the meetings she attends, 
and to anticipate opportunities—such as approaching people during 
breaks or lunch to attract their interests and give them a binder with 
articles and information supporting her argument (Schreuder, 2009b). 
Moreover, after this initial contact, she feels free to email or telephone 
people (including myself) to ask advice or share information about the 
case. Additionally, she invites people to visit her at home, both to have 
an informal conversations about her beliefs and to give people the 
opportunity to experience the openness of the Markermeer-IJmeer 
themselves, from where she lives. She can become angry with peo-
ple who discuss the Markermeer-IJmeer without ever having visited to 
experience the lake themselves. For example, when I visited Verhorst 
for an interview, I was first kindly guided to look at the Markermeer-
IJmeer from the dike to experience the open water, view the shoreline 
of Almere and witness the approaching urbanisation of Amsterdam.
Among her more honourable guests include a chief deputy of the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment, the Delta Commis-
sioner, scientists, experts, regional representatives, local aldermen, 
journalists and many more. Schultz van Haegen, the responsible Min-
ister of Infrastructure and the Environment, was also invited to her 
home. Verhorst wrote the following to Schultz van Haegen:
Before you make a decision, I would like to stand with you on the 
dike of Uitdam … I would like to share this experience with you. 
Only then, I will have the feeling that I have done everything within 
my power to defend the IJmeer. (Anonymous, 2011i)
Unfortunately for Verhorst, the minister was unable or unwilling to 
comply with her request (Anonymous, 2011l). Nevertheless, the minis-
ter, like many others, did accept Verhorst’s invitation to connect on the 
network website LinkedIn.com, which Verhorst also uses to keep track 
of and expand her social and professional network.
Apart from inviting people to her home and trying to connect on-
line, Verhorst also tries to mobilise the public to influence the poli-
cy and political agenda (Anonymous, 2009s, 2011b). During the cold 
winter of 2008 to 2009, Verhorst drafted a petition against the plans 
for outer-dike urbanisation (Anonymous, 2009a). Being unable to 
ice skate herself, she came up with the idea to draft a petition and 
collect signatures from people whom she assumed loved nature as 
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well: ice skaters (Anonymous, 2009j). In this petition, for which she 
collected 22,514 signatures, she argued—just like Breunissen—that, 
based on European legislation, it was not possible to proceed with 
Almere’s plans. The EU only allows changes to a protected area when 
there is a national urgency and no other solutions are possible, given 
the requirement that nature is ap-
propriately compensated (Natura 
2000). Conversely, proponents of 
the outer-dike development and in-
frastructural connection argue that 
these plans would not harm nature or ecology, but would contribute to 
restoring the ecology. Moreover, to make the decision makers aware 
of the legislation and value of the Markermeer-IJmeer, Verhorst and 
her team wrote letters to members of the Dutch Parliament and lob-
bied with aldermen and mayors from neighbouring municipalities, pro-
vincial representatives and local and regional interest groups. Many 
of these supported Verhorst’s vision to keep the Markermeer-IJmeer 
open.
Verhorst is unmistakeably dedicated and engaged, which means 
she receives much praise; however, there is also criticism. According 
to some respondents, Verhorst is narrow-minded and unable and un-
willing to be open to alternative perspectives and arguments. It is said 
that she has prejudices concerning the plans made by Almere, which 
she regards as horrific, regardless of their content and detail. A re-
spondent stated, ‘Manja often thinks in spectres. She has prejudices. 
I then say, “but it [the plans for the IJmeer] could also turn out to be 
great!”’ (R08). Another respondent from Almere (a proponent of the 
plans) stated:
For them, only one thing counts: what you see on the horizon. You 
do not hear from them about how to develop a city where people 
can live and work. Their perspective is dangerous: ‘How can you 
make a city of 350,000 people non-existent?’ This is what makes 
Adri [Duivesteijn] furious. (R12)
Hence, several respondents regarded Verhorst’s interest an example 
of ‘not in my backyard’ behaviour, and corner her and her supporters 
as ‘the ladies on the dike’ (R19). Local councillor and initiator of ‘Build 
the IJmeer Bridge’, Van der Kroef—in clear reference to the people 
of the Angry Swan—stated: ‘We must not be bluffed by a few peo-
ple from Waterland who feel that their view is spoiled’ (Van Lieshout, 
2009). Verhorst replied to this critique by stating, ‘It is about much 
more than our own interest. We are talking about an area important 
for very many people’ (Schreuder, 2009b). However, because Verhorst 
is also described as ‘mediageil’, which literally means ‘media-horny’, or 
enjoying being at the centre of attention, she is not necessarily given 
the benefit of the doubt. Some respondents stated that her campaign 
‘BEFORE YOU MAKE A DECISION, 
I WOULD LIKE TO STAND WITH 
YOU ON THE DIKE OF UITDAM’ 
C
ha
pt
er
 6
: A
lm
er
e’
s 
U
rb
an
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t
risks being more about herself than about the issue she supports be-
cause—according to these respondents—Verhorst always seems to 
be seeking to be in the spotlight (R04; R10). In 2011, partially thanks 
to mobilising her network to vote for her, she was awarded the title 
‘Waterlander 2011’ for her merits to the municipality Waterland and 
the region (Anonymous, 2011b). However, this does not indicate that 
praise of Verhorst does not hold any meaning, as highlighted by the 
fact that, in early 2011, Verhorst was awarded the honourable Knight’s 
Order of Orange-Nassau by the Queen due to her merits for society 
(Anonymous, 2011d).
Advocacy versus brokerage
While Breunissen, Verhorst and their respective organisations are ex-
plicit in their goal to keep the Markermeer-IJmeer open at any cost, 
associations such as the Environmental Federation (Milieufederatie), 
Association for Preservation of the IJsselmeer and Nature Monuments 
are open to negotiate on outer-dike development and the infrastruc-
tural connection. Most of these associations still do not prefer human 
intervention, and would like to see the Markermeer-IJmeer open, but 
are willing to agree on a package deal. For example, if resources are 
to be invested in outer-dike urbanisation, there should be an equal in-
vestment in revitalising the ecosystem. They acknowledge that there 
are other interests that need to be considered alongside ecological 
and landscape quality (R15). The strategic dilemma they face is to ei-
ther act constructively in the RRAAM policy process—such as pushing 
forward their own visions—or hinder the process. They decided that 
it would be better to participate constructively in the RRAAM process 
from a joint perspective, and this pragmatic approach made them an 
easier partner for the RRAAM-work than Friends of the Earth and the 
Angry Swan.
Friends of the Earth and the Angry Swan were not part of the 
RRAAM-work because they could not fully commit themselves to the 
three-fold ambition stated in the RAAM-letter (focus on nature/water, 
accessibility and urbanisation) (R04). Breunissen did not participate in 
the RRAAM policy process due to budget cuts and other priorities of 
Friends of the Earth. Verhorst had no direct access to or influence on 
the decisions made within the RRAAM-work or overall steering com-
mittee, but did participate actively in the RRAAM network. However, 
she did not limit herself to the RRAAM network because, as aforemen-
tioned, she seeks to raise attention and awareness of the public value 
THE STRATEGIC DILEMMA THEY FACE IS TO EITHER 
ACT CONSTRUCTIVELY IN THE RRAAM POLICY 
PROCESS—SUCH AS PUSHING FORWARD THEIR OWN 
VISIONS—OR HINDER THE PROCESS
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of the open landscape of the Markermeer-IJmeer, both within and out-
side the RRAAM process.
6.4 Conclusion
This case study has shown a variety of policy entrepreneurs trying to 
set the agenda on the plans for outer-dike urbanisation and the in-
frastructural connection between Amsterdam and Almere. First, two 
aldermen from Almere became strong advocates of an infrastructural 
connection between Amsterdam and Almere and, mainly in the case of 
Duivesteijn, also promoted outer-dike urbanisation to accommodate 
additional housing, solve problems of traffic congestion, and give the 
city of Almere the socio-economic boost it desperately needs. Second, 
two other policy entrepreneurs seized the momentum to advocate a 
specific alternative for the infrastructural connection. Third, two pol-
icy entrepreneurs from interest groups opposed the plans made by 
the other policy entrepreneurs and advocated to maintain the status 
quo and keep the landscape open, as it currently is. The conflicting 
interests and frames presented resulted in a dynamic agenda-setting 
process because all of the policy entrepreneurs sought to frame the 
issue to set the agenda and exploit various networking strategies to 
gather resources and attain support.
With regard to the framing strategies employed, all policy entre-
preneurs tried to visualise the problems and solutions. Alderman Bijl 
framed the issue at stake mainly from Almere’s new town problems 
and argued that an infrastructural connection would benefit Almere 
and, to a larger extent, the region. He had set up an atelier and cre-
ated a maquette to visualise the infrastructural connection and outer-
dike urbanisation. Bijl succeeded in expanding support and setting 
the public, policy and political agendas. However, he did not succeed 
in instigating a final decision by the national government on the fu-
ture of Almere, and public and political attention waned. Alderman 
Duivesteijn altered the frame and successfully aligned it to the national 
problem of accommodating a demographically changing and grow-
ing population in the Randstad region, which was in the interest of 
the national government. He cleverly linked Almere’s frame to that of 
the national government and succeeded in placing Almere’s ambitions 
back on the regional and national policy and political agendas. Both 
aldermen, though visible in the media, did not seem to invest consider-
able effort in setting the public agenda, although they did nevertheless 
attain some media attention.
The policy entrepreneurs from Almere had the local support of the 
Almere City Council and local stakeholders who expressed their sup-
port for Almere’s ambitions in documents such as the City Manifests 
(Almere, 2003, 2009c). In addition, Almere’s counterpart, the munici-
pality of Amsterdam, became a supporter, particularly of the plan to 
create an infrastructural connection between the two cities. The two 
proponents for specific alternatives of the infrastructural connection 
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framed their options as the best and least costly means to solve prob-
lems with regard to issues such as traffic congestion, mobility and so 
forth. Although these two policy entrepreneurs had more elaborate 
ideas on the future of the Randstad region and IJsselmeer area, they 
decided to focus their frame on the infrastructural connection alone 
to improve their chances of successfully setting the political agenda.
The two policy entrepreneurs opposing these plans framed the is-
sue differently and argued that all the proposed changes threatened 
the open landscape of the Markermeer-IJmeer. They tried to invigor-
ate the values of an open Markermeer-IJmeer and visualised the po-
tential harm done if the plans of the other policy entrepreneurs were 
implemented. Whereas other interest groups were open to negotiat-
ing a package deal, these two policy entrepreneurs were not. They 
were only open to agree on a tunnel, rather than a bridge, as an in-
frastructural connection, if this was really deemed vital for the future 
of Almere and the Randstad region. As a result, Breunissen did not 
participate in the RRAAM process, whereas Verhorst did participate 
but continued to advocate and invigorate the frame of an open Mark-
ermeer-IJmeer.
All the policy entrepreneurs exploited networking strategies. Their 
networking strategies included seizing opportunities and exploiting 
venues to contact the media, experts, politicians, inhabitants, other 
stakeholders and—particularly—decision makers in order to gain ac-
cess to the political agenda and secure political support. However, the 
case study revealed differences between the various policy entrepre-
neurs—particularly those already with access to the political agenda 
setting and those without formal access to the political agenda. The 
outsiders, Van der Vlis, Adema, Breunissen and especially Verhorst, 
exploited a broader range of networking strategies than did the insid-
ers, Bijl and Duivesteijn. Most policy entrepreneurs acting from out-
side engaged in writing letters, drafting petitions, public campaigning, 
approaching the media, mobilising the public and trying to attend as 
many venues that were somehow relevant to their issue, while those 
already with access prioritised networking in political arenas over 
seeking public support. This corroborates with Cobb et al. (1976), who 
argue that groups with access to the political agenda are less likely to 
focus on setting the public agenda than those who do not have that 
access.
Alongside problems of gaining access, another difficulty faced by 
policy entrepreneurs from the outside was that they did not have the 
resources or political power and connections to talk to ministers and 
decision makers to negotiate different solutions. In contrast, the al-
dermen could easily use their political network to gain influence over 
the agenda, and use financial and human resources to conduct thor-
ough research and seek advice. As appointed representatives, these 
policy entrepreneurs had the opportunity to sit around the negotiation 
table with national, provincial and local government representatives, 
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and other key stakeholders, while the outsiders needed to mobilise 
their informal network to gather resources and try to gain influence on 
the agenda setting. Thus, people from within the political system had 
more direct opportunities to influence the political agenda than did 
people acting from the outside.
Consequently, the strategies employed by the outsiders were much 
more diverse than those of the insiders, and were mainly focused on 
setting the public agenda in order to influence the political agenda. 
Thus, while Kingdon (1984) argues that policy entrepreneurs are not 
primarily characterised by the formal positions they hold, this does not 
mean that their formal positions are unimportant. Rather, positional 
power considerably influences the policy entrepreneurs’ repertoire. 
Not only do policy entrepreneurs with formal power employ a smaller 
variety of networking strategies, and can afford and are obliged to do 
so, but they also seem to have more influence on agenda setting than 
actors who have no formal power. Those without formal power need 
to mobilise the public to raise awareness and instigate policy and po-
litical agenda setting from the outside. However, this case study has 
offered a more complex image of agenda setting because it was not 
only inside or outside access that influenced the policy entrepreneurs’ 
effectiveness in setting the agenda, but also contextual factors.
The first contextual factor was that the political stream changed 
when a new administration took office in 2010. During Duivesteijn’s 
first years as alderman, he won the support of the then minister and 
successfully returned the ambitions of Almere to the national agenda. 
However, the new liberal minister was unwilling to simply adopt the 
policy as laid out by her predecessor, due to the changing economic 
tide and difference in policy priorities. Thus, outer-dike urbanisation 
was soon dropped and the need for a short-term decision and imple-
mentation of an infrastructural connection was also questioned by the 
new minister. As a result, Duivesteijn had to cope with a changing po-
litical stream. Policy entrepreneurs such as Van der Vlis and Adema 
exploited the changing political stream by opting for cheaper alter-
natives. They hoped this would convince the national government to 
seriously consider their alternatives, and they successfully managed 
to have their alternatives placed on the policy agenda. However, in the 
most recent State Vision for the region, Adema’s plan was dropped, 
while Van der Vlis’ alternative remained a viable option for the infra-
structural connection. The policy entrepreneurs who wanted to stick 
to the status quo had hoped for a cancellation of all the plans; how-
ever, without a clear decision in favour of outer-dike urbanisation and/
or the infrastructural connection, the minister was also unwilling to 
promise to keep the Markermeer-IJmeer open.
Despite the changing political stream, a second contextual factor 
influenced the agenda setting. In this case study, the government had 
a mobilising role, as it initiated the 2010 to 2012 RRAAM process and 
invited stakeholders to reach a joint perspective on the future of the 
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region and the plans for Almere. On other occasions, outsiders would 
have had a difficult time gaining access to the policy agenda, but, due 
to the open character of the RRAAM process, the policy entrepreneurs 
were given access and plenty of room to publicly share their frame and 
find support. Except for Breunissen, all the outside policy entrepre-
neurs used this venue to share their frames. Duivesteijn, as part of the 
steering committee, exploited that venue to share his frame; however, 
he was not personally involved in the RRAAM network that was open 
to all kinds of actors. He mainly 
placed his trust in private nego-
tiations with governmental part-
ners to settle a negotiated deal. 
However, as the case analysis has 
shown, this proved difficult due to 
his explicit framing.
A third contextual factor that 
influenced the agenda setting was 
the indecisiveness of the national 
government. Despite—or perhaps 
precisely because of—the nation-
al government‘s efforts to create 
consensus by involving all stakeholders in the RRAAM process, this 
was a costly and tiresome policy process, especially when considering 
the years prior to the RRAAM process. After years of agenda setting, 
no final decision has been made, which—according to Bachrach and 
Baratz (1970)—can be considered a ‘non-decision’ (p. 44). This has led 
to a situation in which none of the policy entrepreneurs have to admit 
final failure or can claim success—except Adema, who saw his plan 
being removed from the agenda. The recent postponing of the deci-
sion by the minister can be framed as a success by the proponents 
because the infrastructural connection and its alternatives are not off 
the agenda and will be reviewed in about 15 years. However, this can 
also be framed as a failure—and thus as a success for the opponents—
because, at least for the coming years, no bridge, tunnel or island will 
be established. Hence, the politics of claiming success or failure and 
setting the agenda by policy entrepreneurs from all sides is likely to 
continue until a final decision is made, or until the infrastructural con-
nection and/or outer-dike urbanisation are actually implemented (Hu-
itema et al., 2009, p. 375).
Notwithstanding the contextual factors influencing the agenda set-
ting, all the policy entrepreneurs involved must also blame themselves 
for not successfully setting the political agenda (if one can speak of 
‘success’ in this regard). There have been leaps in public attention for 
Almere’s problems, yet no continued public or political attention to 
address these problems (cf. Downs, 1972). None of the policy entre-
preneurs has been able to prevent a gradual decline in public interest. 
HENCE, THE POLITICS OF 
CLAIMING SUCCESS OR FAILURE 
AND SETTING THE AGENDA BY 
POLICY ENTREPRENEURS FROM 
ALL SIDES IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE 
UNTIL A FINAL DECISION IS MADE, 
OR UNTIL THE INFRASTRUCTURAL 
CONNECTION AND/OR OUTER-
DIKE URBANISATION ARE 
ACTUALLY IMPLEMENTED
145
Certainly, proponents signed City Manifests and opponents signed 
the Pampus Pamphlet and instigated a petition, but the general public 
did not seem that concerned, and remained relatively passive and dis-
engaged. One could regard this as a contextual factor; however, I ar-
gue that the policy entrepreneurs themselves failed to effectively mo-
bilise the public and expand the issue beyond the realm of a selected 
group of actors interested in the issue. Most people did not seem very 
concerned about the future of Almere—presumably because the issue 
had too limited effect on most people’s personal lives, and the policy 
entrepreneurs failed to create a sense of urgency and bridge that gap.
A final observation that must be made for this case study is the 
apparent importance of the personal characteristics of the policy en-
trepreneurs themselves for their effectiveness in setting the agenda. 
Duivesteijn’s bold personal approach led to praise, but also seems 
to have negatively influenced his relationship with other actors, and 
thus—presumably—also influenced his effectiveness in setting the 
political agenda post-2010. The same applies to his most direct op-
ponent, Verhorst, who was respected for her personality, persistency 
and charisma, but criticised for campaigning more for herself than for 
the issue she supported. I will return to this issue in the concluding 
chapter because it relates to the way framing the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ 
influences the agenda setting.
No final decision has yet been made on the future of Almere re-
garding the infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisation. 
However, the minister’s latest response reveals that, although she 
chooses to postpone decision making and await economic and demo-
graphic developments, she is in favour of building the infrastructural 
connection in 2025. Without a doubt, this will give new life to agenda 
setting for the future of Almere.
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Figure 7.1: Schematic version of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. 
Adapted from the draft Structure Vision Wind Energy on Land 
(Ontwerp-structuurvisie Windenergie op land, 2013).
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7.1 Introduction
The following case study concerns the plan to create a wind park in the 
Noordoostpolder. This plan has been successfully placed on the politi-
cal agenda and is currently being constructed. Compared to the case 
study discussed in the previous chapter on the Almere infrastructural 
connection and outer-dike urbanisation, which is still in the process 
of setting the political agenda, this wind park’s implementation began 
in 2012. Up until then, various policy entrepreneurs, both proponents 
and opponents, were involved in strategically influencing the agenda 
setting, and the most prominent of these actors are discussed in this 
chapter. To discuss this case study, it is necessary to go back to the 
1990s.
During the 1990s, various farmers in the Noordoostpolder became 
excited about wind energy. Building wind turbines and supplying wind 
energy proved a profitable business that provided some welcome ex-
tra income. Over the years, entrepreneurial farmers joined arms and 
developed plans for large clusters of turbines along the dikes of the 
Noordoostpolder—the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. The group found 
the required support from the local and provincial authorities; how-
ever, the plan did not proceed swiftly due to coordination problems 
within the group of farmers and with governmental authorities. Nei-
ther did it help that locals living in the municipality of Noordoostpolder 
and neighbouring municipality of Urk started to interfere when they 
became aware of the plans in 2008. Opposing groups and coalitions 
were formed and did everything to stop the wind park. These groups 
argued, among other things, that the wind park would ruin the precious 
landscape and did not fit into the Noordoostpolder. By 2009, the Dutch 
national government also became actively involved and supported the 
Wind Park Noordoostpolder because renewable energy had become 
an important target of national policy. The inconvenient truth for the 
opponents was that the wind park would be realised and the policy 
process seemed irreversible. Not even the highest Dutch Administrate 
Council of State, on which the opponents had placed their last hopes, 
ruled in favour of the opponents (Raad van State, 2012b).
In early 2012, the group of early adopters of contemporary wind en-
ergy commenced with the construction of the largest inland wind park 
in Europe. A total of 86 wind turbines will be erected: 48 sited near 
shore and 38 onshore, with the highest wind turbine having a maxi-
mum hub height of 135 metres, and rotor blades with a tipping height 
of 200 metres (Windenergie langs de dijken van de Noordoostpolder, 
2011). The wind park will produce approximately 1.4 TWh annually, with 
an installed capacity of 429 MW of energy, which is enough to provide 
electricity for almost 400,000 households. This is roughly the number 
of households in the provinces of Flevoland and Friesland combined.
This case study discusses the various policy entrepreneurs involved in 
advocating and opposing the wind park. The proponents were the ini-
tiators of the wind park—mostly farmers living in the Noordoostpolder 
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who wanted to construct the wind park and make a profit, as well as 
local, provincial and national governments. Among the opponents of 
the wind park were policy entrepreneurs from Urk—notably, the ac-
tion group, Urk Briest, and the municipality of Urk. There were also 
opponents from the municipality of Noordoostpolder—notably, the 
local action group, Tegenwind; the association, Rotterdamse Hoek; 
the political party, Our New Society (ONS) Noordoostpolder; and a 
farmer living next to the dike. Before discussing the various strategies 
employed by these policy entrepreneurs, I present the policies con-
cerning wind energy in the Noordoostpolder.
7.2 Policy on wind energy in the Noordoostpolder 
 
7.2.1 Local policy
During the 1980s, the first wind turbines in the Noordoostpolder were 
built by IJsselmij, an energy company on the dikes of the Noordoost-
polder. At that time, any individual or firm could ask the local authori-
ties for a permit to build wind turbines on their grounds. In the 1990s, 
when interest in wind energy was increasing, wind turbines were built 
everywhere and there was little to no alignment of plans and policies. 
Being faced with too many individual requests for wind turbines, the 
municipality council of Noordoostpolder evaluated its policy in 1998 
(Zandvoort Ordening en Advies, 1998). Based on this evaluation, the 
municipality drafted a memorandum to cease granting permits, and 
appointed the most western part of the polder as the location where 
people were allowed to develop plans to build new wind turbines in 
clusters (Gemeente Noordoostpolder, 1998).
In February 1999, a memorandum called ‘Integral Policy for Wind 
Energy’ was published by the municipality of Noordoostpolder, rein-
stating the previously set goals (Gemeente Noordoostpolder, 1999). 
In April 2000, the municipality drafted its ‘Land Use Plan’, in which 
the policy on not allowing solitary wind turbines was confirmed (Ge-
meente Noordoostpolder, 2000). In October 2000, the municipality 
stated that initiators needed to present a project plan on how to pro-
ceed. In April 2002, this led to four groups of farmers and one energy 
company, Essent—which was previously IJssselmij and is now RWE—
joining and reaching an agreement to cluster wind turbine plans for a 
wind park in the western part of the Noordoostpolder (Koepel Win-
denergie Noordoostpolder, 2002). In October 2002, the municipality 
council declared that it supported the agreement and the suggested 
planning process for creating the wind park (Gemeente Noordoostpo-
lder, 2002). In June 2003, the group of initiators, following the agree-
ment, formed an Umbrella Organisation and continued working on the 
plans to create a large wind park, subdivided into four wind parks. It 
began conducting research on the feasibility and environmental im-
pact of the wind turbines, as required by the public authorities, and 
worked on its business case. When, in 2004, the first environmental 
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impact assessment was finished, neighbouring municipalities were in-
formed and the public was told about the plans via the media (Lakeman 
& Zijlstra, 2004). Throughout the years, the city council and Council of 
Mayor and Aldermen of the municipality of Noordoostpolder have al-
ways strongly supported the wind park.
7.2.2 Provincial policy
In 2000, with its Land Use Plan (Provincie Flevoland, 2000), the Prov-
ince Flevoland stated that it would allow new clustered wind turbines 
along the dikes of the Noordoostpolder. In 2006, the province of 
Flevoland drafted its new Land Use Plan and followed the policy as set 
out earlier, concentrating wind turbines and removing current solitary 
wind turbines by 50 per cent (Provincie Flevoland, 2006). In 2007, the 
province changed its 2006 Land Use Plan by putting a stop on all new 
wind parks, except the planned Wind Park Noordoostpolder and in 
the southern part of Flevoland. In 2008, to give the planning process a 
boost, the province of Flevoland, together with governmental parties 
(see next section) established a steering committee with representa-
tives of the Umbrella Organisation and public authorities, including 
several ministries and the municipality of Noordoostpolder. The neigh-
bouring municipality of Urk was not included in the steering commit-
tee because, according to this committee, it had no direct interests. In 
2008, the plan for the wind park was to set up 93 wind turbines, with 
55 in the water outer dike, with a mast height ranging from 98 to 135 
metres and a capacity of 429 MW. 
7.2.3 National policy
In 2006, the national Memorandum on Spatial Planning considered the 
dikes in the Noordoostpolder a possible location for extra wind tur-
bines, as long as this would not create a full fencing of the landscape 
(Nota Ruimte, 2006). In 2007, the then Cabinet Balkenende IV present-
ed the working programme ‘Clean and Efficient’, which stated that the 
focus with regard to renewable energy should be on wind energy. An 
additional 2,000 MW within four years, on top of the then installed 
energy production of 1,500 MW, was deemed necessary. Offshore, 
an additional 450 MW was projected (Werkprogramma Schoon en 
Zuinig, 2007). Due to the new law on spatial planning (Wro, 2008) that 
came into effect in July 2008, the national government had the legal 
power to issue Land Use Plans itself. When, in March 2009, changes in 
the Electricity Act (Elektriciteitswet 1998, 2008) also came into effect, 
planned wind parks with a capacity over 100 MW would automatically 
fall under the National Coordination Regulation (Besluit toepassing ri-
jksprojectenprocedure op windenergieprojecten in de Noordoostpo-
lder, 2006; Uitvoeringsbesluit rijkscoördinatieregeling energie-infra-
structuurprojecten, 2009). Therefore, the national government could 
claim the project coordination and decision-making authority, overrul-
ing decision making by provincial and local authorities.
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In April 2009, following the Kyoto Protocol (United Nations, 1997), 
the EU issued the European Directive 2009/28/EC (European Union, 
2009) on the promotion of using energy from renewable sources, 
obliging the Dutch government to achieve a share of 14 per cent re-
newable energy and a CO2 reduction of 20 per cent by 2020. This 
meant, at that time, an additional 6,000 MW of wind energy should 
be installed. Governments were told to draft an action plan to comply 
with this target. Anticipating the action plan that would be presented 
in June 2010, the then Minister of Economic Affairs announced in No-
vember 2009 that she would take control of the project on wind en-
ergy along the dikes of the Noordoostpolder, and provide a subsidy of 
approximately €1 billion (Nationaal Actieplan Hernieuwbare Energie, 
2010; Stimulering duurzame energieproductie, 2009). A subsidy with 
a maximum of €880 million is to be paid over a period of 15 years to 
cover the revenues of farmers when the standard energy price rate is 
below €0.096 per kWh. An additional €116 million is the government’s 
contribution to the initial investment because of the innovative charac-
ter of the plan. The Wind Park Noordoostpolder, with its 429 MW wind 
energy on land, was regarded an important attribute to the govern-
ment target on reaching the EU requirements. Due to its importance 
in reaching the government target, other governmental plans—such 
as the national Water Plan presented in December 2009—supported 
the allocation of wind turbines in the Noordoostpolder (Anonymous, 
2009f; Nationaal Waterplan 2009-2015, 2009).
In March 2010, the Crisis and Recovery Act came into effect, mean-
ing that all large projects on infrastructure and energy, sustainability 
and innovation needed to be implemented as soon as possible, includ-
ing the Wind Park Noordoostpolder (Crisis- en herstelwet, 2010). In 
June 2010, the Minister of Economic Affairs decided to remove seven 
turbines closest to the border of the municipality of Urk in reaction to 
the local opposition from Urk and a resolution accepted by the parlia-
ment to take Urk’s interest into account (Liberalisering energiemark-
ten: Motie van het lid Zijlstra, 2009; Stimulering duurzame energie-
productie, 2010). A new government, installed in October 2010, also 
set its goal at 14 per cent renewable energy production and embraced 
the Wind Park Noordoostpolder (Regeerakkoord 2010). In January 
2011, the government presented its Land Use Plan for the Wind Park 
Noordoostpolder (Windenergie langs de dijken van de Noordoostpol-
der, 2011), and the initiators began constructing the wind park 1.5 years 
later, in autumn 2012.
In November 2012, another new government was installed, reinstat-
ing the goal of complying with the EU Directive on sustainable energy 
production of 14 per cent. The new government aimed to realise 16 per 
cent renewable energy production by 2020 (Regeerakkoord 2012). The 
new ‘Structure Vision Wind Energy on Land’ (Rijksstructuurvisie Am-
sterdam-Almere-Markermeer, 2013), which was based on the ‘Struc-
ture Vision on Infrastructure and Space’ (Structuurvisie Infrastructuur 
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en Ruimte, 2012), also reinstated this governmental target, of which 
the Wind Park Noordoostpolder remains an important asset. In August 
2013, the national government and over 40 civil society partners—
including trade and labour unions, nature conservation associations 
and NGOs—developed an Energy Agreement on sustainable growth, 
in which wind energy remained a high priority (Energieakkoord voor 
duurzame groei, 2013). Overall, additional wind energy remains an im-
portant target at all governmental levels.
7.3 Framing and networking strategies
This section discusses the strategies employed by the proponents and 
opponents of the wind park. To better understand the agenda set-
ting and strategies employed, the policy entrepreneurial strategies 
are discussed as chronologically as possible. The ideation of the wind 
turbines in the Noordoostpolder began with a window of opportunity 
that was exploited by several farmers from the Noordoostpolder. Over 
the years, this group’s advocates expanded with local, provincial and 
national partners. However, opposition increased in 2008, when peo-
ple from the Noordoostpolder and Urk became aware of the plans to 
create a wind park.
7.3.1 The proponents
The business window of opportunity
In 1994, farmers René De Rond and Piet Bootsma were on a trip to 
Germany where they witnessed a landscape full of wind turbines. The 
two entrepreneurs saw a business opportunity to build wind turbines 
in the Netherlands as well, and, in January 1995, they discussed the 
opportunities with the municipality of Noordoostpolder. Within three 
months, all permits needed for two wind turbines on their own lands 
were granted, and, in October of the same year, the turbines were 
built. Pleased with their initial success, they longed for more. However, 
in 1998, the municipality decided to change policy from solitary wind 
turbines to clustered wind turbines, and they were restrained in their 
options because new wind turbines could not be built just anywhere. 
De Rond and some other farmers formed a coalition and developed a 
plan to cluster wind turbines close to the Noordermeerdijk. However, 
mistakes were made with the environmental impact assessment re-
port, and their plan was subsequently rejected.
De Rond was not the only farmer to see a business opportunity in 
wind energy. Farmers Tjitte De Groot and Pieter Meulendijks also be-
gan investing in wind turbines in the 1990s. De Groot stated:
We were caught on the lots assigned to us half a century ago. As an 
entrepreneur you want to do more. You are used to pioneering and 
you see an opportunity. That is how I got into the business of wind 
energy. (Anonymous, 2011m)
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However, De Groot faced the same barrier as the other farmers in the 
polder: the municipality of Noordoostpolder would not allow solitary 
wind turbines, but only wind turbines clustered in the western part 
of the municipality (Gemeente Noordoostpolder, 1998, 2000). The 
various groups of farmers, who were used to taking care of their busi-
ness alone, now had to work together to develop a joint plan (Viss-
cher, 2011a). In 2000, De Rond, Bootsma, De Groot, Meulendijks and 
other farmers set up a platform with the various stakeholders in-
volved, including the company Essent, that owned the wind park that 
was already there. In 2002, the platform and municipality council of 
Noordoostpolder reached an agreement in which it was stated that 
the initiators would set up an Umbrella Organisation, jointly write an 
environmental assessment report for the permit application and de-
velop a solid business case. An additional requirement given by the 
municipality of Noordoostpolder was that it needed to be possible for 
the people of the Noordoostpolder to financially participate as well. 
In 2003, the Umbrella Organisation was set up with initiators such as 
De Rond, who joined the board. Janneke Wijnia, a tax lawyer, became 
the secretary for the Umbrella Organisation. The group approached 
Henk Tiesinga, who had management experience and a background in 
agriculture, to become their chairperson.
Struggling with the ‘forced marriage’
In 2003, when Tiesinga joined, there were five coalition members in-
volved (Kobessen, 2011). The five parties were, at the Noordermeerdijk 
inner dike, Windpark Creil BV; at the Noordermeerdijk and Wester-
meerdijk outer dike, Westermeerwind BV; at the Westermeerdijk in-
ner dike, Acousticon Windpark BV and VWW Windpark BV; and the 
Zuidermeerdijk electricity company, RWE. Apart from RWE, the three 
parties of the inner dike would later partner in NOP Agrowind, which 
would conduct affairs on their behalf. These five parties had different 
backgrounds and worked together as a coalition of convenience. They 
were partly people from the polder, and partly people from outside the 
polder. In addition, businesspeople from various companies—at that 
time, also Siemens—were involved.
However, there was no real unity between the five parties, with one 
insider noting that the Umbrella Organisation was like a ‘forced mar-
riage’ (R29), and another insider remarking that ‘if [multiple] people 
are forced to go through one door [at the same time], the doorpost 
will wear out’ (R34). The different personalities, cultures and interests 
clashed more than once, and the collaboration was not always whole-
THE VARIOUS GROUPS OF FARMERS, WHO WERE USED TO 
TAKING CARE OF THEIR BUSINESS ALONE, NOW HAD TO 
WORK TOGETHER TO DEVELOP A JOINT PLAN
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hearted (R32). There also consisted different interpretations of the 
agreement, and legal advice was needed more than once. Negotiation 
and mediation was required to keep the group of not likeminded peo-
ple together, but, in terms of content, the group succeeded in settling 
their issues. One insider noted, ‘A negotiated package deal was agreed 
upon; however, if one corner would have been taken out, everything 
would collapse and a great war would commence’ (R32). Though in 
policy terms still supporting the plans, the municipality kept its dis-
tance and regarded it not its responsibility to interfere with the ne-
gotiations. The same applied to the province, which was not greatly 
involved in the process. The direct involvement of these governmental 
levels changed when Anne Bliek, the new executive provincial repre-
sentative, came into office in 2007.
Help from above
As stated in the provincial council coalition statement, Bliek made it 
one of her main targets to reach 60 per cent sustainable energy in the 
province by 2013. In 2007, she contacted the initiators of the wind park. 
The group tried to win her support, but she knew they had internal 
conflicts that first needed to be resolved (R33; Bakker, 2008). Bliek be-
gan venue shopping at the national, provincial, and local governmental 
levels to acquire the four to five hundred thousand of euros required 
to establish and run a steering committee. In 2008, she succeeded in 
finding support from the Ministries of Housing, Spatial Planning and 
the Environment; Economic Affairs; and Agriculture, Nature Manage-
ment and Fisheries, which together paid one quarter. Another quarter 
was paid by the Province Flevoland, one quarter by the municipality of 
Noordoostpolder, and one quarter by the Umbrella Organisation.
An external project director was appointed, Dirk Louter, and a con-
sultancy firm was contracted to professionalise and improve public 
communication, and eliminate internal conflicts. However, the farmers 
still needed extra subsidy to settle a solid business case; thus, they 
contacted Van der Hoeven—the then Minister of Economic Affairs. 
In November 2009, high officials of the ministry negotiated with the 
Umbrella Organisation a national government subsidy of €880 million 
for exploitation, plus €116 million for investments (R35). At that time, 
the national government had already taken over coordination because 
the wind park had become an important project to reach its target 
of 16 per cent renewable energy supply by 2020. However, the coor-
dination of permit applications and plan development remained the 
responsibility of the farmers. Thus, the group of farmers still had to 
invest considerable effort and money to complete the environmental 
assessments required to apply for the permits to commence construc-
tion of the wind park. This proved difficult and troublesome because 
opposition against the wind park had started to stir up public emo-
tions since 2008. Hearings at the Council of State were just one of 
the accomplishments of the opposition, as described in the following 
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sections. While there was help from above from the province, the ini-
tiators had to work together and speak with one voice to attempt to 
achieve their goals (R27).
Fighting over the public agenda
As soon as the plan for the wind park was reported in the media in 
2008, opposing parties contacted the steering committee to have a 
say in the policy process. However, the steering committee parties de-
cided they did not want the opposing parties on board, including the 
municipality of Urk, because they feared that their only goal would 
be to obstruct the process (R27; R33). While the opponents did not 
succeed in gaining access to the political agenda setting, they were 
successful in gaining media attention and using the media as a venue 
to set the public agenda. The proponents felt that the media were sup-
porting the opposition and the nation’s beloved municipality of Urk, 
and thus not open to information distributed by the steering commit-
tee and Umbrella Organisation (R27; R28). They were concerned that 
the opponents’ efforts might lead to the wind park being halted (R27; 
R28; R32). If the decision makers took over the contesting frame of 
the opponents, realisation of the wind park would become even more 
difficult.
One of the framing contests concerned the height of the wind 
turbines, and the way this was visualised by the opposition and ad-
dressed by the media (Hulsing, 2011). According to the proponents, 
the truth was distorted by exaggerating the wind park size and its visu-
alisations, including the ones made by the municipality of Urk. To set-
tle the dispute, the steering committee offered Urk to jointly finance 
independent research into the visualisations, but Urk was not inter-
ested (R27). Therefore, the steering committee decided to initiate the 
research itself, and subsequently demonstrated that the visualisations 
of the Umbrella Organisation were 
correct (Anonymous, 2009e). Fur-
ther, to win the fight over the pub-
lic agenda and provide the public 
with ‘correct’ information, the 
steering committee organised var-
ious information events, including 
a trip to an existing wind park in 
Germany that served as a demonstration project (Anonymous, 2009k, 
2009l, 2010c, 2010e; Meijer, 2009b; Van Herwaarden, 2010a). Addi-
tionally, on Global Wind Day in June 2009, the initiators opened their 
houses and existing wind turbines for people to visit (Anonymous, 
2009o). However, none of the venues set up by the steering commit-
tee and Umbrella Organisation were well attended and public interest 
seemed limited.
Nevertheless, to cultivate some support among the people living 
in the five villages of the Noordoostpolder—Nagele, Tollebeek, Espel, 
DESPITE THEIR ATTEMPTS 
TO WIN OVER THE PUBLIC, 
THE CONTESTING FRAMES 
OF THE OPPONENTS PROVED 
DIFFICULT TO REFUTE
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Creil and Rutten—the municipality of Noordoostpolder advised the 
Umbrella Organisation to provide these villages with funding to spend 
freely, which it will deliver in the amount of €10,000 yearly per village 
over the coming 20 years (Anonymous, 2010g). Additionally, to com-
pensate the people living next to the dike for their discomfort, De Rond 
and the other initiators of the inner-dike projects decided to pay for 
the people’s electricity over the coming 15 years, including the people 
opposing the project. However, the opponents framed these as pay-
ments used to silence the people and stop them appealing at court 
(Van Herwaarden, 2010f; Yang Yang Chiu, 2010a). De Groot and Meu-
lendijks, of Westermeerwind BV, offered the people living in the area 
the opportunity to invest money in the two lines of the wind turbines’ 
outer dike. This was also done to raise public support and allow people 
to financially profit from the wind park.
Despite their attempts to win over the public, the contesting frames 
of the opponents proved difficult to refute, even though, according to 
the proponents, the contesting frames were not supported with evi-
dence. For example, the opponents personally attacked Tiesinga and 
accused him of misusing his position at the water board to favour the 
wind park; however, according to the proponents, there was no proof 
of such actions. Two respondents stated that the opponents were on 
‘a warpath’ (R32) and exploited every opportunity to discredit the wind 
park and the people involved, even if this meant telling untruths and 
hurting people personally by ‘walking over dead bodies’ (R32; R33). 
The proponents, including the governmental actors, argued that they 
would not play the same game and would communicate facts, instead 
of returning the allegations, even thought it was tempting to ‘throw 
with mud’ as well (R27; R32; R33). The proponents stated that the op-
ponents found support nowhere and stood more or less alone because 
they were convinced that everything related to the wind park was 
negative and damaging. Therefore, the proponents felt compelled to 
focus on a legal course of action via the Council of State, instead of 
continuously trying to communicate with the opponents, who could 
not be convinced of the benefits of the wind park (R29). Thus, ulti-
mately, the proponents were pleased with the legal judgement of the 
Council of State, which allowed the farmers to begin constructing the 
wind park.
The ‘beneficial for all’ frame
Throughout the course of events thus far, the proponents had continu-
ously framed the wind park as beneficial for themselves, the region 
and the nation as a whole. Business, tourism and employment in the 
region would all profit from the realisation of the wind park (Poelsma, 
2008; Van Herwaarden, 2010b, 2013c). Further, the wind park was visu-
alised and pictured in promotional videos and brochures as beautifully 
fitting the landscape of the Dutch polder (Windpark Noordoostpolder 
website, 2013). From a broader perspective, the wind park was also 
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framed as essential for the Netherlands to comply with the interna-
tional and European targets on renewable energy (Schreuder, 2009c). 
Without this wind park, the Dutch would have a hard time achieving 
their targets. Thus, the proponents framed themselves as ‘idealists’ 
(R29) who were helping the nation and assisting compliance with the 
international and European targets on renewable energy.
Despite this, a successful realisation and return on investments 
were not guaranteed due to the rising opposition; conflicts at the 
Council of State; and changing regulations with respect to funding, 
nature, and noise nuisance. Therefore, the initiators also framed them-
selves as true ‘diehards’ (Van Herwaarden, 2009a, 2009c) who dared 
to undertake risky endeavours as early pioneers in contemporary wind 
energy. Farmer Meulendijks stated, ‘We are the adventurous type, 
otherwise we would have never started with this project … you need 
considerable perseverance, but we have never thought about giving 
up. We wanted to finish it—this is our life’s work’ (Van Herwaarden, 
2012d). The proponents continued to frame the wind park as beneficial 
for the region and whole nation, while the opponents advocated an 
alternative frame that conflicted with the proponents’ frame.
7.3.2 The opponents from Urk
The policy entrepreneurs who opposed the wind park can be divided 
into two coalitions of convenience: those originating from Urk and 
those from the Noordoostpolder. The following sections discuss these 
coalitions in that order.
Urk fenced with an ‘iron curtain’?
In August 2008, the Urk Briest interest group was established after 
one of its members, Lucia De Vries—a local freelance journalist from 
Figure 7.2: Janneke Wijnia, the secretary for the Umbrella Organisation, explaining in a video 
how everyone will benefit from the creation of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. 
Video still: DailyChannelTV.
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Urk—read a column by Jan Mulder in a national newspaper (De Vries, 
2011b). Mulder warned the 18,000 inhabitants of Urk that they would 
be fenced with an ‘iron curtain’ of wind turbines if the plans for the 
wind park were executed (Meijer, 2009a). This alerted De Vries to the 
effect the wind turbines would have, and, via local media, she began 
looking for others with whom she could protest against the plans. 
In Dutch, ‘Briest’ refers to both a ‘breeze’ caused by wind and to the 
snorting noise made by horses (Langbroek & Vanclay, 2012). Leen Van 
Loosen was one of the people who responded to De Vries, and be-
came the public spokesperson of the committee, while De Vries was 
its secretary.
The year 2008 also marked the beginning of a personal quest of 
Jaap Kroon, who was the major of Urk from 2006 to 2012. He became 
aware of the effect of the wind park next to Urk when he was informed 
of the scale of the plan. Kroon began to realise that the planned wind 
park was not comparable to the current wind turbines on the dike, 
and thus made it his goal to do everything in his power to prevent 
the realisation of the ‘industrial’ wind park next to ‘his’ beloved village 
(Visscher, 2011a). The following sections discuss the various strategies 
employed by these two policy entrepreneurs from Urk.
Framing the threat
Urk Briest, with Van Loosen as its public spokesman, was one of the 
first policy entrepreneurs who tried to set the public agenda by fram-
ing the wind park as a threat to the liveability of Urk (Meijer, 2008). 
Van Loosen did not buy the ‘beneficial for all’ frame of the proponents 
because he believed the scale of the wind park and size of the indi-
vidual wind turbines did not fit the landscape and would be completely 
out of context beside the picturesque village of Urk. Van Loosen felt 
strengthened by the then Minister Plasterk of Education, Culture and 
Science, who had given Urk the status of a ‘culturally protected vil-
lage’ based on the 1988 Monuments Law (Anonymous, 2009n). This 
gave Van Loosen the opportunity to amplify his frame and invigorate 
the values of Urk. He framed Urk as a culturally protected village that 
should be defended against the threatening ‘iron curtain’ of mega wind 
turbines as high as the highest tower in the Netherlands (Anonymous, 
2009h, 2009v, 2011h, 2011t; Visscher, 2011a; Yang Yang Chiu, 2009, 
2010c, 2011b, 2011c).
Van Loosen wanted ‘to show Urk what is lying ahead’ (Anonymous, 
2009h), and therefore propagated that ‘if this plan is executed, we will 
never again see the sun set beautifully in the IJsselmeer’ (Van Her-
waarden, 2009d). Along a similar line of framing, Kroon framed the 
wind park as megalomaniacal and as an ‘iron curtain’ that would ruin 
Urk’s precious skyline (R26; Anonymous, 2009w; Boex, 2011). Kroon 
stated, ‘The view of our thousand year old village rising from the wa-
ter is being destroyed. I cannot find other words to describe it. This 
project is so huge that it belongs in the North Sea’ (Schreuder, 2009c). 
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He argued that no one in Urk thought the wind park was a good plan 
(Anonymous, 2011e; Schreuder, 2009c). Kroon stated that, ‘The 18,000 
inhabitants of Urk, including all infants’ were against the wind park 
(Visscher, 2011a).
Framing the story of maltreatment
Van Loosen and Kroon’s astonishment was strengthened by the cultur-
ally rooted dissonance between the people of Urk, former islanders 
and pioneers, who were mainly farmers, coming to the drained polder 
since 1942 (Langbroek & Vanclay, 2012). Van Loosen stated, ‘The wind 
turbines are placed on the terri-
tory of the municipality of Noor-
doostpolder, but in the view of 
Urk. Just like during the drain-
ing of Noordoostpolder, we are 
once again silenced and side-
lined’ (Monster, 2009). Accord-
ing to Urk Briest, Urk’s history of being maltreated was continued be-
cause its interest was, again, not taken into account (De Vries, 2011a, 
2011b; Urk Briest, 2013). Equally disturbing, according to Urk Briest, 
was the fact that the municipality of Urk had already objected to the 
plan for the wind park in 2004, but had been uninformed ever since 
(Anonymous, 2008f, 2009b, 2009x; Visscher, 2011a). For the same rea-
son, Kroon was very frustrated that the Noordoostpolder had chosen 
HE FRAMED URK AS A CULTURALLY 
PROTECTED VILLAGE THAT 
SHOULD BE DEFENDED AGAINST 
THE THREATENING ‘IRON CURTAIN’ 
OF MEGA WIND TURBINES
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the location for the wind park next to the dike without Urk’s consent 
(R26; R36).
Based on these past events, Noordoostpolder’s choice for this lo-
cation was deemed ‘selfish’ (Meijer, 2009a) and Urk felt maltreated. 
Kroon stated that the location may be Noordoostpolder’s backyard, 
but ‘it is Urk’s front yard’ (Yang Yang Chiu, 2011c). According to Kroon, 
the whole decision-making process on the wind park was ‘undemo-
cratically dictatorial’ (R36) with a dubious role of the governmental 
parties. Kroon argued that the national government should take a neu-
tral stance and take into account all interests, including Urk’s, instead 
of working with the initiators of the wind park (R36). Kroon stretched 
the analogy of the famous cartoon figures, Asterix and Obelix, tire-
less rebelling against the mighty Roman Empire (R36). Kroon identi-
fied himself with the citizens of Urk who, he stated, deserved to be 
represented against the governmental actors who were ‘bulldozing’ 
over them (R36). Hence, these opponents not only framed the wind 
park itself, but also targeted their framing onto (what they claimed 
were) the unfair actions of other actors and the policy process itself. 
Moreover, as discussed below, these opponents began to expand the 
issue framing.
Figure 7.3: According to the opponents from Urk, an ‘iron curtain’ of wind turbines is threatening 
the culturally protected village of Urk. Photo and graphics: Richard Oost.
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Expanding the issue framing
While Van Loosen and Kroon were successful in setting the public 
agenda, they were unsuccessful in setting the policy and political 
agendas. By the end of 2008, they began to realise that arguing that 
the wind park would ruin the cultural heritage of Urk and that they 
were maltreated in the policy process, were too insubstantial argu-
ments to convince policymakers and politicians. To strengthen their 
framing, Van Loosen and Kroon became more knowledgeable on the 
topic of sustainable wind energy and the issues related to the building 
of the wind park, and began to expand their initial framing to set the 
policy and political agendas (Anonymous, 2011h, 2011t; Meijer, 2009a).
For example, Van Loosen and Urk Briest began to argue that the 
environmental protection status of the IJsselmeer under the European 
Natura 2000 legislation did not allow any wind turbines in the area. 
Therefore, when the news came that UNESCO considered listing the 
polder as part of world heritage, Urk Briest objected (Anonymous, 
2010l) and argued: ‘You cannot do both, creating a large industrial area 
and applying for World Heritage status’ (NovaTV, 2010). In addition, it 
was believed by these opponents that many birds and bats would die 
if these turbines—which they named ‘mince mills’—were operating.
While being cautious about questioning the need for additional re-
newable energy supply, Urk Briest and Kroon did try to set the policy 
agenda by arguing that wind energy is not as sustainable as the propo-
nents tend to claim (Meijer, 2009a; Mommers, 2011). They argued that 
policymakers should study alternatives that do not ruin the open land-
scape of the polder, such as solar energy collectors or smaller wind 
turbines that better fit the landscape. In addition, alternative locations 
for the wind park should be reviewed, as these had not been seriously 
considered by policymakers. Kroon proposed returning to the plan for 
a park of 225 MW—almost half of what was planned by Minister Van 
der Hoeven. The wind turbines that had to be realised should not be 
higher than approximately 80 to 100 metres. Kroon also wanted a ra-
dius of seven kilometres around the lighthouse of Urk to remain free 
of wind turbines. However, preferably, the government should opt for 
alternative sources of energy, such as solar energy, geothermal heat 
and biogas, with only minimal wind energy. According to Kroon, this 
would sufficiently help the government reach the target on renewable 
energy supply (Anonymous, 2010j; Yang Yang Chiu, 2010b).
Urk Briest and Kroon also argued that the whole wind park would 
only contribute 0.1 per cent to the national energy consumption, which 
includes the energy consumption of industry (Anonymous, 2009u). 
The financial support from the national government for this reason 
was framed as a waste of public money (Anonymous, 2010p, 2011u; 
Yang Yang Chiu, 2009): ‘The government is like a family with a small 
financial budget buying expensive caviar, while neglecting the pota-
toes, vegetables and other more nutritious products’ (Anonymous, 
2009q). Van Loosen warned the government against bringing in a Tro-
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jan Horse, as the wind park was ‘too big, too expensive, and contro-
versial’ (Anonymous, 2011q). Other more prominent concerns of Urk 
Briest were issues related to the health and wealth of the people. The 
noise made by the wind turbines, the effects of flickering shadow dur-
ing the day, and the disturbing warning lights during the night were 
deemed to negatively affect the wellbeing of the people living in the 
area. Further, the wind turbines were considered bad for tourism and 
problematic for water sports, fisheries and maritime transportation.
In 2012, when the land was excavated to construct the wind park, 
Urk Briest began to worry about water safety (De Jager, 2012; De Vries, 
2012). Urk Briest framed the dikes as vulnerable to a dike breach, and 
tried to ensure everyone was aware of this threat by demonstratively 
appearing wearing life vests at a meeting organised by the Umbrel-
la Organisation (Anonymous, 2009g, 2012a; De Vries, 2012; Meijer, 
2009a; Van Herwaarden, 2009b, 2012c).
The networking strategies employed by the opponents from Urk, as 
discussed below, resembled their divergent framing strategies as they 
desperately sought to employ multiple networking strategies to raise 
awareness and set the agenda.
Mobilising the public
As was the case with the framing, Urk Briest first sought to set the 
public agenda. Urk Briest, as befitting an interest group, tried to in-
form and mobilise local citizens by creatively and playfully organising 
numerous kinds of activities (Anonymous, 2009h; Anonymous, 2011k; 
Meijer, 2009a; Van Herwaarden, 2008). On the ‘Urk Day’ event, Urk 
Briest organised games that involved ‘Throwing Wind Turbines’, the 
‘Big Wind Turbine Quiz’ and a limerick competition. It held a slogan 
contest and sang a self-made protest song during a public event. The 
group sold protest t-shirts and distributed posters and stickers with 
their anti–wind turbine logo (Anonymous, 2010a). Maquettes and visu-
alisations of the wind turbines were made to compare the latter with 
other high infrastructures in the Netherlands. The difference in height 
with the beloved lighthouse of Urk was also highlighted. Wind turbines 
within Urk’s skyline, 11 times as high as the lighthouse, were claimed 
to be unacceptable for the people of Urk. Urk Briest also organised 
debates with the municipality of Urk (Anonymous, 2009p). The group 
also attended public meetings organised by the steering committee 
and municipalities in the region.
It is interesting to observe that Mayor Kroon, who presented him-
self as the head of the village, also participated in mobilising the pub-
lic. He attended events organised by the municipality of Urk and op-
posing groups, and gave speeches to express his concern about the 
wind park. During one event, he even acted as the choirmaster of a 
group singing a protest song, which is symbolic for the role he played 
as a mayor giving voice to the people of Urk (Visscher, 2011b). Kroon 
also made a short video to express his concern, digital visualisations 
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of the wind park (Anonymous, 2010r), and a scale model of the wind 
park that was displayed in the city hall. Kroon took this scale model to 
a meeting with Minister Verhagen early in 2011. As aforementioned, 
provoking the most controversy were visualisations shown to the peo-
ple and presented by the media. According to proponents of the wind 
park, Urk distorted reality and tried to rouse public indignation (Anon-
ymous, 2010k; Meijer, 2009; Schreuder, 2009c). Kroon acknowledged 
that he wanted to create a spectacle to convey the message that it 
was not a regular wind park, but one of the biggest in Europe, being 
planned for construction right next to Urk. ‘The wind energy sector is 
exaggerating as well’, Kroon stated, implying a justification of his own 
visualisations (Mommers, 2011).
Influencing the political agenda
Alongside framing and mobilising the public, Urk Briest tried to gain 
access to the meetings of the Umbrella Organisation and steering 
committee in 2008, but was told it was unwelcome. This refusal was 
not appreciated by Urk Briest because it then had to depend solely 
on the information communicated by the steering committee and 
the Umbrella Organisation, which Urk Briest did not trust. Therefore, 
Urk Briest decided to bypass the Umbrella Organisation and steering 
committee and appeal to the government, ministers, parliament mem-
bers, province, and national and local political parties, often with an 
emotional plea to take their interests into consideration. Letters and 
emails were written to people who had the power to influence the de-
cision (Anonymous, 2009u, 2010p, 2011r; De Vries, 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 
2012; Den Boer, De Vries, Jansen, Lammers & Wiedijk, 2012; Van Her-
waarden, 2010g). Additionally, during a visit by Minister Van der Hoev-
Figure 7.4: A pamphlet used by the opponents to highlight the height of the wind turbines. From 
left to right: A normal house, the lighthouse of Urk, the water tower in Emmeloord, the Dom 
Church in Utrecht, the Euromast in Rotterdam, and one of the planned wind turbines in the 
Noordoostpolder. Source: Municipality of Urk.
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en of Economic Affairs, Van Loosen symbolically offered her blinkers 
to look at Urk’s skyline without being interrupted by the wind turbines 
(Schreuder, 2009c). More seriously, dressed in Urk’s local costume, 
a petition against the wind park Noordoostpolder—with over 5,000 
signatures—was presented to the Parliamentary Committee on Eco-
nomic Affairs by people of Urk Briest (Urk Briest, 2011).
Kroon also tried to set the political agenda and gain access to the 
steering committee as a local public authority, but he and his aldermen 
were not allowed to join. As a result, this strengthened their frame of 
maltreatment. Kroon did attain access to the committee’s minutes and 
his aldermen were allowed to participate in the aldermen consulta-
tion sessions prior to the steering committee’s meetings, but this was 
deemed insufficient for them to be taken seriously as a local coun-
terpart (R23; R27; R33). To overcome the barrier of access to politi-
cal decision making, Kroon tried various networking strategies to set 
the agenda on the national political level and bypass the local and 
provincial governments—who he had publicly accused of not taking 
Urk seriously and not being open to a fair discussion on the wind park 
(Anonymous, 2010s, 2011s; Visscher, 2011a). However, according to the 
proponents, the municipality of Urk and the public had already been 
informed in 2004. Everyone, including Kroon, had the opportunity to 
influence and question or discuss the plans. Moreover, according to 
the proponents, the municipality of Urk had not always wanted to talk 
or did not respond to requests, despite several attempts to involve 
them (Anonymous, 2010q, 2011s; Van Herwaarden, 2010d, 2010e; Vra-
gen gesteld door de leden der Kamer met de daarop door de regering 
gegeven antwoorden, 2011).
Kroon also wrote letters to the responsible ministers and state 
secretaries (Anonymous, 2010s). He not only directly contacted the 
responsible minister, but also wrote letters to the political parties in 
parliament to pressure Minister Van der Hoeven of Economic 
Affairs to consider other locations for the wind park. Unfor-
tunately for Kroon, the minister was unwilling to consider 
this option (Van Herwaarden, 2009d). Van der Hoeven made 
it clear that the only flexibility lay in the way the wind park 
would be realised, not in where and whether the wind park 
would be constructed (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 
2009). While being unsuccessful in changing the minister’s mind, 
Kroon did succeed in instigating a motion proposed by parliament 
member Zijlstra to take into account the interest of Urk (Liberaliser-
ing energiemarkten: Motie van het lid Zijlstra, 2009). The motion was 
accepted by the parliament, giving the minister no other choice but to 
reach out to Urk—as described below.
In the spring of 2010, on behalf of Minister Van der Hoeven, a del-
egation with high officials met Mayor Kroon to negotiate a package 
deal and grant Urk compensation. Iconic of the relationship Kroon 
had with governmental actors, it did not work out well. Kroon had 
‘THE WIND 
ENERGY 
SECTOR IS 
EXAGGERATING 
AS WELL’
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set high stakes by demanding either no wind park, or a substantially 
downscaled version, instead of reaching a negotiated deal (Van Her-
waarden, 2010e). Kroon chose to prioritise advoca-
cy, rather than brokerage, and thus the delegation 
did not realise any of its goals. Kroon, while awaiting 
the procedure at the Council of State, did not want 
to back down and publicly lose face (R25). Although the minister did 
not want to substantially downscale the wind park, according to peo-
ple involved in the negotiation, there was some room for changing the 
plan or compensating Urk financially (R23; R25; R27). In June 2010, de-
spite the failed negotiation, Minister Van der Hoeven decided to can-
cel the seven wind turbines most clearly visible from Urk, which Kroon, 
who was not yet satisfied, described as a ‘step in the right direction’ 
(Anonymous, 2010t; Van der Meulen, 2010). In 2011, when Minister Ver-
hagen, Van der Hoeven’s successor, came into office, Kroon again tried 
to instigate a political discussion on the necessity of the wind park, but 
was unsuccessful because Verhagen wanted to move forward with the 
plan (Anonymous, 2011e; Van der Walle, 2011; Visscher, 2011a).
Joining forces to pursue a legal course of action
As it proved difficult to prevent the realisation of the wind park via 
the political agenda, Urk Briest, Kroon and the other opponents men-
tioned below decided to follow a legal course of action. Urk Briest had 
been keen to follow legal procedures and file complaints and objec-
tions to the plan—not only when environmental permits were filed by 
the initiators, but also when the national governmental took over the 
coordination and objectors could only turn to the highest administra-
tive Council of State. Urk Briest mobilised and aided people to official-
ly make objections. Online and hardcopy standard templates for com-
plaints were made available, which led to over 500 of the total of 650 
complaints (Anonymous, 2009q; Yang Yang Chiu, 2009, 2010c). While 
Kroon was willing to follow Urk Briest’s example and appeal at court, 
the new Crisis and Recovery Act prevented Urk, as public body, from 
suing another public body. To stop the wind park, Kroon needed these 
protest groups to do the suing instead (Anonymous, 2011s; Van der 
Walle, 2011). Therefore, Kroon decided to financially support Urk Bri-
est and the opponents from the Noordoostpolder with over €90,000 
in legal advice. Urk Briest, with limited resources, welcomed the addi-
tional financial resources offered by Kroon. Kroon not only supported 
the resistance in cash, but also personally attended the first hearing at 
Council of State to morally support the opponents.
After February 2012, when the Council of State decided to reject all 
appeals, Kroon’s will to protest was broken. One civil servant from Urk 
declared that Urk ‘could not do the impossible … At a certain moment 
you have to quit and take your loss’ (R25). Additionally, Urk needed to 
consider other interests, such as the workable relationship with their 
direct neighbour—the municipality of Noordoostpolder—as the dis-
A ‘STEP IN THE 
RIGHT DIRECTION’ 
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cussion on the wind park began to interfere with issues that were un-
related to it (R25; R36). Kroon, who retired after his term ended in June 
2012, and the municipality of Urk, did not participate in the second and 
third hearings at the Council of State. From Urk and Kroon’s perspec-
tive, the ‘unfair fight’ was over and lost (R25). Urk Briest did partici-
pate in the other hearings, but remained unsuccessful. Van Loosen’s 
only option was to approach the European Court for Human Rights 
(Anonymous, 2009t, 2011q; Raad van State, 2012b; Van Ketwich, 2012). 
However, Van Loosen considered joining local politics and running for 
city council membership to trigger change in the political arena and 
keep Urk’s cultural heritage on the agenda—the issue with which it all 
began.
7.3.3 The opponents from the Noordoostpolder
Due to the rising opposition in Urk, people living in the Noordoostpo-
lder also became aware of the plans for the wind park. Some of the 
people started to organise opposition and form a coalition of conveni-
ence because they did not want the wind turbines in their own ‘back-
yard’.
The 2008 ‘wake-up call’ for people living in the Noordoostpolder
Writer and visual artist, Harrie Hageman, and doctor, Herma Coumou, 
have lived together next to the dike in the Noordoostpolder for almost 
16 years, and were struck by the news on the wind park in 2008. They 
had grown accustomed to the wind turbines that had been there since 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. However, with the new wind park, they 
would be confronted with much larger turbines, as close as 700 me-
tres to their house. Hageman and Coumou decided to form the protest 
group, Tegenwind—literally meaning ‘against wind’—to raise atten-
tion and mobilise local resistance. Piet Reinders, a video producer and 
manual therapist, lived as close as one kilometre to where the wind 
turbines were planned. Reinders used his association, Rotterdamse 
Hoek—named after a part of the dike, Rotterdamse Hoek—to fight 
the wind park. Berthoo Lammers, leader of the political party, ONS 
Noordoostpolder, has sought to prevent the wind park since 2009 
because, according to him, the ‘megalomaniacal mastodons’ would 
ruin the precious landscape of the Noordoostpolder and fence Urk’s 
culturally protected heritage, and thus did not fit the open landscape 
of the Noordoostpolder (Lammers, 2010f, 2011h, 2011j; Renes, 2010). 
Henk Hoving had his farm next to the dike and was in conflict with the 
municipality of Noordoostpolder because they had not enforced the 
regulations on the noise nuisance of the current wind turbines, even 
though these were permanently violated. Already having bad experi-
ences with the municipality and the construction of wind turbines near 
his house, the plan of a few farmers to build new wind turbines along 
the dikes came as a shock, and Hoving feared that a new, larger wind 
park would worsen the situation of noise nuisance.
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Forging a coalition of convenience
Hoving had been fighting the wind park alone for years; thus, he was 
pleased to hear, in 2008, that others were also against the wind park—
notably, Hageman and Coumou of Tegenwind, Reinders of the asso-
ciation Rotterdamse Hoek, and Lammers of the political party ONS 
Noordoostpolder. Together, they forged a coalition of convenience 
and decided that each person would have his or her own task and fo-
cus. Hoving would focus on the issue of noise nuisance, Hageman and 
Coumou would prepare the legal procedure at the Council of State, 
Reinders would focus on the issue of water safety, and Lammers would 
focus on the policy process within the municipality of Noordoostpol-
der. The group also collaborated with the opponents from Urk, shared 
resources and exploited various venues. They also received help from 
Fred Jansen of the Critical National Platform on Wind Energy (Natio-
naal Kritisch Platform Windenergie—NKPW). Jansen also had knowl-
edge on the issue, and participated in objecting at the Council of State, 
even though he was not a stakeholder in this particular wind park. Al-
though each of the coalition members had his or her own focus, they 
all supported the same framing and exploited similar networking strat-
egies. The following sections discuss this coalition’s main strategies.
Improving one’s wealth at the expense of others
One framing strategy of the opponents from Noordoostpolder was to 
frame the proponents as mainly trying to increase their own wealth at 
the expense of others. Reinders, Hageman and Coumou argued that 
the value of their houses would drop due to the plans for the wind park, 
and that potential buyers would show no interest as soon as they heard 
about the plan for the wind park (Van Herwaarden, 2013a, 2013b). They 
were offended when the initiators offered to pay the electricity costs 
of the people living near the wind farms for the years the wind park 
existed. While this was a tempting deal for many, Hageman and Cou-
mou framed it as a payment to smother resistance. According to them, 
the people were intimidated by the initiators and thought they had 
no choice but to accept. In the meantime, according to Hageman and 
Coumou, the initiating farmers would increase their wealth with big 
houses and expensive motor vehicles, while the rest of the community 
suffered from their wind turbines (Anonymous, 2011m).
Most farmers no longer lived beside the dike, but had moved away 
to live in the villages. This aroused a feeling of injustice among the 
people still living there. Even more upsetting for Hageman and Cou-
mou was that the group of farmers would profit from the wind park 
primarily due (according to them) to illegal state subsidies (Anony-
mous, 2011u, 2012c). It outraged them that millions of euros of tax 
money were earned by ‘30 ex farmers/neighbours who see no trouble 
in the destruction of the wellbeing of hundreds’ (Anonymous, 2011m). 
However, according to the proponents, these claims were untrue (Ko-
bessen, 2011; Van Herwaarden, 2012e). It was acknowledged that the 
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farmers would most likely earn a great deal, but the actual return on 
their investments was uncertain from the beginning. The forecast is 
a return on investment of eight to 15 per cent, but, according to the 
initiators, this is still unclear (Van Herwaarden, 2012e). Thus, accord-
ing to the proponents, the numbers presented by the opponents were 
exaggerated.
In this regard, the opponents also questioned the usefulness and 
necessity of wind energy as the best solution for creating a sustain-
able energy supply. According to Reinders ‘everybody knows’ (R31) 
that wind turbines are not the solution. It is ‘the green lie’ (R31), says 
Reinders. The only reason these ‘robber chiefs’ (R31) invest in wind 
energy is because of the government subsidy and the profit they can 
make. According to Reinders, they are ‘shady traders’ (R31) who look 
for every opportunity to make money. In addition, Hageman and Cou-
mou framed the farmers as untrustworthy because they ‘have never 
spoken the truth on meaningful information’ (Anonymous, 2012b) and, 
allegedly, exercise manipulating practices. All of these allegations are 
refuted by the proponents who argue that they have done nothing ille-
gal or unethical and do share trustworthy and transparent information, 
as long as it does not include sensitive business informative (R27; R28; 
R29; Hulsing, 2011).
Lammers, who tried to set the local political agenda, was upset 
about the municipality accepting a ‘bribe’ of the Umbrella Organisation 
for the five villages in the Noordoostpolder. Lammers claimed, ‘Appar-
ently it is more important [for the council of mayor and aldermen] to 
please a couple of wind farmers, than to take into account the inter-
ests of the citizens of Urk [and the Noordoostpolder]’ (Van Herwaarden, 
2011c). Lammers blamed the municipality of Noordoostpolder for fail-
ing to serve and defend the local interests (Lammers, 2010f; Van Her-
waarden, 2011a). The municipality has been trying too much to comply 
with the ‘wind mafia’ (Lammers, 2010b, 2011h). According to Lammers, 
the ‘wind mafia’ play a dirty game by bribing the villages with subsi-
dies and the people with free energy in return for not suing them (Van 
Herwaarden, 2010c). Moreover, it frustrated Lammers that the initiators 
would profit from taxpayers (Lammers, 2010a, 2011e; 2011f), which is ac-
cording to him ‘unscrupulous vulgar self-enrichment’ (Lammers, 2011f).
Hoving, although using other terms, also argued that the initia-
tors had purposefully not taken into account the interests of the peo-
ple living in the area. He was initially invited to join the plan for the 
wind park, but declined, and felt that he was subsequently seen as 
‘an enemy’ (R30). Hoving stated, ‘The whole thing was like a military 
organisation in which people who did not partake were fought as en-
emies’ (Anonymous, 2011m). Hoving argued that the initiating farmers 
were solely driven by ‘envy and greed’ and ‘that is a recipe for disaster’ 
(R30). According to Hoving, the internal disputes regarding financing, 
allocation of resources and interpersonal grudges were just some of 
the effects of their desire to increase their own wealth (R30).
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‘Manipulating’ the regulations on noise nuisance
Another issue raised primarily by Hoving and Lammers was that the 
national regulation on noise nuisance had been extended to make this 
particular wind park possible. This is a rather technical story, but the 
outcome was that Hoving suggested that the proponents had been 
conspiring to get the new regulation accepted; however, according 
to the proponents, this is not true (R28). An Order in Council (AMvB) 
was prepared at the Ministry of the Housing, Spatial Planning and the 
Environment to change the common decibel noise nuisance norm to 
the European LDen 47 norm, which was deemed suitable for the Wind 
Park Noordoostpolder. According to Hoving and the other opponents, 
this meant an extension of the standard. Instead of granting an all-time 
maximum, the wind turbines were, with this new norm average, al-
lowed to exceed the limit if it was fairly compensated by quieter times. 
According to Hoving, this is a useless norm because it is almost im-
possible to measure an average and enforce this rule (R30). There will 
never be 24/7 monitoring of the wind turbines, making it easy for wind 
turbine owners to cheat.
In 2009, the new norm was discussed in the parliament because 
some members also had concerns. The then responsible Minister 
Cramer assured them that the norm was neutral and not designed by 
the Cabinet to allow large wind parks and meet the targets on sus-
tainable energy. When the Cabinet fell in early 2010, the parliament 
declared the prepared AMvB a controversial topic, meaning that the 
outgoing Cabinet was not allowed to make irreversible decisions on 
the issue. However, in April 2010, Cramer’s temporary successor, Min-
ister Huizinga-Heringa, sent a paper to the municipalities in which she 
announced the new AMvB and advised the municipalities to take note 
of this coming regulation when preparing wind parks. In autumn 2010, 
when she was questioned about this, she acknowledged her mistake, 
but repeated that the norm was neutral nevertheless (Brief van de 
minister van Volkshuisvesting Ruimtelijke ordening en Milieubeheer, 
2010; Verslag van Algemeen Overleg, 2010). On 14 October 2010, the 
inauguration day of the new Cabinet Rutte, the AMvB—thus a royal 
decree—was signed and declared in the official state’s newspaper 
(AMvB windturbines, 2010).
The new Prime Minister Rutte, of the liberal party, had previously 
been against wind turbines and stated that ‘those windmills do not 
wheel on wind but on subsidy’ (EenVandaag, 2010), yet he then let 
the regulation pass (Lammers, 2011j). The initiators, when preparing 
reports for the wind park, had already taken the new AMvB into ac-
count, which came into effect on 1 January 2011. However, with the 
former norm, the wind park would never have been allowed, according 
to Hoving and the other opponents (R30). Now that national regulation 
had changed, Hoving and the other opponents had no other option but 
to ask the local municipality of Noordoostpolder to enforce a custom-
made, stricter norm for the Wind Park Noordoostpolder; however, the 
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Noordoostpolder rejected their request. Lammers sought to change 
policy on the regulations on noise nuisance because he believed the 
municipality had given permits to the Umbrella Organisation based on 
the anticipated AMvB and Lden norm, but legally had to follow the 
rules that were still in effect at that time, in 2010 (Anonymous, 2010f; 
Lammers, 2010d, 2010g). In addition, the re-
sponsible Council of Mayor and Alderman 
had the authority and possibility to work with 
custom-made noise nuisance regulation, 
while alderman Poppe of the municipality of Noordoostpolder stated 
that the Lden 47 noise nuisance regulation was a European standard 
from which the municipality could not deviate (Lammers, 2011c).
In 2011, Lammers successfully submitted a resolution taken over 
by the council to demand the Council of Mayor and Aldermen bet-
ter examine its authority and consider custom-made noise nuisance 
regulations for the wind park (ONS Noordoostpolder, 2011). Later, the 
Council of State judged that the municipality did have the discretion-
ary power to deviate from the norm, but could not be forced to use 
this power. Thus, while Lammers was proven correct, he could not 
force the municipality to deviate from the norm, and thus depended on 
the willingness of the municipality (ONS Noordoostpolder, 2013). The 
Council of Mayor and Aldermen made clear that they were unwilling 
to change policy. Lammers had also targeted his strategies towards al-
derman Poppe who, according to Lammers, was incompetent and had 
lied and misled the city council (Anonymous, 2011p; Lammers, 2012d; 
Van Herwaarden, 2012a). Finally, a motion by Lammers to demand al-
derman Poppe’s resignation failed to reach a majority vote in the city 
council (Lammers, 2012c; Van Herwaarden, 2012b).
Dike safety and the role of the chair of the water board
All the opponents from the Noordoostpolder, including Urk Briest, 
were concerned with the safety of the dikes if the wind turbines were 
built. It was feared that the dikes would weaken because of the wind 
turbines (R31). Reinders and Coumou made a movie about this concern 
and showed it at a hearing at the Council of State (Reinders, 2013). The 
role played by the water board, Zuiderzeeland, and especially its chair, 
Henk Tiesinga, was also questioned by the opponents (Anonymous, 
2011j, 2011o, 2011v, 2012a; De Vries, 2012; Lammers, 2011, 2011a, 2011b, 
2011d; 2011g, 2011k, 2011l; Van Herwaarden, 2011b). When advising and 
leading the Umbrella Organisation from 2000 to 2009, Tiesinga was 
also chair of the water board, Zuiderzeeland, which was responsible 
for granting the permits needed to construct the Wind Park Noor-
doostpolder. The water board contracted investigators who cleared 
Tiesinga’s name and stated that he had acted with integrity and had 
never misused his position within either forum—but the opponents 
were not convinced (Yang Yang Chiu, 2011a). For example, Lammers 
(2011k) stated that ‘wind turbines [are] more important than our safety’. 
‘UNSCRUPULOUS VULGAR 
SELF-ENRICHMENT’ 
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As the opponents feared the risk of dike breakage, they requested 
all kinds of documents about the issue at the water board, Zuider-
zeeland, and at other water boards in the Netherlands. Reinders also 
approached scientists and experts on the issue of water safety, and 
asked the Dutch Safety Board to look into the issue. Additionally, he 
contacted the National Ombudsman for complaining about the water 
board and the entire Dutch legal constitution, including the Council of 
State, which he regarded as biased and in favour of the government 
(Van Herwaarden, 2012c). One might think that raising the issue of wa-
ter safety was essentially a framing strategy of the opponents, since 
they would surely not expect the Dutch legal, political and administra-
tive system to allow the construction of a wind park at the expense of 
risking dike breakage. However, for the opponents, this was a serious 
concern (R24; R31).
Networking to set the public and political agenda
The opponents from Noordoostpolder also employed networking 
strategies. As aforementioned, they formed a coalition of convenience 
to raise attention and mobilise local resistance. A great effort was in-
vested in attaining information about the plans for the wind park. Ad-
ditionally, a public campaign with demonstrations and debates was es-
tablished, together with Urk Briest. The group also distributed leaflets 
to inform the people living in the area and helped them file complaints 
at the Council of State (Anonymous, 2011u). Many of the opponents 
also wrote letters to the media and local municipalities, councilmen, 
political parties, provincial deputies, parliament members, ministries 
and responsible ministers (Anonymous, 2010o; Antwoord op de brief 
van Stichting de Rotterdamse Hoek te Creil, 2009; De Vries, 2012; 
Herwaarden, 2012). The opponents also officially objected against the 
plans at the municipality of Noordoostpolder, and later appealed at 
the Council of State (Anonymous, 2009i). Additionally, they tried to 
try to talk with the initiators themselves and the local authorities, but 
never came on speaking terms.
However, the decision to move forward with the wind park was 
already made and the proponents were not open to others at the 
negotiation table. As was the case with Van Loosen en Kroon, this 
strengthened the frame that citizens are scorned and not honestly and 
openly informed about the plans. In one of the many letters Tegenwind 
wrote, Coumou said, ‘There is complete silence from the side of the 
governmental actors and initiators; one can speak of a closed bastion’ 
(Anonymous, 2008a). Hageman and Coumou already distrusted the 
initiators, but now lost trust in democratic public decision making, the 
government and the legal system in the Netherlands. Coumou felt that 
she could ‘have a say, but have no influence’ (R21). The independently 
operating Council of State was also regarded as ‘simply an extension 
piece for politics’ (Anonymous, 2012b). As soon as the national govern-
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ment supported the plan, the opponents argued that they stood no 
chance and the fight had become unfair.
In taking the monitoring and controlling task of his council mem-
bership seriously, Lammers questioned the conduct of the Council of 
Mayor and Aldermen on this dossier (Anonymous, 2010m; Lammers, 
2012a). He believed the municipality, and the responsible alderman 
Poppe in particular, had been working behind the council and citizen’s 
backs to conspire with the initiators of the wind park without question-
ing the need, necessity and effect of a wind park in the Noordoostpo-
lder (Herwaarden, 2012; Lammers, 2010e, 2012b; Renes, 2010). Lam-
mers used speeches, columns and press releases to emphasise his 
opinion that the wind park did not belong in the Noordoostpolder, and 
that the local government should change its policy (Lammers, 2010c, 
2011h, 2011i; ONS Noordoostpolder, 2012).
Ultimately, the opponents did not succeed in setting the political 
agenda against the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. In addition, the legal 
judgement of the Council of State did not rule in favour of the oppo-
nents. Currently, the only hope for the opponents is that the initiators 
will be unable to finalise the deal financially, and will somehow run 
out of money. Hence, for now, the most likely scenario is that the wind 
park will be completed and fully operational by 2016.
7.4 Conclusion
This case study has shown a variety of policy entrepreneurs trying to 
set the agenda on the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. The proponents 
became strong advocates of the wind park because they saw a busi-
ness opportunity and because it helped comply with locally, provin-
cially and nationally set targets on renewable energy. Conversely, peo-
ple living in the municipalities of Noordoostpolder and Urk tried to do 
everything in their power to stop the realisation of the wind park. The 
conflicting interests and frames resulted in a dynamic agenda-setting 
process because both sides tried to frame the issue to set the agenda, 
and exploited various networking strategies to gather resources and 
secure political support.
With regard to the framing strategies employed, it is remarkable 
that there were two strongly conflicting ways of framing the issue. The 
proponents tended to focus on the need for a wind park to comply 
with internationally, nationally, regionally and locally set goals on re-
newable energy, and on the benefits the wind park would generate for 
all. In contrast, the opponents focused on the effects of the wind park 
on their own living environment by framing the wind park as a horrific 
megalomaniacal threat that would fence the precious landscape of the 
municipality of Urk and Noordoostpolder in an ‘iron curtain’. Addition-
ally, the opponents felt maltreated in the policy process and claimed 
they were not taken seriously by the local, provincial and national gov-
ernmental actors involved.
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Both sides used various tools to invigorate these framing perspec-
tives. Visualisations, stories and rhetoric were used to strengthen the 
frames and gain support. Due to the intense framing and strongly con-
flicting perspectives, both sides were incapable of reaching common 
ground, which can be regarded as a dialogue of the deaf—coined by 
Van Eeten in 1999 (Van Eeten, 1999). All efforts to negotiate, reach 
consensus or create a better understanding of one another’s viewpoint 
resulted in strengthening the policy entrepreneurs’ own frame. People 
could either be in favour of or against the wind park—there was no 
neutral position. Besides framing the wind park—and thus the issue—
differently, it is remarkable to observe both sides blaming and framing 
each other for not telling the truth or playing the political game fairly 
and justly. Unsurprisingly, this invigorated the framing contests.
There were limited attempts from both sides to reach a mutual un-
derstanding. However, when confronted with allegations, they were 
either neglected or legitimatised because the opposing side had done 
the same or worse. The framing contest over the use of symbols serves 
as an example in this regard. Both sides made graphic visualisations 
and maquettes of the wind turbines, but accused the other side of ex-
aggeration and subsequently implied—at least in the case of Kroon—
a justification of their own exaggeration. Thus, the framing contest 
fought in the media strengthened the interactional deadlock. Both 
sides spoke more about each other, 
rather than with each other to try to 
create better mutual understanding 
or agree on a win-win deal. Advo-
cacy was chosen over brokerage, 
resulting in both parties committing 
completely to their own causes, and 
leaving room for only one winner. 
Consequently, the Council of State had to settle the dispute, which led 
to a solo win for the proponents.
Alongside framing strategies, all parties employed networking 
strategies. The proponents formed a coalition and shared resources. 
However, while almost all initiators were farmers, there was consid-
erable internal conflict and the collaboration was initially fragile. It 
seemed as if most issues were eventually resolved, and the initiators 
together sought and found valuable support from all governmental 
and political levels—local, regional and national. This gave them the 
crucial support from the state in pursuing the realisation of the wind 
park. Retrospectively, the proponents followed the steps of the inside 
access model (Cobb et al., 1976). They sought early access to the po-
litical agenda to instigate a more clandestine decision within the local, 
provincial and national governments, and attract support from like-
minded groups (Cobb et al., 1976, p. 135). Behind-the-scenes agree-
ments were made, resulting in crucial political and financial support 
from the governmental parties.
BOTH SIDES SPOKE MORE 
ABOUT EACH OTHER, RATHER 
THAN WITH EACH OTHER 
TO TRY TO CREATE BETTER 
MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING OR 
AGREE ON A WIN-WIN DEAL
175
It is no surprise that the proponents did not bother setting the pub-
lic agenda because, until 2008, this was not even needed. However, as 
Cobb et al. (1976, p. 135) indicate, groups with inside access most likely 
will not succeed in setting the agenda and changing policy if opposing 
groups manage to set the public agenda to their advantage. There-
fore, the proponents were rightfully concerned when the opponents 
managed to set the public agenda and tried to set the policy and po-
litical and agendas from the outside. The opponents had joined forces 
and formed coalitions of convenience to gather and share resources 
and reach out to politicians. The people opposing the wind park had 
very diverse backgrounds and would, under normal circumstances, 
not know of each other’s existence, let alone work together. However, 
because they had a common goal, they found and aided each other 
by establishing campaigns; writing letters; filing complaints; appeal-
ing at court; and sharing arguments, knowledge and other resources. 
Together, they seized considerable opportunities and exploited vari-
ous arenas and venues.
Thus, overall, why did the proponents’ strategies prove more ef-
fective than the opponents’ strategies? First, context served as a con-
straint to the opponents and opportunity to the proponents. Many of 
the circumstances did not favour the opponents. The internationally, 
nationally, provincially and locally set goals on renewable energy were 
essential, leaving almost no room for the opponents to change policy 
in that regard. Further, the Wind Park Noordoostpolder became an im-
portant way to achieve those targets. Not even a change in national 
administration opened a window for the opponents to set the political 
agenda. Hence, the opponents had to follow a legal course of action to 
enforce policy change from the outside. For the proponents, the con-
text served as an opportunity to align their frame with governmental 
policies. They even received help from above when the provincial and 
national governments up-scaled the plan for the wind park by giving it 
prominence on the political agendas. However, this does not infer that 
all of the success of the proponents is attributable to contextual fac-
tors because, as previously discussed, they also effectively lobbied for 
support at all governmental levels. They also had to cope with chang-
ing regulations with respect to funding, nature and noise nuisance; 
however, these barriers were relatively easily overcome.
Second, while context mattered and favoured the proponents, the 
opposing parties were also responsible for their failure. They became 
involved in the agenda setting too late to radically change policy. Their 
timing in 2008 was imperfect because the political agenda had already 
been set in favour of the proponents, and the opponents subsequently 
continuously lagged behind the decision making. Moreover, the fram-
ing and networking strategies of the opponents were too dispersed 
and not thoroughly constructed and aligned. Following Benford and 
Snow (2000), it can be argued that the opponents’ frame amplifica-
tion and extension were effective to mobilise the public and set the 
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public agenda, but ineffective to secure support from politicians and 
governmental actors, such as local (with the exception of Urk’s Coun-
cil of Mayor and Aldermen), provincial and national representatives. 
The opponents continuously broadened their frame and linked it to all 
kinds of issues related to effects on health, water safety, the environ-
ment, the landscape, alternatives for wind energy, maltreatment in the 
policy process and so forth. Soon, every potential argument undermin-
ing the wind park was included in the framing, without thorough con-
sideration of the possible effectiveness of these arguments to set the 
political agenda—although it did prove successful in setting the public 
agenda, at least locally. Politicians did sympathise with the opponents, 
but saw no reason to publicly support the idea to stop the wind park, 
and all the opponents’ arguments were refuted or ridiculed.
Conversely, the proponents timed their strategies effectively and, 
by the 1990s, had already begun trying to set the political agenda. 
They established a good relationship with local politics and succeeded 
in settling internal disputes and establishing a professional Umbrella 
Organisation that strictly and strategically focused on complying with 
targets set in governmental policy, creating a solid business case, meet-
ing all legal requirements, and negotiating with governmental actors. 
The initiators were also effective in finding support from stakeholders 
and qualified people to help them resolve internal conflict, overcome 
lack of knowledge and play the political game on their behalf.
This case study has demonstrated that, to effectively set the agen-
da, various framing strategies not only need to be clearly focused and 
aligned with each other, but also aligned with networking strategies. 
Framing and networking go alongside each other and are complemen-
tary, but, to be as effective as the proponents in this case, they must 
be coupled and fine-tuned. Frames have to be thoroughly constructed 
to raise awareness among decision makers to secure their support. In-
side access, political support and skilful framing and networking have 
proven to be decisive in setting the political agenda. Outside initiation 
and setting the public agenda to enforce political agenda priority has 
been an ineffective strategy for opposing policy entrepreneurs. One of 
the lessons to be learnt here is that successful public agenda setting 
does not automatically lead to effective setting of the political agenda.
Currently, in 2014, the Wind Park Noordoostpolder is being im-
plemented and there are no indications that it will not be completed. 
The opponents have ceased resistance and are no longer involved in 
setting the agenda or obstructing implementation. Moreover, wind 
energy remains an important target at all governmental levels (Ener-
gieakkoord voor duurzame groei, 2013; Ontwerp-structuurvisie Wind-
energie op land, 2013).
Figure 7.5: The first layer of a wind turbine is put into its place in the Noordoostpolder. 
Photo: NOP Agrowind.
177
C
H
A
P
T
ER
 8
: C
O
N
C
LU
SI
O
N
CON
LU
SI
ON
CON
CLU
SI
ON
8
C
ha
pt
er
 8
: C
on
cl
us
io
n
8.1 Introduction
This thesis began with the prime example of policy entrepreneurship, 
Cornelis Lely, who clearly left his mark on the IJsselmeer area as it is 
known today. A question was posed about how actors have tried to 
strategically set the agenda in the context of the IJsselmeer area dur-
ing the last few decades. This concluding chapter answers this ques-
tion based on the theoretical framework, this study’s methodological 
approach and the empirical case studies. The theoretical review intro-
duced the relevant concepts to study policy entrepreneurs, who seek 
to realise or oppose policy change by setting the agenda. For analyti-
cal purposes, a distinction was made between two types of strategies: 
framing and networking strategies. The methodological chapter ac-
counted for the case study approach and the way data were collected 
and analysed. The subsequent four empirical case studies revealed 
that various actors have strategically sought to leave their mark on the 
area, and sometimes continue to do so.
This concluding chapter first discusses some case study examples 
of framing and networking strategies to confirm the use of these strat-
egies by policy entrepreneurs. Second, it argues that policy entrepre-
neurs exploit the use of visualisation by sketching a brighter or more 
frightening future. Third, it reveals how policy entrepreneurs not only 
frame the issue at stake differently, but also frame the self and oth-
ers in terms of motives, behaviour and position in the agenda-setting 
process. Fourth, it claims that policy entrepreneurs need to cope with 
the context in which they operate in order to be effective in setting the 
agenda, as the context can offer both opportunities and constraints. 
The role of governmental actors proves to be particularly crucial. Fifth, 
this chapter argues that employing framing and networking strategies 
in an intertwined and coupled manner is highly effective, but not with-
out risks if not properly executed. This chapter and thesis then con-
cludes with some final remarks.
8.2 Policy entrepreneurial strategies revisited
The first chapter indicated that, although the study of policy entre-
preneurship increasingly receives attention in political and social sci-
ences, understandings of the strategies that policy entrepreneurs em-
ploy in their efforts to pursue policy change are still limited (Brouwer 
& Biermann, 2011; Mintrom, 2000; Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Pralle, 
2009; Roberts, 1998; Roberts & King, 1991; Sheingate, 2003; Zahari-
adis, 2007). Room remains for further conceptual development and 
empirical research of policy entrepreneurship and the strategies em-
ployed by policy entrepreneurs (Mintrom & Norman, 2009), which is 
what this study has achieved.
8.2.1 Framing strategies
The theoretical review of the literature described framing as the 
process by which producers and receivers of messages transform 
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information into a meaningful whole (or ‘frame’) (Entman, 1993). In-
formation about the problem, its possible solutions and the means 
deemed necessary to address the problem is framed in a way to ad-
vance the favoured projects of policy entrepreneurs (Kingdon, 2002). 
Policy entrepreneurs try to ensure that their frame is supported by the 
public, politics and policymakers (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993; Stone, 
2002; True et al., 2007) or at least try to make their perception of reali-
ty more salient than other possible interpretations (Entman, 1993). The 
theoretical review distinguished various framing strategies that policy 
entrepreneurs can employ to promote their frames. A selection—
though not all—of empirical examples with respect to each framing 
strategy is discussed below.
First, framing strategies involve the use of narratives and stories 
to convince an audience of the necessity of political action or policy 
measures (Stone, 2002). The Second Delta Committee adhered to the 
narrative of climate change adaptation and sharing a ‘story of social 
control’ that stated that the Dutch have always been able, in their in-
teractio is approaching. Alongside the story of control, the commit-
tee also shared the ‘story of decline and crisis’ by recalling historical 
disasters in water management, and the country’s dependence on the 
natural environment.
A second framing strategy is the use of rhetoric, described as the 
art of persuading, influencing or pleasing people through using spo-
ken or written speech. The policy entrepreneurs in the case on nature 
development used rhetoric to distance themselves from the Dutch 
tradition of nature conservation. They argued that the Dutch people 
had lost sense of what true nature was like before human disturbance. 
They argued that increased human intervention leads to less true na-
ture, and pleaded to manage and develop nature with the least pos-
sible human involvement.
Another different form of framing is with the use of symbols. A 
symbol is anything that represents something else, and its power lies 
in the potential to accommodate multiple meanings (Yanow, 1996). 
Proponents of the infrastructural connection between Almere and 
Amsterdam presented the connection as a symbol for the relation-
ship between the city of Almere and Amsterdam. Additionally, local 
actors argued that Almere needed a landmark, such as a bridge, to 
brand the city. A Golden Gate–like bridge between the two twin-cities 
would help accomplish this, while also serving as a stepping-stone 
for future interaction and collaboration between the cities. The fact 
that symbols can accommodate multiple meanings is demonstrated 
by the different way the opponents framed the issue. The opponents 
regarded the bridge and the coupled outer-dike urbanisation plans as 
a representation of the megalomania and delusions of grandeur of the 
proponents—a strategy that would do more harm than good for the 
open landscape of the area.
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Further, framing can be used to exploit crises or focusing events. 
Crises or focusing events can trigger a window of opportunity be-
cause they often highlight failure in policy and thus create a chance 
to learn and advance new ways of framing the problem, its solutions 
and the means deemed necessary to enable the solutions (Birkland, 
1998, 2004, 2008; Boin et al., 2009; Kingdon, 2002). A clear example 
of crisis exploitation occurred when the Second Delta Committee, as a 
policy entrepreneur, created its own crisis narrative in the absence of a 
recent crisis. While the committee did not blame anyone in particular, 
it used the self-created opportunity to develop a sense of urgency be-
cause the possible effects of climate change were not felt by the Dutch 
people, yet—according to the committee—change was needed in an-
ticipation of future crises. As the case study revealed, the committee 
very persuasively framed the need to anticipate climate change and 
water management, even though there was no occurrence of a recent 
crisis prior to the committee’s establishment.
Therefore, to current understandings of crisis exploitation, this 
study contributes the knowledge that it is not necessary for a crisis to 
actually occur for an agency—notably, a policy entrepreneur—to set 
the agenda and change policies. Framing a possible crisis or severe 
problem can be sufficient to raise awareness. As long as the present-
ed frame aligns with people’s imagination, it has potential power. All 
the people involved could imagine that the flooding of large parts of 
the Netherlands would lead to major disruptions and crises because 
they had experienced flooding in the past and recently witnessed the 
flooding in New Orleans. However, I hypothesise that, for policy issues 
without clear links to concrete or actual threats—such as the ageing 
of a population—it would be more difficult to rely on people’s imagina-
tion. As a consequence, it would be more difficult for policy entrepre-
neurs to raise attention, find support and set the agenda.
Due to the often sudden and unexpected nature of crises and fo-
cusing events, their aftermath is often a framing contest (Boin et al., 
2009). Much depends on the way actors interpret, frame and react to 
crises by blaming others or denying responsibility and absolving the 
blame. During the period studied, no crisis related to any of the cases 
occurred; therefore, I cannot name a case study example of a fram-
ing contest in reaction to a recent crisis. However, the 1993 and 1995 
high waters did provide the nature development policy entrepreneurs 
with the opportunity to couple nature development with water safety 
along the major Dutch rivers. They pointed out that their approach to 
water safety would provide politicians with a solution that both water 
managers and landscape preservationists could embrace. The framing 
contest, as initiated by the adherents of nature development, was not 
characterised by blaming others, but by positively focusing on pos-
sible solutions. This proved to be an effective approach, and, conse-
quently, the framing contest was not very strong.
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IT IS NOT NECESSARY FOR A CRISIS TO ACTUALLY OCCUR 
FOR AN AGENCY—NOTABLY, A POLICY ENTREPRENEUR—
TO SET THE AGENDA AND CHANGE POLICIES
Surprisingly, the strongest framing contests were found not in reac-
tion to a crisis (such as the 1993 and 1995 high waters in the nature de-
velopment case) or an anticipated future crisis (such as with the Sec-
ond Delta Committee). When discussing the use of symbols, I already 
gave the example of a framing contest between the opponents and 
proponents of the infrastructural connection and outer-dike urbanisa-
tion near Almere. Another framing contest was in the case on the Wind 
Park Noordoostpolder, where the policy entrepreneurs initiating the 
plan for the wind park framed the wind turbines as beneficial for the 
region, while all opposing policy entrepreneurs framed them as caus-
ing only negative effects for the people living in the region. This topic 
will be returned to later; however, for now, we can conclude that the 
cases revealed that crises are not a necessary condition for framing 
contests.
A final framing strategy was the aligning of frames, described as 
a means and necessary condition to mobilise society (Benford, 1993; 
Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow et al., 1986). This study has proved that 
frame alignment was a framing strategy used by all the policy entre-
preneurs discussed, especially the distinguished, but closely related, 
frame bridging, amplification and extension. For example, the Second 
Delta Committee aligned frames by linking water safety to climate 
change, while the nature development policy entrepreneurs aligned 
frames by coupling nature development with the management of the 
major rivers. The Almere aldermen used frame alignment by linking 
the Almere’s interests to the national need to accommodate addition-
al houses in the Randstad region, while the policy entrepreneurs in 
favour of the plan proposed alternative routes by limiting their initial 
elaborate plans to the specific needs expressed during the RRAAM 
process. Finally, the policy entrepreneurs opposing the Almere plans 
used the discussion on the future of the region as a stepping-stone to 
advocate an open Markermeer-IJmeer. The farmers in the Noordoost-
polder used frame alignment by coupling a business opportunity to 
governmental policy changes on renewable energy, and its opponents 
used frame alignment by linking the creation of a wind park to the neg-
ative effects of wind turbines on public health and the environment.
With regard to frame transformation, the policy entrepreneurs 
discussed in the first two cases advocated frame transformation in 
water and nature management, while the policy entrepreneurs dis-
cussed in the latter two cases did not advocate any large-scale frame 
transformation. This may be explained by their specific focus on local 
and regional infrastructural projects, rather than a focus on chang-
ing national policy. Nevertheless, as indicated, the aligning of frames 
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proved to be a necessary strategy for policy entrepreneurs trying to 
raise awareness and find supporters. The case studies provided more 
examples of frame alignment, but it is sufficient here to state that it is 
an important framing strategy employed by policy entrepreneurs. To 
align frames effectively, policy entrepreneurs need to be willing and 
able to be adaptive and flexible in their framing of the issues at stake.
In summary, as the aforementioned examples have revealed, the 
six distinguished framing strategies are very closely related because 
any frame can be fit with a story or narrative, substantiated by the 
use rhetoric and symbols, and aligned with other frames. Crisis ex-
ploitation was not used in every case, but the problematisation of a 
currently undesirable situation did always take place. As the literature 
on agenda setting has also suggested, policy entrepreneurs will most 
likely try to frame the current situation as undesirable and problem-
atic in order to promote their own frame. This will be returned to later 
when discussing the framing of a brighter or more frightening future. 
As indicated, there was not a strong framing contest by policy entre-
preneurs in the first two cases—which also explains their relative suc-
cess—but there were strong framing contests in the latter two cases. 
It seems as though issues raise more awareness when framed in terms 
that directly relate to the living environment of people. Hence, policy 
entrepreneurs that succeed in doing this effectively are likely to induce 
strong framing contests and mobilise many supporters.
8.2.2 Networking strategies
The theoretical review explained how networking strategies are cru-
cial to successfully set the agenda within dynamic policy processes 
(Blavoukos & Bourantonis, 2012; Mintrom & Vergari, 1996; Olsson et al., 
2006; Roberts, 1998; Roberts & King, 1991; Schlager, 2007). There are 
limitations to what policy entrepreneurs can achieve alone; therefore, 
they seek to establish and manage networks to bring likeminded ac-
tors together, while also using additional physical, juridical, financial 
and knowledge resources (Roberts & King, 1991; Zahariadis, 2007). 
This study confirms the use and importance of networking strategies, 
and names various empirical examples with respect to each network-
ing strategy.
Policy entrepreneurs try to manage their networks to understand 
the preferences and worries of other actors, and anticipate any conse-
quences. Network management also helps policy entrepreneurs shape 
their arguments to make them convincing and compelling to potential 
supporters. Additionally, managing networks helps build a trustwor-
thy and credible reputation and increases visibility (Mintrom & Vergari, 
1996). For example, in the case on the infrastructural connection and 
outer-dike urbanisation of Almere, Verhorst—who leads the action 
group, the Angry Swan—was keen to manage her network by initiat-
ing and maintaining relationships with the media, public, politicians 
and interest groups. She exploited every opportunity to be informed 
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or to lobby for her case to keep the Markermeer-IJmeer open. Her 
network management helped increase her visibility and awareness of 
the issue she supports. This was particularly necessary because Ver-
horst holds no formal position in the policy process, whereas the alder-
men from Almere, 
Bijl and Duivesteijn, 
had access to and 
were involved in this 
process. Such insid-
ers have the luxury 
of investing less in exploiting a broad range of networking strategies 
than do outsiders such as Verhorst who—due to their limited opportu-
nities to gather substantial resources and set the political agenda—are 
compelled to invest considerably in setting the public agenda and rais-
ing awareness. However, managing networks is not only undertaken to 
become more visible, but is also practised to seek support for building 
coalitions, which is discussed below.
Policy entrepreneurs need others to realise effective agenda set-
ting and thus engage in building teams or coalitions (Huitema & Mei-
jerink, 2010; Meijerink, 2005; Sabatier, 2007; Simmons et al., 2011). In 
my case studies, I found only examples of coalitions of convenience, 
and no coalitions that were only resource dependent or were involved 
in a long-term relationship because of deeply shared core-beliefs. Ap-
parently, policy entrepreneurs prefer coalitions (of convenience) that 
serve their own ideas, visions and goals regarding the issue at stake. In 
the case on nature development, a small group of people formed a coa-
lition and shared similar ideas with regard to nature development. The 
proponents of nature development were also keen to form a strategic 
alliance with nature conservation organisations, river engineers, the 
clay industry and tourist organisations. These groups did not share the 
same policy beliefs, but did have converging interests in the concept 
of nature development. In the Almere case study, through political ma-
noeuvring, the Almere aldermen found regional and national support; 
however, it would not be correct to consider the group of supporters a 
strong coalition because the idea to build houses outer dike was soon 
dropped and the idea for the infrastructural connection was never ful-
ly supported by all regional actors. The case study of the Wind Park 
Noordoostpolder showed that the initiators of the wind park forged 
a coalition because they were not allowed to construct solitary wind 
turbines. While they were forced to work together, they managed to 
build an effective coalition of convenience. The opponents of the wind 
park from Urk and the Noordoostpolder also formed coalitions of con-
venience to share resources and allocate various tasks.
Networking also involves the exploitation of different venues (Hu-
itema & Meijerink, 2010; Pralle, 2003; Princen & Kerremans, 2008; 
True et al., 2007). Policy entrepreneurs use venues to influence poli-
cymaking and sell their own ideas. A specific way to exploit venues is 
SHE EXPLOITED EVERY OPPORTUNITY TO BE 
INFORMED OR TO LOBBY FOR HER CASE TO 
KEEP THE MARKERMEER-IJMEER OPEN
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by establishing pilot or demonstration projects (Huitema & Meijerink, 
2010; Lovell, 2009). The case on nature development clearly displays 
the practice of venue exploitation by pilot projects. The policy entre-
preneurs in this case were keen to use venues to actually show people 
how nature appears if undisturbed by humans. In addition, in the case 
on Almere, policy entrepreneurs exploited venues such as Atelier IJ-
meer 2030+, the public event at Pampus, the RRAAM meetings and so 
forth. Further, in the case of the wind park, there was exploitation of 
venues by initiators who organised public events, and opponents who 
organised debates, demonstrations and numerous other activities to 
mobilise support.
In short, as the aforementioned examples reveal, the three distin-
guished networking strategies were important for these policy entre-
preneurs to mobilise public and political support for their frame. As ex-
pected, based on the literature review, the management of networks 
and exploitation of venues helped the policy entrepreneurs forge coa-
litions of convenience and reach a wider group of people.
8.2.3 Strategies confirmed, yet further conceptualisation required
The above indicates that there is sufficient evidence to support the 
argument that policy entrepreneurs use framing and networking strat-
egies to raise awareness, gain support and set the agenda. Howev-
er, there is a need to further conceptualise understandings of policy 
entrepreneurship and framing and networking strategies. Therefore, 
I want to discuss in greater depth the empirical findings of the case 
studies.
8.3 Framing by visualising a brighter or more frightening future
As explained in the introductory and theoretical chapters, policy en-
trepreneurship literature could benefit from empirical analysis of fram-
ing strategies because it has a tendency to focus on networking, rather 
than framing (Brouwer, 2013; Brouwer & Biermann, 2011; Huitema & 
Meijerink, 2009b; Mintrom & Norman, 2009). For this reason, this sec-
tion and the subsequent section focus and elaborate on this study’s 
main insights with regard to framing. The policy entrepreneurship lit-
erature, and policy sciences in general, could benefit from the insights 
offered by the cases discussed in this research.
The policy entrepreneurs discussed were keen to employ framing 
strategies with regard to information about the problem, its possible 
solutions and the means deemed necessary to achieve these solu-
tions. Policy entrepreneurs are well aware of the need to align frames; 
engage in framing contests; exploit crises; and use symbols, rheto-
ric, stories and narratives. However, the framing of the issue through 
well-considered speech, symbols and so forth is insufficient to gain 
attention and raise support. Therefore, policy entrepreneurs often 
try to convey their frame through visualisations that may prove to be 
‘worth a thousand words’. Interestingly, there is no single way to use 
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framing through visualisations. Rather, there is a diverse set of visual 
tools available to policy entrepreneurs, including graphical designs, 
maquettes, photos, images, maps, symbols and much more.
Depending on the resources available and the policy entrepre-
neurs’ creativity, the possibilities to take advantage of these tools are 
endless. Nevertheless, based on the conducted case studies, I distin-
guished two means of framing through visualisations, regardless of the 
visual tools used. Visualisations are used by policy entrepreneurs to 
present either an image of a brighter future or an image of a fright-
ening future, which agrees with Stone’s (2002) ‘story of decline and 
crisis’ and ‘story of control’. Policy entrepreneurs advocating a policy 
change are most likely to visualise a bright future in which their sug-
gested policy change plays an important role, while policy entrepre-
neurs opposing the policy change tend to do the opposite and picture 
a frightening future. Neither group of policy entrepreneurs are averse 
to exaggerating and ignoring certain facts in order to prove their point 
through visualisations.
8.3.1 Brighter future
The proponents of nature development were keen to picture a brighter 
future with nature development being adopted as the primary policy 
concept. The policy entrepreneurs’ Plan Stork included designs for the 
major rivers and showed where nature development could be imple-
mented. Additionally, pictures were shown of the Loire river in France 
to give an impression of how the policy entrepreneurs imagined the 
rivers could and should appear in a brighter future for the Netherlands. 
Images of the Oostvaardersplassen as the prime example of nature 
development were also often used to convey the message that nature 
development offers a brighter future.
In the case of the infrastructural connection and outer-dike devel-
opment near Almere, alderman Bijl also used framing visualisations to 
present a brighter future. An artist’s impression and large maquette 
were made to envision how outer-dike urbanisation and the infrastruc-
tural connection between Amsterdam could look. Many stakeholders 
were invited to come and see the maquette and the idea evolve, give 
input, provide feedback and possibly offer support. The subsequent 
alderman Duivesteijn used graphic designs to picture a brighter future 
for Almere and the Amsterdam metropolis. Adema, one of the policy 
entrepreneurs advocating an alternative routing of the infrastructural 
connection, also used images and visualisations to indicate how his 
alternative would appear once implemented. I also observed this in 
the case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, in which the proponents 
attempted to visualise the wind park on a drawing board and create 
graphics to give people the impression that the wind park would not 
negatively affect their living environment. They wanted to convey that 
the wind park would fit perfectly with the landscape of the polder, and 
would benefit all.
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8.3.2 More frightening future
The other form of framing through visualisation by policy entrepre-
neurs is the visualisation of a frightening future, typically employed 
by policy entrepreneurs opposing policy change. The policy entrepre-
neurs who established a campaign to keep the Markermeer-IJmeer 
open made pictures, posters and banners to show how the plans for 
Almere would ruin the landscape. To enforce this point, one of the pol-
icy entrepreneurs invited people to her house next to the Markmeer-
IJmeer. This was undertaken so that people could experience the harm 
the plans for Almere would cause to the location.
In the case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, graphic visualisa-
tions and maquettes were made by the opponents to portray a horrific 
megalomaniac wind park that would fence off the precious landscape 
of the Urk and the Noordoostpolder with an ‘iron curtain’. Maquettes 
and images were used by the opponents during campaigning events, 
and displayed in the city hall to raise awareness. The mayor of Urk even 
brought the maquette to a meeting with the then responsible minister. 
Moreover, the mayor created a video to visualise how the wind tur-
bines would negatively affect the cultural heritage of the village of Urk.
8.3.3 Combining both visualisations of the future
One policy entrepreneur sought to combine both visualisations of 
a brighter future and a more frightening future. The Second Delta 
Committee conveyed the two distinctive futures simultaneously. This 
policy entrepreneur presented a worrying and frightening future by 
showing video footage of the flooding in 1953, the (near) river floods in 
1993 and 1995, and the damage caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005 
in New Orleans, arguing that such a natural catastrophe could strike 
the Netherlands at any time. A map was shown of the Netherlands 
with potential flooding if no action was taken and the worst scenario 
eventuated. However, the committee did not want to leave the public 
without hope. Thus, after capturing the attention of the public with the 
picture of a frightening future, the committee moved forward by stat-
ing that the risks caused by climate change can also offer great oppor-
tunities. If the Dutch were to anticipate climate change and take into 
account the recommendations offered by the committee, there would 
be a brighter future for the country as a safe and attractive place to 
live, work, invest and recreate for many generations to come.
8.3.4 Summary
Therefore, as indicated at the beginning of this section, policy entre-
preneurs focusing on promoting a certain policy change will most like-
THERE IS POWER IN THE FRAMING OF ISSUES; HOWEVER, 
THIS STUDY REVEALS THAT THERE IS ALSO A STRATEGY 
TO FRAME THE SELF AND THE OTHER
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ly present their ideas as being part of a brighter future. However, this 
does not mean that visualising a frightening future—as undertaken by 
the committee—is ineffective. A frightening future can raise aware-
ness and convince the public that action needs to be taken to change 
the undesirable or even dangerous status quo. Policy entrepreneurs 
can use the image of a frightening future as a stepping-stone to frame 
a brighter future resulting from their solutions. As in the case of the 
Second Delta Committee, this can be quite effective.
A side note is that using these two kinds of framing is not without 
risks. For example, I hypothesise that, if the framing of a frightening 
future is not thoroughly constructed and supported by facts and real-
ity, it will most likely be criticised and ignored—possibly together with 
the subsequent image of a brighter future. The Second Delta Commit-
tee ran the risk of not being taken seriously; however, its frame was 
thoroughly constructed and discussed with a broad array of external 
actors before publication. Therefore, the committee was sensitive 
to no-go areas and employed popular scientific, policy and political 
thoughts and ideas to construct its frame. While the Second Delta 
Committee was successful in framing a future through visualisations, 
the case studies also provide unsuccessful examples. For example, 
the policy entrepreneurs opposing the Wind Park Noordoostpolder 
used visualisations that were deemed incorrect. This led to a situation 
in which the visualisations themselves became subject of the public 
debate—a framing contest—rather than the issue these opponents 
supported. Moreover—and this will be returned to later—they were 
unable to combine and align their framing into a coherent narrative or 
story to win the support of the decision makers.
8.4 Framing the self and the other
Following the aforementioned finding that policy entrepreneurs are 
more creative than the policy entrepreneurship literature suggests, I 
found a variety of ways in which policy entrepreneurs not only framed 
the issue at stake differently by using visualisations, but also framed 
themselves and the other actors involved in the agenda-setting pro-
cess. There is power in the framing of issues; however, this study re-
veals that there is also a strategy to frame the self and the other. I dis-
covered three ways in which policy entrepreneurs frame the self and 
the other in terms of motivation, behaviour and position.
8.4.1 Framing motivation
First, policy entrepreneurs tend to present themselves as people with 
the correct and most sincere motivation. Policy entrepreneurs pose as 
people with true and unselfish motivations who seek to serve the inter-
est of a larger group of people—a true knight on a white horse. This 
applies to all policy entrepreneurs, regardless of their goal to either 
advance or oppose policy change. For example, alderman Duivesteijn 
argued that he wanted the best for Almere, which is struggling with 
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new town and congestion problems. From his perspective, everyone 
would benefit from the infrastructural connection and outer-dike ur-
banisation. In contrast, Verhorst—leading the action group, the Angry 
Swan—argued that she, and many others, loved the area and that it 
should remain unspoiled and open as it currently is—not only for her-
self and the current generation, but also for future generations.
Alongside this form of promoting one’s own motivation, there is the 
strategy of questioning the motives of others. People in favour of the 
plans for Almere argued that Verhorst only cared for her own interests 
and own view, while neglecting the interests of all the people from 
Almere, such as those stuck in traffic congestion every day. Similarly, 
policy entrepreneurs opposing the Wind Park Noordoostpolder argued 
that the initiators cared only for their own interests, and they blamed 
them for being motivated by greed, envy and a desire to improve their 
wealth at the expense of others—like wolves in sheep’s clothing, con-
cealing true intentions. The opposing policy entrepreneurs had a deep 
feeling that injustice had been done to them and the people living in 
the area by the proponents who neglected their interests in the policy 
process. For this, they were dedicated to gaining justice from the lo-
cal, provincial and national governments to support their interests and 
the interests of those people who could not or dared not stand up for 
themselves. In contrast, the initiators saw themselves as entrepreneurs 
exploiting a business opportunity, not conscious of having done any-
thing wrong. Moreover, they saw themselves as idealists and diehards 
who were assisting Dutch society by contributing to the governmental 
and international targets on renewable energy.
8.4.2 Framing behaviour
Second, policy entrepreneurs frame their own behaviour and the be-
haviour of others. For example, the policy entrepreneur Verhorst ar-
gued that she would fight to the end to protect the area, and do every-
thing in her power to accomplish this. She framed herself as sociable 
and good at making new friends and acquaintances with experts and 
people from the media and politics. She also enjoyed networking and 
being involved in the policy process. While many people respected her 
personality, campaigning and networking, including her opponents, 
there have also been critiques of her actions. Some people frame her 
behaviour as an attempt to be in the spotlight, rather than promoting 
the issue she supports. Alderman Duivesteijn—Verhorst’s most direct 
opponent—was also appraised for his skills and approach, yet criti-
cised for his boldness and temperament, which seemed to negatively 
influence his relationship with other actors.
In the case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, opponents of the 
wind park argued that the initiators were lying, bribing and intimidat-
ing others. Proponents of the wind park rejected this framing and ar-
gued that the opponents were not averse to dirty politics themselves. 
According to the initiators, the opponents were on a ‘warpath’ and 
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would exploit every opportunity to discredit the wind park and the 
people involved, even if this meant spreading lies and hurting people 
personally by ‘walking over dead bodies’ and ‘throwing mud’.
8.4.3 Framing position
Third, policy entrepreneurs frame their own and other people’s posi-
tions. Policy entrepreneurs try to gain empathy for themselves and 
the issue they support by framing themselves as the underdog and 
the other as the dominant player. The policy entrepreneur Verhorst, 
opposing the plans for Almere, presented herself as ‘guardian of the 
area’, personifying and symbolising the protection of the open land-
scape of the Markermeer-IJmeer. From her perspective, Duivesteijn, 
with his plans to destroy the Markermeer-IJmeer, must be stopped.
In contrast, Duivesteijn framed himself as representative of the in-
terests of Almere—as the disadvantaged person who was asked by 
the national government to accommodate the growing population of 
Amsterdam, but not given the means necessary to comply with this. 
According to Duivesteijn, without the infrastructural connection and 
outer-dike urbanisation, Almere would remain handicapped. Interest-
ingly, Duivesteijn also framed his position by stating that Almere not 
only depended on support from the national government, but also that 
the national government depended on the compliance of Almere. He 
framed Almere as an indispensable stakeholder in the government’s 
desire to increase national housing capacity and give an impulse to the 
Amsterdam metropolis. According to Duivesteijn, the national govern-
ment did not have many alternatives in the densely populated Rand-
stad region, and therefore needed Almere to create 60,000 houses 
and 100,000 working places for 160,000 people during the coming 
decades.
The policy entrepreneurs involved in stopping the Wind Park Noor-
doostpolder framed themselves as victims of others’ decision to build 
the wind park near their homes without their consent. One policy 
entrepreneur compared himself with the famous cartoon figures, As-
terix and Obelix, who rebelled against the mighty Roman Empire. This 
policy entrepreneur argued that he did not stand a chance against the 
dominant and dictatorial ruling of the local, regional and national gov-
ernments. Conversely, the initiators of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder 
regarded themselves as part of the tradition of pioneers known in the 
history of the polders, who, with their hands-on mentality and level-
headedness, overcame various barriers to come this far. They believed 
they had earned the chance to complete the Wind Park Noordoostpo-
lder after two decades of advocacy.
8.4.4 Empathy and power
As the above discussion has revealed, a distinction can be made be-
tween the framing of the self and others in terms of motivations, be-
haviour and position. By framing the self in a certain manner, a policy 
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entrepreneur implicitly or explicitly also frames the other. Inversely, by 
framing the other, a policy entrepreneur implicitly or explicitly frames 
the self. Additionally, the framing of motivations, behaviour and posi-
tion are often interrelated. For example, the framing of one’s motiva-
tion to attain justice and of being an underdog or victim legitimises the 
campaigning, such as the opponents fighting against the Wind Park 
Noordoostpolder.
I consider framing the self and the other as playing the empathy 
card. The policy entrepreneurs’ hope is to have people sympathise 
with them and the issue they support. The case studies have shown 
that this can be very effective for setting the public agenda; however, 
it is not effective for setting the policy and political agenda. Decision 
makers tend to be primarily sensitive to political and substantive ar-
guments, rather than emotional ones. On one occasion, I witnessed 
a policy entrepreneur openly play a power card, rather than only an 
empathy card—Duivesteijn, when defending the interests of Almere, 
argued that Almere is an indispensable stakeholder from which the 
national government needs cooperation. I hypothesise that the power 
card can only effectively be played by policy entrepreneurs in a formal 
position in order to negotiate terms, such as in the case of alderman 
Duivesteijn.
8.5 Constraining and enabling contexts
All the case studies revealed that contextual factors can both constrain 
and enable policy entrepreneurs in finding ways to set the agenda. 
The context offers some challenges for policy entrepreneurs to set the 
agenda. For instance, policy entrepreneurs need to be well aware of 
the actors in the context in which they operate. This is the reason that 
the Second Delta Committee involved a broad array of actors and net-
works, including scientists, policymakers, experts and politicians. In-
teractions with these actors helped the committee develop ideas and 
build arguments others could support.
In the case on nature development, the policy entrepreneurs were 
well aware of their contexts. This led them to adjust their strategy by 
framing the concept of nature development differently, and by looking 
for support from people with backgrounds other than nature devel-
opment. In the case of the infrastructural connection and outer-dike 
urbanisation of Almere, the 
first alderman employed 
strategies to find sup-
port locally and regionally, 
while the subsequent alder-
man successfully focused 
on finding support nationally—at least until 2010, when the political 
stream changed and a new minister took office. Interestingly, the op-
posing policy entrepreneurs in the Almere case tried the same. For ex-
ample, Verhorst tried to network at these different levels, even though 
BY FRAMING THE OTHER, A POLICY 
ENTREPRENEUR IMPLICITLY OR 
EXPLICITLY FRAMES THE SELF
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it was much more difficult for her acting from outside than for policy 
entrepreneurs acting from inside the political arena, such as the alder-
men of Almere.
The case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder also showed the prac-
tice and need for policy entrepreneurs to deal with the actors in their 
contexts. At first, most policy entrepreneurs advocating the wind park 
tried to find support from local actors in the municipality of Noor-
doostpolder. When there was 
sufficient support locally and 
the province became involved, 
they focused on finding support 
from the province. As soon as it 
became clear that the province 
was in favour of the plan for the 
wind park and the national gov-
ernment took over control, the 
focused shifted towards the national government. The opponents also 
tried to win political support to set the political agenda, but were too 
late and always lagged at least one step behind the proponents (I will 
return to this later).
As well as knowing who to deal with—in any given context—the 
position of policy entrepreneurs is important. I agree with Kingdon 
(1984) that policy entrepreneurs are not primarily characterised by 
the formal position they hold, yet having a formal position certainly 
brings many advantages—most notably, inside access to the political 
agenda, politicians, decision makers and resources, as demonstrated 
by the aldermen in the case of Almere. However, as the other cases 
reveal, formal positions are not automatically helpful or necessary. 
The policy entrepreneurs advocating nature development even had to 
work around their own department to set the political agenda. In ad-
dition, the initiators of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, as outsiders, 
had no formal position in government, and yet were still able to win 
the support of the government by cleverly framing and networking. 
Thus, positional power is not decisive, but knowing who to deal with 
and what positional power you have contributes to effective agenda 
setting. Equally important is the anticipation of constraining and ena-
bling contextual factors. I now discuss the various contextual factors 
that influenced the policy entrepreneurs’ strategies to effectively set 
the agenda.
The contextual factor that was relevant in the case on the Second 
Delta Committee from the beginning was the fact that the national 
government decided to establish the committee. Without the national 
government, there would not have been a committee trying to set the 
agenda. The absence of a recent crisis was another contextual factor. 
With major changes in water management often preceded by natural 
disasters, it was quite remarkable that the committee managed to set 
the agenda in the absence of such a recent crisis. While this would 
POLICY ENTREPRENEURS ARE 
NOT PRIMARILY CHARACTERISED 
BY THE FORMAL POSITION THEY 
HOLD, YET HAVING A FORMAL 
POSITION CERTAINLY BRINGS 
MANY ADVANTAGES
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normally be regarded a major constraint, the committee decided to 
take up the challenge and cleverly and persuasively framed the issue 
of climate change and water safety in its own terms by drafting a crisis 
narrative based on historical, recent and possible future examples of 
crises.
The case on nature development showed that the spontaneous 
developments in the Oostvaardersplassen provided the policy entre-
preneurs the opportunity to convince others that large-scale nature 
development was possible—even in the Netherlands. The competi-
tion issued by the EO Wijers foundation provided the proponents of 
nature development with another opportunity to raise awareness for 
their ideas and find support. The high waters of the main rivers in 1993 
and 1995 helped the policy entrepreneurs align nature development 
with river management and frame it as an alternative solution to wa-
ter safety. However, there were also constraining factors that limited 
the policy entrepreneurs’ effectiveness in setting the agenda. In the 
nature development case, there was path dependency and resistance 
to policy change within the policy entrepreneurs’ own governmental 
department, and, during the second half of the 2000s, the changing 
economic and political context. The 2010 newly established Cabinet 
also withdrew political support for further implementing the EHS, ro-
bust ecological corridors and projects such as the Oostvaarderswold.
In the case of Almere, the policy entrepreneurs also had to deal 
with a changing economic and political context and newly established 
Cabinet in 2010. This served as a constraint for the proponents of the 
outer-dike urbanisation and infrastructural connection between Am-
sterdam and Almere. However, the previous government had already 
initiated the 2010 to 2012 RRAAM process and involved all kinds of 
stakeholders to draft a shared perspective on the future of the region 
and the plans for Almere. 
The case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder revealed that the in-
ternationally, nationally, provincially and locally set goals on renew-
able energy provided the proponents of the wind park opportunities 
to align their plan with governmental policy, while opponents were 
limited in that respect. The Wind Park Noordoostpolder had already 
become an important asset for the various government levels to reach 
their targets on renewable energy, making it almost impossible for the 
opponents to change these targets and cancel the plans for the wind 
park.
In short, all these cases show the importance of contextual factors 
in terms of both constraining and enabling. In more than one of the 
above examples, the policy entrepreneurs succeeded in converting an 
apparently constraining contextual factor into an opportunity to set 
the agenda. This corroborates the presented description of a policy 
entrepreneur as an opportunity seeker who is willing to take risks, is 
eager to persevere and is capable of turning a situation to his or her 
own advantage. It is not easy for policy entrepreneurs to take a step 
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back or give up, even if a situation is not in their favour. However, all 
the studied cases also reveal that one contextual factor is most im-
portant: the role and perspective of various levels of government re-
garding the issue. This emphasises the importance of politics to policy 
entrepreneurs’ ability to effectively set the agenda (Beeson & Stone, 
2013). Retrospectively, I note that the government—notably, the na-
tional government—acted mainly in four contrasting roles: initiator, 
obstructer, facilitator and confiscator.
First, in the case of the Second Delta Committee, the national gov-
ernment acted as the initiator for policy change by instigating a com-
mittee and trying to set the agenda for water safety. In the case study 
on nature development, the national government initially acted as an 
obstructer of policy change—at first unwilling to accept the concept 
of nature development. However, due to the policy entrepreneurs dis-
cussed, this changed and the national government became an impor-
tant supporter, especially in the water sector—at least until 2010. In 
the case of the plans for Almere, the national government operated 
mainly as a facilitator by establishing the RRAAM project and enabling 
actors to participate in the policy process. With the Wind Park Noor-
doostpolder, the national government seized the project by changing 
policy and exerting its authority, while also collaborating with the ini-
tiators of the wind park.
In all cases, the final decision of the implementation of the plan lay 
with the national government, rather than the local or regional govern-
ments. Even when a participatory policy process was established—as 
with Almere—and even when local and provincial authorities decided 
to change their policy—as with the wind park—the national govern-
ment could still change its perspective and intervene. Therefore, policy 
entrepreneurs are often dependent on the role played by the national 
government. A major difficulty faced by policy entrepreneurs is that 
the dominant role played by the national government not only varies 
across cases, but also over time, which makes it extra challenging to 
anticipate any changing role of the national government (not limited to 
the aforementioned four roles) or a new Cabinet taking office. Moreo-
ver, as the cases reveal, different roles lead to different opportunities 
and constraints for policy entrepreneurs to set the agenda effectively.
The fact that policy entrepreneurs are often dependent on the role 
and perspective of the national government also emphasises the im-
portance of the political agenda over the public and policy agendas. 
Politicians and government representatives are the actors who can 
decide whether plans will be seriously considered or implemented, 
and are thus the most important people from whom to gain support. 
If policy entrepreneurs want to change policy that has regional or na-
tional implications, they should carefully consider the interests and 
perspectives of the national government. All efforts to set the agenda 
and change policy from the bottom-up can prove fruitless if the na-
tional government rejects the plan. For example, in the case of the 
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infrastructural connection, the national government has not yet made 
a decision—which, in Bachrach and Baratz’s (1963) terms is a ’non-de-
cision’—and thus success can be claimed by both the proponents and 
opponents of the change.
Conversely, in the case of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder, the na-
tional government decided that the wind park—even though it began 
as a local policy matter—was going to be implemented, leaving not 
much room for further discussing the need and urgency of building the 
wind park at any governmental level. This proved to be convenient for 
the proponents because they saw their plan adopted and supported 
by the national government. The opponents, who had targeted their 
strategies at local and provincial governmental levels first, then had to 
compete with the interests of the national government. Unfortunately 
for the opponents, there existed none of the needed good relation-
ships between them and the proponents, including the governmen-
tal actors. Consequently, no meaningful interaction occurred and no 
consensus was built, which resulted in an interactional deadlock and 
dialogue of the deaf (Van Eeten, 1999). The efforts of the opponents to 
pressure the decision makers by first setting the public agenda were 
shown to fail. This was not because they were unable to set the public 
agenda, which they fairly successfully did, but because this was not 
sufficient to gain the support of the governmental authorities—apart 
from the local support of the municipality of Urk.
These examples lead to the conclusion that the main aim of policy 
entrepreneurs should not be to begin by focusing on mobilising wide-
spread public support aimed at setting the public agenda, which sub-
sequently should contribute to setting the political agenda (Cobb et 
al., 1976). Instead, the central priority of policy entrepreneurs must be 
to employ strategies aimed at setting the political agenda and winning 
the support of the government at various levels. 
8.6 Combining and aligning framing and networking strategies
The present case studies have empirically confirmed the use and 
power of framing and networking strategies. Policy entrepreneurs re-
alise that they cannot rely on one strategy alone, but need to try to 
spread their risks and chances of success by employing a broad range 
of framing and networking strategies. On its own, exploiting the range 
of strategies available can lead to success; however, if policy entrepre-
neurs want to have a higher chance of being effective, they need to 
cleverly combine and align framing and networking strategies. I claim 
that the more effectively policy entrepreneurs combine and align vari-
ous strategies, the more successful they will be. In turn, policy entre-
preneurs who exploit multiple framing and networking strategies, but 
are unable to combine and align them, are likely to be less effective in 
setting the agenda. Below, I name various successful and unsuccessful 
case study examples.
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AN INTERACTIONAL DEADLOCK 
AND DIALOGUE OF THE DEAF 
A successful example in this study was the case of the Second Del-
ta Committee, in which framing and networking strategies were ef-
fectively used in an integrated and intertwined matter. Not only were 
framing strategies (such as narratives, symbols, rhetoric and so forth) 
cleverly combined and aligned, but strategies such as team building 
and involving a wider network of actors were also employed. There 
was continuous interaction between the committee and actors rel-
evant to the issue at stake in order to know how to align their fram-
ing to issues important to politicians, community groups, experts and 
policymakers from multiple government levels. This enabled the com-
mittee to be adaptive and gradually create a vision with recommenda-
tions many could support. Hence, as has been argued, there was a 
great deal of consensus on the need to institutionally adapt to climate 
change in water management, with limited opposition.
Another successful example was the case of nature development, 
in which a group of civil servants faced inertia in their considered 
conservative department. Initially, there was no support for adopt-
ing the policy entrepreneurs’ radical view on nature. Thus, rather than 
following command and accepting decisions from their bosses, they 
sought new opportunities. These entrepreneurs could have stuck to 
their perspective on nature development and networked to find sup-
porters and build a coalition of likeminded civil servants within their 
department—after all, they believed that nature development is a 
goal in itself and should become central to environment and nature 
policy making. However, instead of focusing solely on nature develop-
ment, the policy entrepreneurs altered and aligned their framing of 
nature development with discussions in water management on water 
safety. An expert in water management subsequently joined the group 
of policy entrepreneurs and helped draft the award-winning plan to 
redesign the rivers.
Alongside building an interdisciplinary team, the policy entrepre-
neurs were keen to frame nature development as also beneficial for 
the clay industry and tourist organisations. The policy entrepreneurs 
successfully networked to gain 
support from the then Minister of 
Transport, Public Works and Wa-
ter Management. She took over 
the framing of nature development 
as a promising alternative approach to water safety for managing the 
Dutch major rivers. Thanks to the policy entrepreneurs’ efforts to share 
the concept of nature development—such as via public speeches and 
pilot and demonstration projects—the support of the public was also 
attained. Thus, the policy entrepreneurs’ strategies were carefully 
considered and effectively combined. The policy entrepreneurs antici-
pated their circumstances and were willing to adjust their framing and 
networking strategies accordingly.
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However, as the case on nature development also revealed, the 
policy entrepreneurs were not successful on all occasions, as they 
failed to effectively set the agenda from the second half of the 2000s 
onwards. The implementation of the EHS, the Oostvaarderswold 
and nature development in general was questioned due to the politi-
cal stream changing. In addition to this changing context, the policy 
entrepreneurs also have themselves to blame because they failed to 
undertake for the dry areas what they did so effectively for the river-
ine areas: adjust framing and networking to find sufficient actors who 
were willing and able to commit to implementing nature development. 
The most recent effort to reframe nature development in terms of ad-
aptation to climate change is probably too late to make nature devel-
opment a political and policy priority for the years to come.
Another unsuccessful example of effectively combining and align-
ing the full range of framing and networking strategies is the case of 
the Wind Park Noordoostpolder. The policy entrepreneurs opposing 
the Wind Park Noordoostpolder did set the public agenda, but failed 
to set the policy and political agendas. Part of the ineffective employ-
ment of various strategies was caused by their amateurism and un-
clear focus. While the proponents professionalised their actions and 
acquired the necessary resources and support, the opponents failed 
to do so. Their involvement in agenda setting came too late and they 
subsequently always lagged behind the decision making. Additionally, 
their framing and networking strategies were too dispersed and not 
thoroughly constructed and aligned. They aligned their framing inef-
fectively and failed to attain substantive political support. They con-
tinuously broadened their problem frame and tried to link all issues 
that somehow related to the wind park, such as the effects on public 
health, water safety, the environment, ecology, the landscape, alterna-
tives for wind energy and so forth. Moreover, with their only options 
involving no wind park at all or severely limited solutions, they did not 
find support among the decision makers. As a result, their frames were 
perceived as moving beyond credibility. Further, when one of the op-
ponents, the mayor of Urk, was given the opportunity to negotiate the 
Wind Park Noordoostpolder, he did not want to budge an inch, even 
though he was in a losing position—which he believed not to be the 
case.
Again, the broad problem and narrow solution framing did help 
raise public awareness and set the public agenda, but decision makers, 
politicians and the administrative Council of State were not impressed 
by this framing. As a result, the choice of the opponents to take full 
risks and allow no room for negotiation left them empty handed. Con-
versely, the proponents of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder were suc-
cessful in establishing a professional organisation with a clear focus 
on complying with formal procedures, meeting all regulations, closing 
a solid business case and sharing information on the plan for the wind 
park with whomever it concerned. Moreover, they succeeded in realis-
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SIMPLY EMPLOYING THE FULL RANGE OF STRATEGIES CAN 
PROVE TO BE INEFFECTIVE AND UNREWARDING. THUS, 
STRATEGIES MUST BE CLEVERLY COMBINED AND ALIGNED 
IN ORDER TO EFFECTIVELY SET THE AGENDA
ing a good working relationship with governmental actors who had the 
power to make a difference, and pushed through the implementation 
of the Wind Park Noordoostpolder.
The above examples reveal that policy entrepreneurs, as befitting 
opportunity seekers, must continuously try and find (new) ways to set 
the agenda, but not without thoroughly planning their framing and 
networking strategies. Simply employing the full range of strategies 
can prove to be ineffective and unrewarding. Thus, strategies must be 
cleverly combined and aligned in order to effectively set the agenda.
8.7 Final remarks
This research has provided a qualitative case study approach on policy 
entrepreneurship. I have undertaken four in-depth case studies by per-
sonally conducting 46 interviews, analysing over 1,427 newspaper ar-
ticles, and studying numerous documents. I believe this has provided 
me with substantial data to study policy entrepreneurship, framing 
and networking strategies, agenda setting and the constraining and 
enabling effects of contexts. However, there are limitations to this 
study and its findings, as well as possibilities for future research.
First, it is important to consider the extent to which the research 
findings are applicable to a larger class of units than the Dutch context 
of the presented case studies. As has been argued, this was never the 
main objective of this research, yet it is still debatable whether the 
same conclusions would be reached elsewhere. I am convinced that 
policy entrepreneurs in other case studies and contexts revealed in 
previous research (Brouwer, 2013; Hammond, 2013; Huitema & Mei-
jerink, 2009b; Kingdon, 1984; Zhu, 2013) would generally employ the 
same types of strategies to set the agenda. There would certainly be 
interesting differences in how strategies are employed and what pri-
orities policy entrepreneurs would have, but framing and network-
ing strategies must still be employed. As well as focusing only on the 
Dutch context, this study is limited because it did not problematise or 
operationalise the various local policy contexts. As this research has 
hinted, different contexts may provide policy entrepreneurs with dif-
ferent opportunity structures to set the agenda effectively. For these 
reasons, I suggest that other researchers could focus on these issues 
and seek to thoroughly compare policy entrepreneurship in various 
policy domains, countries and so forth.
Second, future studies could focus on policy entrepreneurship dur-
ing various phases in the policy process. In some cases in this research, 
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it proved difficult to clearly demarcate the agenda-setting phase from 
other phases in the policy process; thus, other studies may reveal that 
there are different types of policy entrepreneurs and strategies re-
quired during these different phases, especially when policy entrepre-
neurs with various capabilities are collaborating and allocating tasks. 
The nature development case hints in that direction, as I observed ac-
tors working as pioneers, early adopters, multipliers, translators and 
popularisers, yet there were also actors involved in making business 
plans, calculating profits for nature and for adjacent sectors, and trying 
to convince others by adopting their languages. Future study on policy 
entrepreneurship could focus on the phases of the policy process in 
relation to different types of policy entrepreneurship and strategies. 
Importantly, as argued in the theoretical chapter referring to Kingdon 
(1984), one must be careful not to differentiate policy entrepreneurs 
based on formal positions held, as this is incompatible with the basic 
understanding of what defines a policy entrepreneur—behaviour, not 
position.
Third, another interesting issue is the apparent importance of the 
policy entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics. Although scholars of-
ten do present some of the personal characteristics of policy entrepre-
neurs, as the theoretical framework revealed, they are never thorough-
ly analysed. Based on observations and presumptions, it is generally 
believed that policy entrepreneurs need to exhibit certain motivations 
and skills to pursue policy change or prevent change from occurring. 
This study does not answer how to systematically study personal char-
acteristics, and how these affect policy entrepreneurs’ strategies. My 
consideration in this regard was to examine what policy entrepreneurs 
actually do, rather than who they are or what drives them. However, 
the latter may be an interesting topic for future study because vari-
ous policy entrepreneurs in these case studies demonstrated strong 
personalities and capabilities that were not necessarily helpful for re-
alising effective agenda setting. Moreover, as I have argued, personal 
characteristics are often also subject to the framing of the self and the 
other.
Last, I would of course challenge other researchers to empirically 
study the hypotheses posed in this thesis: Are crises not a prerequisite 
for radically changing policy? Do policy entrepreneurs make extensive 
use of visualisations of a brighter or more frightening future as a way 
to frame issues? Are there differences between the proponents and 
opponents of policy change in this respect? Do other policy entrepre-
neurs also frame themselves and other people involved in agenda set-
ting in terms of motivation, behaviour and position? Would any policy 
entrepreneur be able to successfully play the empathy or power card, 
or are there limitations when taking into account the formal position 
of the policy entrepreneur in the policy process? Are the function of 
context and the role of the national government as significant in other 
cases as they were in these? Should setting the political agenda re-
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ally be considered the number one priority of a policy entrepreneur, 
rather than first focusing on the public agenda? Does combining and 
aligning framing and networking strategies prove to be important for 
policy entrepreneurs operating elsewhere? To what extent does for-
mal positional power influence the effectiveness of employing framing 
and networking strategies? Are there different types of policy entre-
preneurships and strategies required during different phases of the 
policy process, and does this influence the effectiveness of various 
strategies? What is the importance of policy entrepreneurs’ personal 
characteristics and how do these affect the employment of strategies?
I trust that the present study encourages other researchers to con-
tinue studying policy entrepreneurship and the role of individuals in 
agenda setting and policy change. I believe that this study has provid-
ed various insights for conducting future studies. At least, as promised 
in the first chapter, the added value of this research has been to not 
only study the usual suspects of policy en-
trepreneurship at national governmental lev-
els, but also to discuss the policy entrepre-
neurs operating at local and regional levels 
and contexts. Moreover, this study has given 
in-depth insights to the strategies employed 
by both the proponents and opponents of 
policy change. In addition, it has contributed 
to a better understanding of networking and, 
particularly, framing strategies, which, until now, had not been thor-
oughly analysed in empirical policy entrepreneurship studies.
The present study has examined a variety of policy entrepreneurs—
both men and women, amateurs and professionals, insiders and out-
siders, winners and losers and ‘people in between’—all with the desire 
and potential to leave their mark on agenda setting in the IJsselmeer 
context. The brighter future this study provides is that, given any situ-
ation, individuals do have the power to make a difference. As was the 
case with the prime example of policy entrepreneurship, Cornelis Lely, 
the effects of people’s efforts to set the agenda may yet require dec-
ades to become visible or even be appraised.
THE BRIGHTER FUTURE 
THIS STUDY PROVIDES 
IS THAT, GIVEN ANY 
SITUATION, INDIVIDUALS 
DO HAVE THE POWER TO 
MAKE A DIFFERENCE
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Inleiding
Het doel van dit onderzoek is het verkrijgen van inzicht in de wijze 
waarop individuen op strategische wijze proberen om hun visies en 
plannen ten aanzien van het IJsselmeergebied op de agenda te krij-
gen. Deze individuen worden beschouwd als zogenaamde policy en-
trepreneurs (‘beleidsondernemers’). Een beleidsondernemer is iemand 
die een bepaald idee of plan propageert en deze op strategische wijze 
onder de aandacht probeert te brengen van de media, maatschap-
pij, politici en beleidsmakers. Op die manier probeert de beleidson-
dernemer de agenda te bepalen en acceptatie en implementatie van 
diens plannen te verzekeren of deze van anderen tegen te houden. Hij 
kan expert, ambtenaar, politicus, bestuurder, lobbyist, actievoerder 
of wat dan ook zijn1. Het meest kenmerkende aan de beleidsonderne-
mer is evenwel niet diens positie in het beleidsvormingsproces, maar 
diens onverstoorbare ijver om allerlei middelen, zoals tijd, energie, 
reputatie en soms ook geld, in te zetten voor het realiseren of tegen-
houden van beleidsverandering. Meestal is zo’n persoon vastberaden, 
doortastend, en bereid tot het nemen van risico’s; soms tegen beter 
weten in maar wel altijd doelbewust.
Strategieën
De beleidswetenschappelijke literatuur laat zien dat een beleidson-
dernemer verschillende middelen en strategieën tot zijn beschikking 
heeft om zijn doel te bereiken. In dit onderzoek worden twee typen 
strategieën onderscheiden: framing- en netwerkstrategieën. 
Framing-strategieën worden ingezet om ideeën en plannen zo te 
presenteren dat deze worden overgenomen door anderen. Op die 
manier streeft de beleidsondernemer er naar om percepties te beïn-
vloeden en aandacht en draagvlak te genereren voor zijn frame. Een 
frame is een ordening van gefragmenteerde informatie in een ge-
structureerd raamwerk of kader dat duiding geeft aan een fenomeen 
of een gebeurtenis–in dit geval aan een nog te realiseren (of tegen 
te houden) plan. In de beleidswetenschappelijke literatuur wordt wel 
een onderscheid gemaakt tussen het framen van problemen, oplos-
singen en middelen die nodig zouden zijn om die oplossingen te be-
werkstelligen. In dit onderzoek is een zestal framing-strategieën on-
derscheiden. 
Ten eerste kan een beleidsondernemer verhalen benutten waar-
binnen zijn ideeën, visies en plannen een plek krijgen. Ten tweede 
wordt retoriek benut om door geschreven of gesproken woord argu-
menten te construeren en mensen te overtuigen. Ten derde worden 
symbolen gebruikt om–soms complexe–ideeën in een eenvoudig te 
begrijpen en herkennen symbool te vangen. Ten vierde maakt een be-
leidsondernemer gebruik van crisis exploitatie om zijn visie of plan 
op de agenda te zetten wanneer een crisis plaatsvindt. Een crisis kan 
een momentum creëren voor de beleidsondernemer waarop hij zijn 
idee kan agenderen, bijvoorbeeld als oplossing van de crisis of als 
1  Ik gebruik voor 
het gemak 
alleen de 
mannelijke 
vorm, maar 
uiteraard 
kunnen ook 
vrouwen 
beleids onder-
nemers zijn.
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preventieve maatregel voor de toekomst. Om die reden is een be-
leidsondernemer, ten vijfde, vaak betrokken in een framing contest 
waarbij verscheidene beleidsondernemers, en mogelijk andere acto-
ren, strijden om de betekenis die wordt gegeven aan een crisis: wat 
zijn de oorzaken, wat zijn de oplossingen? Op die manier proberen ze 
de maatschappelijke, beleidsmatige en politieke discussie te domi-
neren. Tot slot trachten beleidsondernemers door middel van frame 
alignment hun frame te laten aansluiten op of afwijken van de frames 
van anderen.
Alleen framing is evenwel niet voldoende om een bepaald issue 
op de agenda te krijgen, omdat het ook nodig is om medestanders te 
krijgen en draagvlak te generen. Beleidsondernemers die alleen wer-
ken zijn beperkt in hun mogelijkheden en middelen–zoals tijd, ener-
gie, reputatie en geld–om plannen op de agenda te krijgen en zullen 
daarom door te netwerken de medewerking zoeken van anderen. In 
dit onderzoek is een drietal netwerkstrategieën onderscheiden.
Ten eerste is een beleidsondernemer druk met het managen van 
verscheidene netwerken om te kunnen anticiperen op belangen van 
anderen en te bouwen aan relaties. Ten tweede zoekt een beleids-
ondernemer naar mogelijkheden binnen die netwerken om coalities 
te smeden met actoren die van elkaar afhankelijk zijn of een gedeeld 
belang of frame hebben en elkaar zouden kunnen ondersteunen in 
het realiseren van gemeenschappelijke of complementaire doelstel-
lingen. Ten derde benutten beleidsondernemers verschillende evene-
menten of fora om ideeën onder de aandacht te brengen van andere, 
voor hen en hun plan, relevante actoren. Zo kan een beleidsonderne-
mer bijvoorbeeld een pilot project initiëren, debatavond organiseren, 
publiekscampagne optuigen, gemeenteraadsvergadering bezoeken 
of netwerk borrel langsgaan. 
Onderzoeksaanpak
Om te kunnen onderzoeken hoe beleidsondernemers opereren in de 
context van het IJsselmeergebied is kwalitatief empirisch onderzoek 
gedaan. Dataverzamelingsmethoden betroffen het afnemen van 46 
semigestructureerd diepte-interviews, bestuderen van in totaal meer 
dan 1427 krantenartikelen, en analyseren van relevante beleidsstuk-
ken, nota’s, kamerverhandelingen, brieven et cetera. Aan de hand 
van het theoretisch kader en met behulp van de hiervoor genoem-
de dataverzamelingsmethoden is een viertal casussen geselecteerd 
die gerelateerd zijn aan het IJsselmeergebied en waarbij sprake was 
van beleidsondernemers die proberen of probeerden het beleidsvor-
mingsproces te beïnvloeden–en dan met name de agenderingsfase. 
De gekozen casussen zijn allemaal ruimtelijk relevant en hebben be-
trekking op recente discussies over water, natuur, stedelijke ontwik-
keling en windenergie in het IJsselmeergebied.
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Casussen
De eerste casus2 betreft de Tweede Deltacommissie, een ad hoc ad-
viescommissie die door het Nederlandse kabinet werd geïnstalleerd 
in 2007. Deze commissie, in dit onderzoek beschouwd als een indi-
viduele beleidsondernemer, benutte verscheidene strategieën om 
klimaatadaptatie in het Nederlandse waterbeheer op de agenda te 
krijgen. Een belangrijk resultaat van haar invloed betreft de instelling 
en uitvoering van het nationale Deltaprogramma, waarbij het IJssel-
meer wordt beschouwd als het belangrijkste zoetwaterreservoir voor 
Nederland, zowel nu als in de toekomst. 
De tweede casus focust op een kleine groep beleidsondernemers 
die er in de jaren tachtig en negentig in slaagde om natuurontwik-
keling op de agenda te zetten. Tot dan toe was natuurbehoud het 
leidende principe in het Nederlandse natuurbeleid. Ontwikkelingen 
in de Oostvaardersplassen speelden een belangrijke rol in het op de 
agenda zetten van natuurontwikkeling omdat deze volgens de be-
leidsondernemers lieten zien dat het mogelijk was om natuur te ont-
wikkelen zonder of met minimale interventies van de mens. Hoewel 
deze casus toont dat deze beleidsondernemers succesvol zijn ge-
weest in het koppelen van natuurontwikkeling aan het waterbeleid 
van de grote rivieren, laat hun succes in de rest van Nederland een 
gemengd beeld zien. Bijvoorbeeld wanneer gekeken wordt naar de 
implementatie van de Ecologische Hoofdstructuur (EHS) en groot-
schalige ecologische verbindingszones als het Oostvaarderswold, 
dat gepland stond tussen de Oostvaardersplassen en het Horster-
wold.
De derde casus gaat over de wensen en plannen van de gemeente 
Almere om buitendijks te bouwen en een infrastructurele verbin-
ding–brug of tunnel–te bouwen tussen Almere en Amsterdam. Er 
zijn vier beleidsondernemers die dergelijke plannen verdedigen of 
een alternatieve route bepleiten voor de infrastructurele verbinding 
door het Markermeer-IJmeer. Twee beleidsondernemers zijn nadruk-
kelijk tegen deze plannen en verdedigen het open houden van het 
Markermeer-IJmeer. Anno 2014 is nog geen definitieve keuze ge-
maakt voor of tegen buitendijkse ontwikkeling of een infrastructu-
rele verbinding, zodat nog geen duidelijke winnaars of verliezers zijn 
aan te wijzen. 
De vierde en laatste casus betreft het plan om een grootschalig 
windpark te bouwen langs de dijk van de Noordoostpolder. Een klei-
ne groep boeren is sinds de jaren negentig bezig om deze plannen op 
de agenda te krijgen. Deze voorstanders van het park ondervonden 
echter weerstand van inwoners van de gemeente Noordoostpolder 
en de naburige gemeente Urk toen de media in 2008 de plannen op-
pikten. Ook in deze casus worden de strategieën van voor- en te-
genstanders geanalyseerd. Begin 2012 begon de constructie van het 
windpark waardoor de voorstanders als meest succesvolle beleids-
ondernemers kunnen worden beschouwd.
2 Zie pagina 52, 
figuur 3.1, voor 
een overzichts-
kaart van de 
vier casussen. 
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Conclusies
Uit de analyse van de vier empirische casussen is een vijftal conclu-
sies te trekken. 
1 FRAMING EN NETWERKEN INDERDAAD VAN GROOT STRATEGISCH BELANG
Ten eerste laat dit onderzoek zien dat beleidsondernemers inderdaad 
de eerder genoemde framing- en netwerkstrategieën benutten om in-
vloed uit te oefenen op de agendering van hun plannen of het tegen-
houden van de agendering van de plannen van anderen. Het onder-
scheiden van framing en netwerken is nuttig gebleken, ook al werd 
zowel tijdens de theoretische discussie als de empirische analyse 
duidelijk dat er veel overlap bestaat tussen deze twee typen strate-
gieën. Ik zal bij elk van de genoemde framing en netwerkstrategieën 
voorbeelden noemen uit de casussen. 
Framing-strategieën
De Tweede Deltacommissie maakte gebruik van verhalen om haar 
frame kracht bij te zetten. De commissie creëerde het verhaal dat Ne-
derland, met een rijke historie in waterbeheer, in staat is om zich goed 
voor te bereiden op klimaatverandering. Echter, de commissie maakte 
ook gebruik van het verhaal dat crisissen in het Nederlandse water-
beheer, zoals de overstroming in 1953 en de bijna overstromingen van 
de rivieren in 1993 en 1995, ons ieder moment weer zouden kunnen 
overvallen. De commissie formuleerde daarom een reeks aanbevelin-
gen om Nederland adequaat voor te bereiden op een toekomst met 
klimaatverandering. 
De beleidsondernemers uit de casus over natuurontwikkeling 
maakten gebruik van retoriek om hun frame kracht bij te zetten dat 
natuurbehoud als beleidsprioriteit plaats moest maken voor natuur-
ontwikkeling. In hun retoriek maakten zij gebruik van het onderscheid 
tussen ‘echte natuur’, waarbij geen verstoring is van de mens, en het 
cynisch bedoelde ‘boerennatuur’, waarbij boeren overheidssubsidies 
ontvangen om natuur te beheren. 
De voorstanders van buitendijkse bebouwing en de brug tussen 
Amsterdam en Almere gebruikten symbolen voor hun frame. Buiten-
dijkse bebouwing zou figuurlijk en letterlijk moeten dienen als een 
stepping stone om Almere dichter bij Amsterdam te brengen en vice 
versa. De brug zou symbool moeten staan voor de verbinding en sa-
menwerking van Almere met de Amsterdam metropolis. Daarnaast 
zou een Golden-Gate-achtige brug Almere de allure moeten geven 
van een stad van betekenis die onderdeel is van de Amsterdam me-
tropolis. Zonder een dergelijke verbinding zou Almere ‘gehandicapt’ 
blijven en zich niet verder kunnen ontwikkelen tot een veelzijdige en 
sociaaleconomisch aantrekkelijke stad. Het feit dat symbolen ver-
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schillende interpretaties kunnen dragen blijkt wel uit het feit dat te-
genstanders van de plannen van Almere in deze symbolen tekenen 
van grootheidswaanzin en megalomanie zagen die, eenmaal werke-
lijkheid geworden, meer kwaad dan goed zouden aanrichten. 
Het exploiteren van crisissen vond het meest nadrukkelijk plaats 
in de casus over de Tweede Deltacommissie die succesvol een eigen 
crisisverhaal creëerde. Dit is bijzonder knap aangezien zich op Ne-
derlandse bodem kort voor de instelling van de commissie geen over-
stromingen of andere rampen hadden voorgedaan, terwijl veel weten-
schappelijke literatuur veronderstelt dat een crisis een voorwaarde is 
voor radicale beleidsverandering. Op basis van dit onderzoek kan wor-
den geconcludeerd dat een crisis geen absolute voorwaarde is voor 
een beleidsondernemer om (radicale) beleidsverandering te realiseren.
Met name in de laatste twee casussen was sprake van framing 
contests. Hoewel de literatuur veronderstelt dat dit meestal plaats-
vindt als reactie op een crisis, hebben deze casussen laten zien dat dit 
geen vereiste is voor een framing contest. Zo zijn de contrasterende 
interpretaties van de symbolische betekenis van de plannen van Al-
mere te interpreteren als een framing contest en zijn ook de voor- en 
tegenstanders van het windpark Noordoostpolder verwikkeld geraakt 
in een framing contest–waarover later meer. 
Frame alignment vond plaats in iedere casus. De Tweede Delta-
commissie koppelde waterveiligheid aan klimaatverandering. De 
voorstanders van natuurontwikkeling koppelden natuurontwikke-
ling aan de veiligheid van de grote rivieren. Twee voorstanders van 
de plannen van Almere koppelden deze plannen aan de wens van 
de overheid om in de Randstadregio de toenemende vraag naar wo-
ningen op te vangen. Nadat drie marktpartijen met dure voorstellen 
waren gekomen voor de infrastructurele verbinding van Almere naar 
Amsterdam zagen twee beleidsondernemers hun kans schoon om 
hun plannen te presenteren binnen het beleidsproces omtrent het 
Rijk- en regioprogramma Amsterdam Almere Markermeer (RRAAM). 
Volgens hen waren hun plannen aanzienlijk goedkoper en kwalitatief 
beter. Tegenstanders van de plannen voor Almere hebben de discus-
sie over de toekomst van de metropoolregio benut als kans om de 
waarde van een open Markermeer-IJmeer op de agenda te zetten. 
De boeren die het initiatief hadden genomen voor het windpark in de 
Noordoostpolder hebben hun plannen gekoppeld aan de wens van de 
overheid om de capaciteit van windenergie in Nederland te verhogen. 
De tegenstanders koppelden hun framing aan de veronderstelde ne-
gatieve invloed van het windpark op hun omgeving en gezondheid. 
Kortom, frame alignment is een belangrijke strategie gebleken voor 
beleidsondernemers.
Netwerkstrategieën 
De case studies laten zien dat beleidsentrepreneurs veelvuldig ge-
bruik maken van netwerkstrategieën. 
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Met betrekking tot het managen van netwerken liet de beleids-
ondernemer van de Kwade Zwaan, tegenstander van de plannen van 
Almere om buitendijks te bouwen en een infrastructurele verbinding 
te creëren tussen Amsterdam en Almere, stevig van zich horen in 
verscheidene netwerken. Het managen van netwerken op verschil-
lende niveaus–lokaal, regionaal en nationaal–was een van haar be-
langrijkste strategieën om medestanders te vinden onder burgers, 
beleidsmakers en politici voor haar plan om het Markermeer-IJmeer 
open te houden en de plannen van Almere tegen te houden. 
In iedere casus was sprake van het bouwen van coalities. Echter, 
beleidsondernemers bleken in alle gevallen voornamelijk geïnteres-
seerd in het aangaan van wat kan worden beschouwd als strategische 
allianties of ‘gelegenheidscoalities’ met een relatief tijdelijk karakter. 
De beleidsondernemers van het eerste uur in de natuurontwikke-
lingscasus schroomden bijvoorbeeld niet om daarbij over disciplinai-
re grenzen heen te kijken en samen te werken met landschapsarchi-
tecten en wateringenieurs. In breder verband ging de groep zelfs een 
samenwerking aan met natuurbehoudsorganisaties, de ANWB en de 
klei-industrie. Met name de samenwerking met de klei-industrie was 
opmerkelijk omdat die tot dan toe juist werd gezien als partij met 
weinig oog voor de natuur. Toch waren de beleidsondernemers in 
staat om de belangen van deze actoren op elkaar te laten aansluiten 
en synergie te vinden in complementaire doelen. 
Het benutten van verscheidene fora en evenementen is even-
eens belangrijk gebleken voor beleidsondernemers om aandacht 
en draagvlak te creëren. Zo hadden de voorstanders van natuuront-
wikkeling meerdere demonstratie- en pilotprojecten opgezet om 
burgers, beleidsmakers en politici er van te overtuigen dat het in 
Nederland mogelijk is om natuurontwikkeling te realiseren. De Oost-
vaardersplassen waren daarbij steeds het belangrijkste voorbeeld. In 
de casus over de stedelijke ontwikkeling van Almere zette voormalig 
wethouder Bijl van Almere, een van de besproken beleidsonderne-
mers, een atelier op aan Amsterdamse zijde van het IJmeer (Atelier 
IJmeer 2030+) waar verscheidene actoren werden uitgenodigd om 
de plannen voor Almere te zien ontwikkelen op de tekentafel en in 
de vorm van een grote maquette. Ook de tegenstanders van deze 
plannen hebben evenementen georganiseerd om het Markermeer-
IJmeer open te houden, zoals het organiseren van openbare debat-
ten en het varen van een rondje om het eiland Pampus (Rondje Pam-
pus) met hun medestanders.
Hoewel de casussen het gebruik van zowel framing- als netwerkstra-
tegieën bevestigen is door middel van theoretisch, en vooral ook em-
pirisch, onderzoek verdere uitwerking en doordenking van deze stra-
tegieën gewenst. Dit geldt met name voor de framing-strategieën 
omdat deze in de literatuur over beleidsondernemers onderbelicht 
blijven. 
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2 FRAMEN DOOR HET VISUALISEREN VAN EEN ZONNIGE OF MEER ONWENSELIJKE TOEKOMST
Beleidsondernemers framen problemen, oplossingen en middelen om 
die oplossingen te realiseren, niet alleen in geschreven en gesproken 
woord, maar ook door het benutten van visualisaties. In elk van de be-
sproken casussen speelden visualisaties een belangrijke rol. De visuele 
middelen die een beleidsondernemer kan benutten zijn vermoedelijk 
net zo rijk als de creativiteit van de beleidsondernemer. In de casussen 
kwamen grofweg twee manieren naar voren waarop het frame werd 
gevisualiseerd: het visualiseren van een zonnige toekomst of daaren-
tegen het visualiseren van een onwenselijke of zelfs beangstigende 
toekomst. 
Opvallend genoeg lijken voorstanders van beleidsverandering 
voornamelijk gebruik te maken van het visualiseren van een zonnige 
toekomst waarin hun oplossingen voor het voorliggende probleem een 
belangrijke rol spelen. Zo maakten de voorstanders van de plannen 
voor Almere aantrekkelijke animaties en grafische visualisaties van de 
boodschap dat deze plannen een positieve invloed zouden hebben op 
de uitstraling van de regio en Almere. Ook de voorstanders van het 
windpark Noordoostpolder maakten visualisaties om de boodschap 
over te brengen dat de windmolens prachtig zouden passen in het 
strakke landschap van de Noordoostpolder en nauwelijks inbreuk zou-
den plegen op het open karakter van het landschap. 
Het is geen verrassing dat tegenstanders dezelfde plannen framen 
als onderdeel van een onwenselijke en beangstigende toekomst. Zo 
maakten de tegenstanders van de plannen van Almere gebruik van af-
beeldingen, posters, en banners om duidelijk te maken dat deze plan-
nen het open landschap zouden vernietigen. Tegenstanders van het 
windpark maakten maquettes, afbeeldingen en video’s om de bood-
schap te communiceren dat de gemeente Noordoostpolder en Urk 
zouden worden omheind met een ‘ijzeren gordijn’ van windmolens dat 
het cultureel erfgoed van Urk zou schaden. 
Hoewel het voorgaande suggereert dat een beleidsondernemer of 
een zonnige of een beangstigende toekomst presenteert, bleek dat 
niet het geval bij de Tweede Deltacommissie. De commissie maakte 
namelijk gebruik van beide. In de video die werd gepresenteerd bij 
het rapport van de commissie werden originele beelden gebruikt van 
de watersnoodramp uit 1953 en de bijna-overstromingen van 1993 en 
1995 om de kijkers een beangstigende toekomst voor te schotelen. 
Echter, nadat de kijker werd wakker geschud met deze beelden werd 
in de video overgestapt op de positieve boodschap dat Nederland een 
zonnige toekomst tegemoet kan zien indien het anticipeert op klimaat-
verandering in het waterbeheer. Dit laatste vanzelfsprekend met in-
achtneming van de aanbevelingen van de commissie. In het geval van 
de Tweede Deltacommissie is, mede door de professionele uitvoering, 
deze framing-strategie bijzonder succesvol geweest.
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3 FRAMEN VAN DE EIGEN PERSOON EN DE ANDER
Het voorliggende onderzoek laat zien dat niet alleen ideeën, visies en 
plannen het object zijn van framing maar ook de actoren die betrok-
ken zijn bij de beleidsvorming. In de casussen kwam naar voren dat 
beleidsondernemers (al of niet handig) gebruik maken van het framen 
van zichzelf en de ander om sympathie voor hun standpunt op te wek-
ken. Beleidsondernemer bleken dat te doen in termen van motivatie, 
gedrag en positie. 
Beleidsondernemers hebben de neiging zichzelf te presenteren als 
integer, oprecht en eerlijk, en hun motivaties worden gegrond in het 
verlangen om het belang van de lokale gemeenschap te verdedigen en 
representeren. Zo presenteerde Duivesteijn zich als iemand die niet 
zijn eigen belang maar het belang van de inwoners van Almere verde-
digt. Volgens hem hebben de inwoners van Almere te lijden onder de 
sociaaleconomische problemen van hun new town en moet daar wat 
aan gedaan worden. Aan de overkant van het Markermeer-IJmeer ver-
dedigde Verhorst een open landschap. Volgens haar zullen de mensen 
uit Uitdam en omstreken lijden onder de expansiedrang van Almere. 
Deze beleidsondernemer presenteerde zichzelf daarbij als liefhebber 
en beschermer van het Markermeer-IJmeer, zodat dit gebied open en 
onaangetast blijft voor huidige en toekomstige generaties. Naast het 
framen van de eigen motivatie, trokken beleidsondernemers de moti-
vaties van anderen in twijfel. Zo nam Duivestijn het de tegenstanders, 
waaronder Verhorst, kwalijk dat zij alleen maar aan hun eigen belang 
dachten en geen rekening hielden met de inwoners van Almere die 
dagelijks lange tijd in de file moeten staan. Ook in de windpark Noord-
oostpolder casus namen de tegenstanders het de voorstanders kwalijk 
dat zij alleen maar handelden vanuit hun eigenbelang. Hen werd ver-
weten dat zij, gedreven door onder andere hebzucht, zichzelf verrijk-
ten ten koste van de lokale bevolking. Echter, de voorstanders waren 
zich van geen kwaad bewust en benadrukten dat zij de samenleving 
juist een dienst bewijzen door de Nederlandse overheden te helpen 
met het bereiken van de doelstellingen voor duurzame energieopwek-
king. 
Behalve van het framen van motivaties maakten beleidsonderne-
mers ook gebruik van het framen van gedrag. Verhorst, in de casus 
over Almere, presenteerde zichzelf als iemand die alles in het werk 
stelt om haar idealen te verwezenlijken. Zij benutte haar persoonlijk-
heid en sociale vaardigheden om contacten te leggen en te netwerken 
met mensen die een verschil konden maken. Dit kwam haar echter ook 
op kritiek te staan omdat mensen haar verweten dat zij door haar ge-
drag meer zichzelf dan haar belangen in de schijnwerpers zette. Ook 
Verhorst’s meest directe opponent, Duivesteijn, werd geprezen om 
zijn vaardigheden en aanpak, maar tegelijkertijd bekritiseerd om zijn 
temperamentvolle gedrag en verbaal felle aanpak. In de casus over 
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het windpark Noordoostpolder werd eveneens veelvuldig gebruik ge-
maakt van het framen van gedrag. Zo werden tussen de voor- en te-
genstanders over en weer beschuldigingen geuit. Voorstanders werd 
leugens, omkoperij en intimidatie verweten. Andersom werd tegen-
standers verweten over lijken te gaan, modder te gooien, en alles te 
benutten dat ook maar enigszins het windpark en de betrokken perso-
nen in diskrediet zou kunnen brengen. 
Behalve het framen van motivaties en gedrag, framen beleidson-
dernemers ook posities. Beleidsondernemer presenteerden zichzelf 
als de underdog en de ander als de dominante speler. In de casus 
over het windpark Noordoostpolder namen de tegenstanders van het 
windpark een slachtofferrol aan en schreven ze de voorstanders en 
overheidspartijen een dominante positie toe. Een van de tegenstan-
ders kwam met het beeld van de stripfiguren Asterix en Obelix die met 
beperkte middelen rebelleerden tegen het machtige Romeinse rijk. Op 
vergelijkbare wijze zouden lokale burgers machteloos staan tegenover 
de zogezegd ondemocratische en dictatoriale overheidspartijen met 
wie de voorstanders in zee waren gegaan. De voorstanders konden 
zich niet in dit beeld vinden en beargumenteerden dat ze altijd binnen 
de kaders van de wet hadden gehandeld en geen misbruik hadden ge-
maakt van hun posities. 
4 CONTEXTFACTOREN DIE HELPEN OF HINDEREN
De casussen maken duidelijk dat, behalve de eigen strategieën, ook 
contextfactoren bijzonder relevant zijn voor de wijze waarop beleids-
ondernemers effectief (kunnen) zijn in het beïnvloeden van de agenda. 
Dit maakt dat beleidsondernemers goed op de hoogte dienen te zijn 
van de context waarbinnen zij opereren. Zo is het van belang om als 
beleidsondernemer te weten welke actoren al dan niet relevant zijn 
voor het behalen van doelstellingen. De Tweede Deltacommissie had 
bijvoorbeeld vroegtijdig aansluiting gezocht bij belangrijke en toon-
aangevende beleidsmedewerkers, politici, wetenschappers en experts 
die input konden geven voor het ontwikkelen van het eindrapport van 
de commissie. 
Vooral in de casussen over Almere en het windpark Noordoostpol-
der werd het belang van een multi-level aanpak duidelijk. Zo focuste 
wethouder Bijl van Almere op het creëren van draagvlak op lokaal en 
regionaal niveau terwijl zijn opvolger zijn aandacht vooral richtte op 
het nationale niveau. Een vergelijkbare verschuiving van focus was 
waar te nemen in de casus over het windpark Noordoostpolder waar-
bij de initiatiefnemers achtereenvolgens draagvlak probeerden te cre-
eren op lokaal, regionaal en nationaal overheidsniveau. 
Hoewel een beleidsondernemer niet primair te karakteriseren is 
door diens al dan niet formele positie in het beleidsvormingsproces 
betekent dit niet dat formele posities niet belangrijk zijn. Zo bleek dat 
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de wethouders van Almere als insiders veel eenvoudiger toegang had-
den tot het formele beleidsvormingsproces en daardoor gemakkelij-
ker in staat waren om te framen en te netwerken dan de outsiders uit 
oppositionele belangengroepen. Dit betekent echter niet dat formele 
posities per definitie voordelen opleveren of nodig zijn voor beleids-
ondernemers om plannen op de agenda te zetten. De beleidsonderne-
mers voor natuurontwikkeling waren, als beleidsmedewerkers bij het 
ministerie, juist beperkt in hun mogelijkheden. Zij werden binnen het 
departement tegengewerkt en zagen zich genoodzaakt om steun bui-
ten de overheid te zoeken. Daarnaast bleken de boeren uit de Noord-
oostpolder, aanvankelijk zonder formele toegang tot de politieke agen-
da, zeer goed in staat om het beleidsvormingsproces te beïnvloeden.
Andere contextfactoren die van belang waren, hebben te maken 
met–vanuit strategisch oogpunt–fortuinlijke externe ontwikkelingen. 
In de casus over natuurontwikkeling waren er de spontane ontwik-
keling van natuur in de Oostvaardersplassen, de EO Wijers stichting 
die een prijsvraag uitschreef en de bijna-overstromingen van de grote 
rivieren in 1993 en 1995, als opeenvolgende kansen om natuurontwik-
keling te agenderen. Naast deze helpende omstandigheden, waren 
er ook beperkende factoren in deze casus, zoals de wijziging in be-
leidsprioriteiten van het in 2010 aangestelde Kabinet Rutte-I. Mede 
door de economische crisis nam het politieke draagvlak voor groot-
schalige natuurontwikkeling en ecologische verbindingszones af. In 
de casus over de plannen van Almere hadden deze contextfactoren 
eveneens invloed op het succes van de beleidsondernemers omdat het 
politieke draagvlak afnam voor grootschalige investeringen in buiten-
dijkse bebouwing en voor een infrastructurele verbinding tussen Am-
sterdam en Almere. Dit laat onverlet dat beleidsondernemers zelf actie 
kunnen ondernemen en situaties naar hun hand kunnen zetten, zoals 
verscheidene beleidsondernemers hebben weten te doen.
Een van de belangrijkste contextfactoren bleek de rol van de over-
heidspartijen te zijn, en dan met name de nationale overheid. De hou-
ding van de overheid kan van groot of doorslaggevend belang zijn voor 
het welslagen van de strategieën van beleidsondernemers. Dit maakt 
dat beleidsondernemers er verstandig aan doen om hun aandacht in 
eerste instantie te richten op het beïnvloeden van de politieke agenda, 
en niet zozeer te starten met het trachten te beïnvloeden van de pu-
blieke en beleidsagenda. De besproken beleidsondernemers die daar 
goed mee zijn omgegaan zijn in elk geval succesvoller geweest in het 
op de agenda krijgen van hun plannen en ideeën dan zij die dat niet 
(effectief) deden. Het helderste voorbeeld hiervan leveren de initia-
tiefnemers van het windpark Noordoostpolder die, zoals aangegeven, 
op strategische wijze op politiek en bestuurlijk niveau lokaal, regionaal 
en nationaal draagvlak zochten en vonden. De tegenstanders die sterk 
hadden ingezet op het beïnvloeden van de publieke agenda, in de ver-
wachting dat dit ook de politiek onder druk zou zetten om beleid te 
veranderen, bleken uiteindelijk minder succesvol.
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5 COMBINEREN EN AFSTEMMEN VAN FRAMING- EN NETWERKSTRATEGIEËN
De casussen hebben bevestigd dat beleidsondernemers gebruik ma-
ken van de verscheidene framing- en netwerkstrategieën. Beleidson-
dernemers realiseren zich dat ze niet hun aandacht moeten vestigen 
op een enkele strategie, maar dat zij hun kansen moeten spreiden door 
de rijke variatie van framing- en netwerkstrategieën zo volledig moge-
lijk te benutten. Echter, het simpelweg benutten van zo veel mogelijk 
strategieën kan ook nadelig werken, zoals uit de empirische analyse is 
gebleken. Een belangrijke factor die de effectiviteit van de strategieën 
beïnvloedt betreft het op slimme en voor de omstandigheden geschik-
te wijze combineren en afstemmen van de framing- en netwerkstrate-
gieën. Hoe beter de beleidsondernemers daartoe in staat waren, des 
te effectiever hun strategieën waren. Dit betekent tevens dat beleids-
ondernemers er verstandig aan doen juist wel te focussen op enkele 
strategieën en die goed te combineren en op elkaar af te stemmen, in 
plaats van beroep te doen op een grote hoeveelheid strategieën. Een 
van de redenen dat de voorstanders van het windpark Noordoostpol-
der succesvoller waren dan hun tegenstanders is dat de voorstanders 
goed in staat waren om zich te richten op enkele zeer effectieve stra-
tegieën. De tegenstanders hebben geprobeerd zoveel mogelijk strate-
gieën te benutten, maar bleken niet in staat deze op effectieve wijze te 
combineren en af te stemmen. De voorstanders hadden bijvoorbeeld 
al in een vroeg stadium de steun weten te verkrijgen van overheidspar-
tijen terwijl de tegenstanders een moeizame relatie ontwikkelden met 
diezelfde overheidspartijen. De voorstanders wisten hun frame sterk 
af te bakenen terwijl de tegenstanders hun frame voortdurend hebben 
proberen uit te breiden. De strijd tegen het windpark Noordoostpolder 
begon vanuit de overtuiging dat het windpark niet in de Noordoost-
polder hoort en een negatieve invloed zou hebben op het culturele 
erfgoed van de gemeente Urk. Echter, binnen korte tijd werden daar 
uiteenlopende onderwerpen aan gekoppeld zoals de veronderstelde 
negatieve invloed van de windmolens op de gezondheid (waaronder 
geluidsoverlast, slagschaduw en knipperende verlichting op de wind-
molens), op de overlevingskans van vleermuizen en migrerende vogels, 
op de lokale economie, de veiligheid van de dijk, et cetera. Hoewel 
deze framing een positieve invloed had op het lokale draagvlak tegen 
het windpark, met name in de gemeente Urk, had dit mede tot gevolg 
dat overheidspartijen de tegenstanders minder serieus namen. Door 
de uitspraken van de Raad van State, in het voordeel van de voorstan-
ders van het windpark Noordoostpolder, bleken de argumenten van 
de tegenstanders in de meeste gevallen ook juridisch geen stand te 
houden. Het is daarom van groot belang dat beleidsondernemers hun 
framing- en netwerkstrategieën goed doordenken, combineren en af-
stemmen om effectief de agenda te beïnvloeden, en dan met name de 
politieke agenda.
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Tot besluit
Deze studie heeft inzicht verschaft in de wijze waarop beleidsonderne-
mers op strategische en effectieve wijze ideeën, visies en plannen op de 
agenda zetten. Graag moedig ik andere onderzoekers aan om de bevin-
dingen uit dit onderzoek nader te bestuderen en te vergelijken met ca-
sussen in andere landen en beleidscontexten. In dit onderzoek is uitslui-
tend gekeken naar de Nederlandse context, en dan ook nog in bepaalde 
beleidscontexten en casussen die gerelateerd zijn aan het IJsselmeer-
gebied. Ik ben er van overtuigd dat beleidsondernemers elders dezelfde 
type strategieën zullen benutten maar daar mogelijk wel anders invul-
ling en prioriteit aan geven doordat de contextfactoren verschillen.
Een andere vorm van vervolgonderzoek kan zijn om nader in te gaan 
op de rol van beleidsondernemers in verschillende fasen in het beleids-
vormingsproces. In dit onderzoek is voornamelijk gekeken naar de agen-
deringsfase, terwijl beleidsondernemers tevens actief zijn bij de selectie 
van alternatieven, de besluitvorming, de implementatie en de evaluatie. 
Hoewel fasen in het beleidsproces vaak niet goed zijn te scheiden, en 
er vaak overlap is, zou vervolgonderzoek kunnen aantonen dat andere 
type beleidsondernemers nodig zijn gedurende de verschillende fasen.
Tevens zou het interessant zijn om het relatieve belang van bepaalde 
persoonlijkheidskenmerken van beleidsondernemers verder te onder-
zoeken, zoals sociale vaardigheden en de mate van opportunisme, as-
sertiviteit, tegendraadsheid, competitiviteit, et cetera. In enkele casus-
sen kwam het belang van deze kenmerken terug terwijl deze bewust 
niet het onderwerp zijn geworden van nadere analyse. De reden daar-
voor was dat beleidsondernemers primair te typeren zijn op grond van 
wat zij doen, in plaats van wie zijn of welke formele positie zij bekleden. 
Dit laat onverlet dat in de wetenschappelijke literatuur wel bepaalde es-
sentiële persoonlijkheidskenmerken en capaciteiten van beleidsonder-
nemers worden genoemd maar, vaak gebaseerd op veronderstellingen 
en observaties, zelden systematisch worden uitgewerkt, geanalyseerd 
en getoetst. 
Tot slot wil ik graag nog de volgende nuancering aanbrengen. Be-
leidsprocessen kunnen chaotisch verlopen en diverse plotwendingen 
kennen. Daarnaast kunnen beleidsprocessen een gebed zonder eind 
worden als het bijvoorbeeld heel lang duurt voordat knopen worden 
doorgehakt. De kans blijft daardoor aanwezig dat wat in dit onderzoek 
als relatief succes wordt beschouwd later als een falen wordt gezien–en 
vice versa. Met name in de agenderingsfase, en zeker ook in de overige 
fasen van het beleidsproces, is nog van alles mogelijk. Het is dan ook 
nog maar de vraag of men over bijvoorbeeld tien jaar tot eenzelfde ana-
lyse en beoordeling van de behandelde beleidsondernemers zal komen 
als meer bekend is over het verdere verloop van het beleidsproces. In 
ieder geval heeft dit onderzoek laten zien dat door strategisch te hande-
len individuen en groepen een verschil kunnen maken en hun stempel 
kunnen drukken op het beleidsvormingsproces en het IJsselmeerge-
bied, al is dat wellicht maar op kleine schaal of van korte duur. 
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Leaving Your Mark:
Policy Entrepreneurs Setting the Agenda 
in the IJsselmeer Area
 
This book reports on Simon Verduijn’s (1985) PhD research 
on a variety of individuals who try to leave their mark on 
the IJsselmeer area, the Netherlands. These individuals are 
regarded as policy entrepreneurs: people that strategically 
employ framing and networking strategies to advocate 
or oppose policy change by setting the public, policy and 
political agendas. The book discusses relevant literature 
on policy entrepreneurship, framing and networking 
strategies, and agenda setting. The empirical research 
comprises an in-depth study of four cases, involving semi-
structured interviews, document study and newspaper 
article analysis.
The first case selected concerns the Second 
Delta Committee, which set the agenda for water 
safety and climate adaptation in the Dutch Delta, and 
recommended a substantial increase in the water level of 
the IJsselmeer. The second case concentrates on policy 
entrepreneurs who pushed for a change in Dutch nature 
policy, advocating a focus on nature development over 
nature preservation. The third case considers policy 
entrepreneurs’ support or opposition to plans to realise 
outer-dike urbanisation and build an infrastructural 
connection—either a bridge or tunnel—through the 
Markermeer-IJmeer. The final case looks at policy 
entrepreneurs who advocated or opposed plans to create 
large clusters of wind turbines close to the historical 
village of Urk.
The study reveals how policy entrepreneurs employ 
various framing and networking strategies, exploit the 
use of visualisations, frame issues at stake differently, and 
frame themselves and others. Insights are also offered 
into how policy entrepreneurs cope with the enabling 
and constraining factors of context, with their various 
strategies, resulting in successes as well as failures.
